prudent man upon inquiry in Montana

1991Certainly, constructive notice rises to the level of reasonable notice as required by Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co. (1933), 28 P.2d 187 , 95 Mont. 434 .

1991Certainly, constructive notice rises to the level of reasonable notice as required by Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co. (1933), 28 P.2d 187 , 95 Mont. 434 .

1969This test is stated in Brannon v. Lewis and Clark Cty., 143 Mont. 200, 205 , 387 P.2d 706, 709 , as, “Were the circumstances of the adverse possession sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry?” Defendants argue that they had neither actual nor constructive notice of the water line at the time they acquired the property.

1969This test is stated in Brannon v. Lewis and Clark Cty., 143 Mont. 200, 205 , 387 P.2d 706, 709 , as, “Were the circumstances of the adverse possession sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry?” Defendants argue that they had neither actual nor constructive notice of the water line at the time they acquired the property.

1947Section 8781, Bevised Codes, provides: “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself, in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such facts.” See Yale Oil Corporation v. Sedlacek, 99 Mont. 411 , 43 Pac. (2d) 887 ; Curtis v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., 108 Mont. 275 , 89 Pac. (2d) 1038, 1040 .

1947Section 8781, Bevised Codes, provides: “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself, in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such facts.” See Yale Oil Corporation v. Sedlacek, 99 Mont. 411 , 43 Pac. (2d) 887 ; Curtis v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., 108 Mont. 275 , 89 Pac. (2d) 1038, 1040 .

1943(Anthis v. Sandlin, 149 Okl. 126 , 299 Pac. 458 .) As noted above, plaintiffs affirmatively pleaded in their complaint that the contract was placed on record in 1931, and that the plaintiffs, as the purchaser’s personal representatives, were in possession of the land until ousted thereof by Luinstra in November, 1934; and their reply admits the defendant’s conveyance to the latter “as in * * * the defendant’s answer is alleged,” which was that the conveyance was only of defendant’s right, title and interest, and subject to the rights of the parties in possession.

1943(Anthis v. Sandlin, 149 Okl. 126 , 299 Pac. 458 .) As noted above, plaintiffs affirmatively pleaded in their complaint that the contract was placed on record in 1931, and that the plaintiffs, as the purchaser’s personal representatives, were in possession of the land until ousted thereof by Luinstra in November, 1934; and their reply admits the defendant’s conveyance to the latter “as in * * * the defendant’s answer is alleged,” which was that the conveyance was only of defendant’s right, title and interest, and subject to the rights of the parties in possession.

1939The language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Moelle v. Sherwood , 148 U.S. 21 , 13 Sup. Ct. 426 , 37 L.Ed. 350 , is pertinent: "Whether the grantee is to be treated as taking a mere speculative chance in the property or a clear title, must depend upon the character of the title the grantor had when he made the conveyance (by quitclaim deed); and the opportunities afforded the grantee of ascertaining this fact, and the diligence with which he has prosecuted them, will, besides the payment of a reasonable consideration, determine the bona fide nature of the transaction on his part."

1939The language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Moelle v. Sherwood , 148 U.S. 21 , 13 Sup. Ct. 426 , 37 L.Ed. 350 , is pertinent: "Whether the grantee is to be treated as taking a mere speculative chance in the property or a clear title, must depend upon the character of the title the grantor had when he made the conveyance (by quitclaim deed); and the opportunities afforded the grantee of ascertaining this fact, and the diligence with which he has prosecuted them, will, besides the payment of a reasonable consideration, determine the bona fide nature of the transaction on his part."

1939Constructive — which is imputed by law." Section 8781 provides: "Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself, in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such facts." The majority rule referred to in the majority opinion, as given in Phoenix Title Trust Co. v. Old Dominion Co. , 31 Ariz. 324 , 253 P. 435 , 59 A.L.R. 625, 632 , is to the effect that priority in recording of a quitclaim deed is not alone sufficient to defeat a subsequent bona fide

1939Constructive — which is imputed by law." Section 8781 provides: "Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact has constructive notice of the fact itself, in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such facts." The majority rule referred to in the majority opinion, as given in Phoenix Title Trust Co. v. Old Dominion Co. , 31 Ariz. 324 , 253 P. 435 , 59 A.L.R. 625, 632 , is to the effect that priority in recording of a quitclaim deed is not alone sufficient to defeat a subsequent bona fide

1935Codes 1921.) This rule embodies an old rule of chancery (Trerise v. Bottego, 32 Mont. *419 244, 79 Pac. 1057 , 108 Am.

1931(Angus v. Mariner, 85 Mont. 365 , 278 Pac. 996 .) Had it pursued reasonable inquiry, it would have discovered that the facts were as they are now shown to be, namely: that Hostetler never had any claim or interest in the check or the money represented by it, and that it in fact represented money belonging to plaintiff, and that the cheek was given to Hostetler without any consideration whatsoever.

1931(Angus v. Mariner, 85 Mont. 365 , 278 Pac. 996 .) Had it pursued reasonable inquiry, it would have discovered that the facts were as they are now shown to be, namely: that Hostetler never had any claim or interest in the check or the money represented by it, and that it in fact represented money belonging to plaintiff, and that the cheek was given to Hostetler without any consideration whatsoever.