fourth assignment error in North Carolina

1972In United States v. Wild, supra, color slides presenting a nude male, seated or lying facing the camera, holding or touching his erect penis, and slides depicting two nude males in the act of fellatio were held to be hard core pornography.

1971First, the defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by allowing Officer Phillips to testify over defendant’s objection that the defendant was “talking very loud and boisterous,” and “using very loud and boisterous language.” “An observer may testify to common appearances, facts and conditions in language which is descriptive of facts observed so as to enable one not an eyewitness to form an accurate judgment in regard thereto.” State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509 , 160 S.E. 2d 469 (1968).

1971First, the defendant contends the court committed prejudicial error by allowing Officer Phillips to testify over defendant’s objection that the defendant was “talking very loud and boisterous,” and “using very loud and boisterous language.” “An observer may testify to common appearances, facts and conditions in language which is descriptive of facts observed so as to enable one not an eyewitness to form an accurate judgment in regard thereto.” State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509 , 160 S.E. 2d 469 (1968).

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1956In the recent case of S. v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119 , 86 S.E. 2d 798 , Higgins, J., in speaking for the Court, said: “Granting or denying a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the presiding judge and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal, except for abuse of discretion or a showing the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial,” citing S. v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410 , 70 S.E. 2d 5 ; S. v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230 , 81 S.E. 2d 778 ; S. v. Culberson, 228 N.C. 615 , 46 S.E. 2d 647 ; S. v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497 , 50 S.E. 2d 520 .

1934The fourth assignment of error of plaintiff, sustained by the Forsyth County Court, and affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court, is as-follows: “Fourth exception — That the referee found as a conclusion of law that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of Maryland and, therefore, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as set out in the referee’s conclusion of law No. 2: Whereas, he should have found that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of North Carolina, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and that the laws of Maryland do not apply for the re

1934The fourth assignment of error of plaintiff, sustained by the Forsyth County Court, and affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court, is as-follows: “Fourth exception — That the referee found as a conclusion of law that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of Maryland and, therefore, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as set out in the referee’s conclusion of law No. 2: Whereas, he should have found that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of North Carolina, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and that the laws of Maryland do not apply for the re

1934The fourth assignment of error of plaintiff, sustained by the Forsyth County Court, and affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court, is as-follows: “Fourth exception — That the referee found as a conclusion of law that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of Maryland and, therefore, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as set out in the referee’s conclusion of law No. 2: Whereas, he should have found that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of North Carolina, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and that the laws of Maryland do not apply for the re

1934The fourth assignment of error of plaintiff, sustained by the Forsyth County Court, and affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court, is as-follows: “Fourth exception — That the referee found as a conclusion of law that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of Maryland and, therefore, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as set out in the referee’s conclusion of law No. 2: Whereas, he should have found that the contracts are governed by the laws of the State of North Carolina, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and that the laws of Maryland do not apply for the re

1934In Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N. C., 577 (596), we find: “In Trust Co. v. Lentz, 196 N. C., 398 (at page 406), 145 S. E., 776 , it is said: Tn view of the position taken by some of the parties that the judge was without authority to change the report of the referee — the reference being by consent — it is sufficient to say that, in a consent reference, as well as in a compulsory one, upon exceptions' duly filed, the judge of the Superior Court, in the exercise of his supervisory power and under the •statute, may affirm, modify, set aside, make additional findings, and confirm, in whole or in part,

1934In Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N. C., 577 (596), we find: “In Trust Co. v. Lentz, 196 N. C., 398 (at page 406), 145 S. E., 776 , it is said: Tn view of the position taken by some of the parties that the judge was without authority to change the report of the referee — the reference being by consent — it is sufficient to say that, in a consent reference, as well as in a compulsory one, upon exceptions' duly filed, the judge of the Superior Court, in the exercise of his supervisory power and under the •statute, may affirm, modify, set aside, make additional findings, and confirm, in whole or in part,

1934Therefore, when a contract is usurious by the law of the State wherein it was made, but not according to that of the State wherein it is to be performed, the parties will be presumed to have contracted with reference to the law of the latter State, and the contract will be upheld, subject to the conditions of good faith just set forth.” In Bundy v. Credit Co., 202 N. C., 604 (607), we find: “Bad faith cannot be defined with mathematical precision.

1934In Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N. C., 577 (596), we find: “In Trust Co. v. Lentz, 196 N. C., 398 (at page 406), 145 S. E., 776 , it is said: Tn view of the position taken by some of the parties that the judge was without authority to change the report of the referee — the reference being by consent — it is sufficient to say that, in a consent reference, as well as in a compulsory one, upon exceptions' duly filed, the judge of the Superior Court, in the exercise of his supervisory power and under the •statute, may affirm, modify, set aside, make additional findings, and confirm, in whole or in part,

1914The fourth assignment of error to the charge of the court, that if defendants fought willingly they cannot avail themselves of the principle of self-defense, is sufficiently answered in S. v. Garland, 138 N. C., 675 , by Justice Ilolce: “It is the law of this State that where a man provokes a fight by unlawfully assaulting another, and in the progress of the fight kills his adversary, he will be guilty of manslaughter at least, though at the precise time of the homicide it was necessary for the original assailant to kill in order to save his own life.

1910Craddock v. Banner, 142 N. C., 89 .

1895The fourth assignment of error is that his Honor erred in charging the jury “that a stipulation in a note or mortgage in the event of default of payment of the note and interest, and said note should have to be collected by foreclosure of mortgage or suit in court, an attorney’s fee should be due and payable by the mater of the note, in addition to the principal and interest, was evidence of the usurious nature of the transaction.” There was no error in this statement of the lawn In Tinsley v. Hoskins, 111 N. C., 340 , it is held that a stipulation in a note “that in case this note is collecte