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8 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 269 , 627 A. 2d 630, 647 (1993); In re Guarino, 104 N.J. 218, 229-32 , 516 A. 2d 1063 (1986). 2007See, e.g., State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 269 , 627 A. 2d 630, 647 (1993); In re Guarino, 104 N.J. 218, 229-32 , 516 A. 2d 1063 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonellogreen2 sentences2009See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 50-51 , 477 A. 2d 1224 (1984). [6] Therefore, we hold that Congress has not expressly preempted a state common law claim that would provide compensation based on a common law claim of employer negligence for the failure to verify the proper identity of a prospective employee. 2009See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 50-51 , 477 A. 2d 1224 (1984). [6] Therefore, we hold that Congress has not expressly preempted a state common law claim that would provide compensation based on a common law claim of employer negligence for the failure to verify the proper identity of a prospective employee. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010Thus, the Court interpreted the statutory language as preempting all state causes of action that created the possibility of “a jury determination that the FDA-approved labeling for a pacemaker violated a state common-law requirement for additional warnings.” Id. at 329 , 128 S.Ct. at 1011 , 169 L.Ed.2d at 906 . 2010Thus, the Court interpreted the statutory language as preempting all state causes of action that created the possibility of “a jury determination that the FDA-approved labeling for a pacemaker violated a state common-law requirement for additional warnings.” Id. at 329 , 128 S.Ct. at 1011 , 169 L.Ed.2d at 906 . | 2 | 2010–2012 |
Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings of Guarino
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 269 , 627 A. 2d 630, 647 (1993); In re Guarino, 104 N.J. 218, 229-32 , 516 A. 2d 1063 (1986). 2007See, e.g., State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 269 , 627 A. 2d 630, 647 (1993); In re Guarino, 104 N.J. 218, 229-32 , 516 A. 2d 1063 (1986). | 2 | 1993–2007 |
State v. Hartley
green
1 sentence2020This is because "the failure [to] scrupulously . . . honor an accused's previously-asserted right to silence amounts to a constitutional violation and a violation of the state common-law privilege against self-incrimination, and any inculpatory statement made in the absence of fresh warnings must be deemed to have been unconstitutionally and illegally obtained as a matter of law." Hartley, 103 N.J. at 271 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
green
2 sentences2012In Buckman, supra, 531 U.S. at 349 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. at 1018 n. 4, 148 L.Ed.2d at 862 n. 4, the Court held that state law claims brought by individuals based on intentional misrepresentations to the FDA during or after the PMA process are barred. 2012In Buckman, supra, 531 U.S. at 349 n. 4, 121 S.Ct. at 1018 n. 4, 148 L.Ed.2d at 862 n. 4, the Court held that state law claims brought by individuals based on intentional misrepresentations to the FDA during or after the PMA process are barred. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 491-502, 116 S.Ct. at 2253-58 , 135 L. 1998Id. at 491-502, 116 S.Ct. at 2253-58 , 135 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Michigan v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1986Contrary to Justice Handler’s assertion, post at 294, we do not blur “the distinctive lines between constitutional and non-constitutional violations.” We recognize those lines and grasp full well the distinction drawn by Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 483 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), between on the one hand police conduct that directly infringes on an accused’s right against compulsory self-incrimination, and on the other a violation only of the “prophy lactic rules developed to protect that right,” id. at 439, 94 S. Ct. at 2361 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 190 1986Contrary to Justice Handler’s assertion, post at 294, we do not blur “the distinctive lines between constitutional and non-constitutional violations.” We recognize those lines and grasp full well the distinction drawn by Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 483 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), between on the one hand police conduct that directly infringes on an accused’s right against compulsory self-incrimination, and on the other a violation only of the “prophy lactic rules developed to protect that right,” id. at 439, 94 S. Ct. at 2361 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 190 | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.