statutory right challenge in New Jersey

2018Cf. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). [ Tumpson , 218 N.J. at 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (second and third alterations in original).] We note the Supreme Court has recently refined the three-part test outlined in Tumpson to determine whether a statute confers substantive rights for the purpose of establishing a CRA claim, holding, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual; (2) whether the right "is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial c

2018Cf. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). [ Tumpson , 218 N.J. at 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (second and third alterations in original).] We note the Supreme Court has recently refined the three-part test outlined in Tumpson to determine whether a statute confers substantive rights for the purpose of establishing a CRA claim, holding, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual; (2) whether the right "is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial c

2018Cf. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). [ Tumpson , 218 N.J. at 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (second and third alterations in original).] We note the Supreme Court has recently refined the three-part test outlined in Tumpson to determine whether a statute confers substantive rights for the purpose of establishing a CRA claim, holding, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual; (2) whether the right "is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial c

2018Cf. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). [ Tumpson , 218 N.J. at 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (second and third alterations in original).] We note the Supreme Court has recently refined the three-part test outlined in Tumpson to determine whether a statute confers substantive rights for the purpose of establishing a CRA claim, holding, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual; (2) whether the right "is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial c

2018Cf. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). [ Tumpson , 218 N.J. at 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (second and third alterations in original).] We note the Supreme Court has recently refined the three-part test outlined in Tumpson to determine whether a statute confers substantive rights for the purpose of establishing a CRA claim, holding, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual; (2) whether the right "is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial c

2018Cf. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 , 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 , 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). [ Tumpson , 218 N.J. at 477 , 95 A.3d 210 (second and third alterations in original).] We note the Supreme Court has recently refined the three-part test outlined in Tumpson to determine whether a statute confers substantive rights for the purpose of establishing a CRA claim, holding, a court must determine: (1) whether, by enacting the statute, the Legislature intended to confer a right on an individual; (2) whether the right "is not so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial c

2025We recognize "[t]he doctrines of collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, res judicata, and the like serve the important policy goals of 'finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion[,] and uncertainty; and basic fairness.'" First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007) (quoting Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 (1980)).

2025We recognize "[t]he doctrines of collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, res judicata, and the like serve the important policy goals of 'finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion[,] and uncertainty; and basic fairness.'" First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007) (quoting Hackensack v. Winner, 82 N.J. 1, 32-33 (1980)).

2019However, "[f]ear of damage to one's recreational interest or generalized property rights shared with other property owners is insufficient to demonstrate a particularized property right or other special interest." Spalt[ v. DEP, 237 N.J.