statutory right privilege in California

1952Petitioner does not thereby show grounds for issuance of habeas corpus. [1] There is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to a hearing preceding revocation of probation. ( In re Davis, 37 Cal.2d 872, 873-874 [ 236 P.2d 579 ].) [2] If a hearing is held, it is not governed by the rules concerning formal criminal trials. [3] The court may revoke probation solely on the basis of the probation officer's report. ( In re Dearo, 96 Cal. App.2d 141, 143 [ 214 P.2d 585 ].) There is no right to present witnesses. ( People v. Hayden, 99 Cal. App.2d 97, 99 [ 221 P.2d 221 ].) [4] The constitutiona

1952Petitioner does not thereby show grounds for issuance of habeas corpus. [1] There is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to a hearing preceding revocation of probation. ( In re Davis, 37 Cal.2d 872, 873-874 [ 236 P.2d 579 ].) [2] If a hearing is held, it is not governed by the rules concerning formal criminal trials. [3] The court may revoke probation solely on the basis of the probation officer's report. ( In re Dearo, 96 Cal. App.2d 141, 143 [ 214 P.2d 585 ].) There is no right to present witnesses. ( People v. Hayden, 99 Cal. App.2d 97, 99 [ 221 P.2d 221 ].) [4] The constitutiona

1965Case No. 276368, [No. 10Í28] a violation, that will be a revocation of probation, and a concurrent sentence. ’ ’ Defendant’s contentions as to the lack of notice of hearing and right to a hearing as to the violation proceeding are answered by the established rule stated in In re Levi, 39 Cal.2d 41 at 44 [ 244 P.2d 403 ] : “There is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to a hearing preceding revocation of probation.

1965Case No. 276368, [No. 10Í28] a violation, that will be a revocation of probation, and a concurrent sentence. ’ ’ Defendant’s contentions as to the lack of notice of hearing and right to a hearing as to the violation proceeding are answered by the established rule stated in In re Levi, 39 Cal.2d 41 at 44 [ 244 P.2d 403 ] : “There is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to a hearing preceding revocation of probation.

2023(Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59 , 72 [“‘“‘Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are [forfeited] or abandoned.’”’”]; Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467 , 555 [same].) 32 central assertion of a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is that the employer’s motives for terminating the employee are so contrary to fundamental norms that the termination inflicted an injury sounding in tort.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 702 ; see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167,

2016(Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1104 ; see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 176 (Tameny).) Typically, the tort arises in circumstances where the employer retaliates against an employee who (1) refused to violate a statute; (2) performed a statutory obligation; (3) exercised a statutory right or privilege; or (4) reported an alleged violation of a statute of public importance.

1996For example, the wrongful termination action protects an employee’s rights to refuse to participate in illegal behavior, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, at pp. 1090-1091 and cases cited.) It also protects an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace (see, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]) and from employment discrimination based on pregnancy (Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1292-1296 [ 43

1996For example, the wrongful termination action protects an employee’s rights to refuse to participate in illegal behavior, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, at pp. 1090-1091 and cases cited.) It also protects an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace (see, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]) and from employment discrimination based on pregnancy (Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1292-1296 [ 43

1996For example, the wrongful termination action protects an employee’s rights to refuse to participate in illegal behavior, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, at pp. 1090-1091 and cases cited.) It also protects an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace (see, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]) and from employment discrimination based on pregnancy (Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1292-1296 [ 43

1996For example, the wrongful termination action protects an employee’s rights to refuse to participate in illegal behavior, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, at pp. 1090-1091 and cases cited.) It also protects an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace (see, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]) and from employment discrimination based on pregnancy (Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1292-1296 [ 43

1996For example, the wrongful termination action protects an employee’s rights to refuse to participate in illegal behavior, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, at pp. 1090-1091 and cases cited.) It also protects an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace (see, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]) and from employment discrimination based on pregnancy (Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1292-1296 [ 43

1996For example, the wrongful termination action protects an employee’s rights to refuse to participate in illegal behavior, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, at pp. 1090-1091 and cases cited.) It also protects an employee’s right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace (see, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130 , 801 P.2d 373 ]) and from employment discrimination based on pregnancy (Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1292-1296 [ 43

2016(Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090-1091 (Gantt).

1994(Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 .) Tort claims for wrongful discharge typically arise when an employer retaliates against an employee for “(1) refiising to violate a statute ...[,] (2) performing a statutory obligation ...[,] (3) exercising a statutory right or privilege. . . [, or] (4) reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1091-1092, fn. omitted.) Most of Turner’s complaints pertained to ABI’s alleged violations of its own internal practices or its collective bargaining agreements.

2021Division Seven, which decided Dueñas, has stated, “Consistent with Dueñas, a defendant must in the first instance contest in the trial court his or her ability to pay the fines, fees and assessments to be imposed. . . .” (People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490 ; see also People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96 (Kopp), [“It is the defendant who bears the burden of proving an inability to pay”], rev. granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)8 Appellant’s failure to object on the basis of Dueñas forfeited his challenge. 8In Kopp, the Supreme Court will consider two issues: “(1) Must a cou

2016Subdivision (a) provides that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.” Subdivision (b) identifies several types of proceedings “concerning the internal affairs of the trust.” On its face, section 17200 allows Bennett, as a vested beneficiary of the grandchildren’s trust, 4 to file a petition challenging the validity of the 2008 amendment. (§ 24, subd. (c); see Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 699 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In our view, the petition falls und

2016Subdivision (a) provides that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.” Subdivision (b) identifies several types of proceedings “concerning the internal affairs of the trust.” On its face, section 17200 allows Bennett, as a vested beneficiary of the grandchildren’s trust, 4 to file a petition challenging the validity of the 2008 amendment. (§ 24, subd. (c); see Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 699 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In our view, the petition falls und

2016Family Code section 3041.5 expressly grants a party the right to such a hearing, if requested. “ ‘[W]e apply the general rule “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” ’ ” (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 790 , 213 P.3d 125 ]; see People v. Montano (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 118, 122 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ].) We interpret the family court’s order in the context of the applicable statute, which we presume the family court was fully aware of and followed.

2016Family Code section 3041.5 expressly grants a party the right to such a hearing, if requested. “ ‘[W]e apply the general rule “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” ’ ” (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 790 , 213 P.3d 125 ]; see People v. Montano (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 118, 122 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ].) We interpret the family court’s order in the context of the applicable statute, which we presume the family court was fully aware of and followed.

2016Family Code section 3041.5 expressly grants a party the right to such a hearing, if requested. “ ‘[W]e apply the general rule “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” ’ ” (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 790 , 213 P.3d 125 ]; see People v. Montano (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 118, 122 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ].) We interpret the family court’s order in the context of the applicable statute, which we presume the family court was fully aware of and followed.

2016Family Code section 3041.5 expressly grants a party the right to such a hearing, if requested. “ ‘[W]e apply the general rule “that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” ’ ” (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 790 , 213 P.3d 125 ]; see People v. Montano (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 118, 122 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ].) We interpret the family court’s order in the context of the applicable statute, which we presume the family court was fully aware of and followed.

2015While the issue on appeal was simply whether the surety had a statutory right to a hearing on its extension motion, the court explained in a footnote in dicta that the “plain text” of section 1305.4 “clearly states that any extension runs from the date the court issues an order granting an extension.” In reaching this conclusion the court cited a nine-word paraphrase contained in People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th 653, 658 (American Contractors), “„[T]he trial court may . . . extend the period by no more than 180 days from the date the trial court orders the extens

2015American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 662-663, held the premature entry of summary judgment following a bail forfeiture renders the judgment voidable, not void.

2015While the issue on appeal was simply whether the surety had a statutory right to a hearing on its extension motion, the court explained in a footnote in dicta that the “plain text” of section 1305.4 “clearly states that any extension runs from the date the court issues an order granting an extension.” In reaching this conclusion the court cited a nine-word paraphrase contained in People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th 653, 658 (American Contractors), “„[T]he trial court may . . . extend the period by no more than 180 days from the date the trial court orders the extens

2013(Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College (7th Cir. 2005) 420 F.3d 712, 723-724 ; Colarossi v. Coty US, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153 ; cf. King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 [plaintiff's personal belief of retaliatory motive not enough to prove retaliatory motive]; Joaquin v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1226-1229 [employer's termination of plaintiff for falsely filing sexual harassment claim not sufficient proof of retaliation].) Wrongful Constructive Termination A wrongful constructive termination claim requires proof that (1) the

2013(Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1249, 1251-1252, 1256 ; Gibson v. ARO Corp. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1638, 1640 .) Beyond disputing that it did not retaliate, the County contends there was insufficient evidence of the last two elements.

2013(People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1180 [limiting restitution to the loss in value of returned stolen property]; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7 , 41–42 [limiting restitution based on the doctrine of comparative negligence]; People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1153, 1162 [denying restitution for receipt of stolen property because defendant was not responsible for the theft].) Once a victim makes a prima facie case for restitution, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the amount of loss claimed by the victim is some other value.

2013(Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1249, 1251-1252, 1256 ; Gibson v. ARO Corp. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1638, 1640 .) Beyond disputing that it did not retaliate, the County contends there was insufficient evidence of the last two elements.