as-applied proportionate penalties challenge in Illinois

2026Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 45 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 . ¶ 90 Although the record in this case contains more information regarding the defendant’s youth and background than others, including a psychological evaluation prepared in connection with the juvenile transfer proceedings, the record was not developed for purposes of litigating an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge.

2025Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 43 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 27 (“our supreme court has held that young adults may rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence”); see also e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to 15 No. 1-24-0953 his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 12

2025Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 43 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 27 (“our supreme court has held that young adults may rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence”); see also e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to 15 No. 1-24-0953 his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 12

2025“A defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where, among other circumstances, the penalty imposed is ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (quoting Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 338 ). ¶ 41 While petitioner can raise an as-applied proportionate penalties claim under Hilliard, he ultimately cannot succeed on his claim where his 40-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40 , and it was not “wholly disproportionate to the of

2025Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶¶ 11, 23, 27 . ¶ 37 Our supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s as-applied proportionate penalties claim, noting that his sentence was discretionary and that, even with the mandatory enhancement, the sentence was less than the defined de facto life sentence for juveniles as stated - 11 - No. 1-23-1152 in Buffer.

2025“A defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where, among other circumstances, the penalty imposed is ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (quoting Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 338 ). ¶ 41 While petitioner can raise an as-applied proportionate penalties claim under Hilliard, he ultimately cannot succeed on his claim where his 40-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40 , and it was not “wholly disproportionate to the of

2025Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 43 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 27 (“our supreme court has held that young adults may rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence”); see also e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to 15 No. 1-24-0953 his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 12

2025See e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (concluding that the 18-year- old defendant’s as-applied, youth-based proportionate penalties challenge to his 76-year sentence 10 Although our supreme court also initially held that Miller applied to discretionary life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , ¶ 40), it subsequently overruled that decision, concluding that it was at odds with t

2026Similarly, in People v. House, 2021 IL 125124 , the court acknowledged that a young adult offender may raise an as-applied proportionate penalties claim where the circumstances of the offender’s youth and development are demonstrated through an evidentiary record. ¶ 31 This court has also, in limited circumstances, allowed successive petitions raising emerging adult claims to proceed where the defendant presented new individualized evidence regarding youth-related characteristics.

2025Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 43 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 27 (“our supreme court has held that young adults may rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence”); see also e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to 15 No. 1-24-0953 his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 12

2021See also People v. Landerman, 2018 IL App (3d) 150684 (young adult offenders’ ineffective assistance claims premature where record undeveloped as to applicability of Miller); People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 57 (following Harris and finding that an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge was premature); People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (2d) 160650 (young adult offenders’ argument on appeal premature where record undeveloped as to applicability of Miller); but cf. People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B , ¶ 25, appeal allowed,- 140 N.E.3d 231 (Ill. 2020) (holding trial record

2020See also People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 57 (following Harris and finding that an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge was premature where (1) the defendant did not raise his claim in the trial court, (2) the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and (3) the trial court did not make findings of fact with respect to the issue).

2026In the supplemental briefing, Gates concedes the first fails after Spencer but insists on the second: “As Spencer makes clear, the fact that Gates’[s] sentence is not a de facto life sentence in no way prohibits him from raising an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge at a new sentencing hearing. *** [T]rial counsel was ineffective for not advocating for a lesser sentence under the proportionate penalties clause[.]” -6- ¶ 38 The State’s waiver argument collapses Gates’s two claims into one claim dependent on a de facto life sentence and labels Gates’s focus in the supplemental briefing

2025“A defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where, among other circumstances, the penalty imposed is ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (quoting Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 338 ). ¶ 41 While petitioner can raise an as-applied proportionate penalties claim under Hilliard, he ultimately cannot succeed on his claim where his 40-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40 , and it was not “wholly disproportionate to the of

2021See also People v. Landerman, 2018 IL App (3d) 150684 (young adult offenders’ ineffective assistance claims premature where record undeveloped as to applicability of Miller); People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 57 (following Harris and finding that an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge was premature); People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (2d) 160650 (young adult offenders’ argument on appeal premature where record undeveloped as to applicability of Miller); but cf. People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B , ¶ 25, appeal allowed,- 140 N.E.3d 231 (Ill. 2020) (holding trial record

2020See id., ¶¶ 46-48 (concluding that the record was insufficient to allow appellate review of the 18-year-old defendant's as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence under the proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, making the claim premature and more appropriate for another proceeding where evidence could be presented, such as a postconviction proceeding or proceeding pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)); People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (2d) 160650, ¶¶ 86-89 (declining to address an as- applied proportionate penalt

2023We have repeatedly found Illinois courts have been aware that “less than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they have insisted that sentences take into account that reality of human development.” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 93 (quoting Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 47 , citing People v. Maldonado, 240 Ill.

2023The court held that defendant failed to show cause, reaffirming its holding “in Dorsey that ‘Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause’ in a successive postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 92. ¶ 21 The Clark court found that the “same reasoning” in Dorsey applied to the 24-year-old defendant because, “[a]s is the case with juvenile offenders, Illinois courts were also aware that ‘less than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they have insisted that sentences t

2022In Davis, our supreme court found that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S 460 (2012) was such a development as the Miller decision announced a new substantive rule regarding how the eighth amendment applied to juveniles sentenced to mandatory prison terms of natural life without parole. 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39 .

2020See People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 ; People v. Warren, 2016 IL App (1st) 090884-C, ¶ 48 (cause-and-prejudice test satisfied where defendant brought an eighth amendment challenge to his sentence under Miller because the decision was not available for consideration in earlier postconviction proceedings). ¶ 22 Defendant’s motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition, alleging an as- applied proportionate penalties clause violation, should have been granted.

2026See People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541 .

2026See People v. Billups, 2016 IL App (1st) 134006, ¶ 16 . ¶ 60 With this in mind, we consider defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to his mandatory de facto life 19 sentence.

2025See People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000) (“A petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by rephrasing in constitutional terms issues which were previously addressed ***.”) -8- No. 1-24-1172 ¶ 24 Nevertheless, relying on People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682 , Reyes posits that the vast majority of the evidence supporting his proportionate penalties clause claim did not exist or was unavailable to him at the time of his sentencing or direct appeal, thereby overcoming any procedural hurdles.

2025See People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000) (“A petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Act by rephrasing in constitutional terms issues which were previously addressed ***.”) -8- No. 1-24-1172 ¶ 24 Nevertheless, relying on People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682 , Reyes posits that the vast majority of the evidence supporting his proportionate penalties clause claim did not exist or was unavailable to him at the time of his sentencing or direct appeal, thereby overcoming any procedural hurdles.

2025Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 43 ; Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 ; People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st) 201151, ¶ 27 (“our supreme court has held that young adults may rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] to support an as-applied challenge to a life sentence”); see also e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to 15 No. 1-24-0953 his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 12

2025See e.g., People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (holding that a 19-year-old defendant was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to his natural life sentence); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (concluding that the 18-year- old defendant’s as-applied, youth-based proportionate penalties challenge to his 76-year sentence 10 Although our supreme court also initially held that Miller applied to discretionary life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , ¶ 40), it subsequently overruled that decision, concluding that it was at odds with t

2025See People v. White, 2025 IL 129767, ¶ 43 (40-year sentence was proportionate to the offense, where the defendant was a 20- year-old adult offender who personally shot and killed an unarmed victim). ¶ 24 Citing People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002), defendant insists the trial court should have found an as-applied proportionate penalties violation here and then imposed a sentence below the statutory minimum on that basis.