forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in New Mexico

2007See Hallum, 606 *703 N.W.2d at 354-55 (discussing the difference between the two terms). {36} We note that in describing the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, Davis, cited to Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 172 , an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which required the prosecution to prove the defendant acted in order to procure the unavailability of a witness.

2007See Hallum, 606 N.W.2d at 354-55 (discussing the difference between the two terms). {36} We note that in describing the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, Davis cited to Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 172 , an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which required the prosecution to prove the defendant acted in order to procure the unavailability of a witness.

2007See also People v. Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d 335 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420, 433 (2005) (noting that except in situations in which the defendant is on trial for the murder of a witness whose testimony the prosecution wants to admit, a defendant's intent or motive is relevant in determining whether the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing applies).

2007See also People v. Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d 335 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420, 433 (2005) (noting that except in situations in which the defendant is on trial for the murder of a witness whose testimony the prosecution wants to admit, a defendant's intent or motive is relevant in determining whether the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing applies).

2004Under the facts of this case, what little the record reveals, we have no basis to infer anything about Defendant’s motive in absconding and remaining a fugitive, other than the self-evident fact that he fled from the likely consequences of a successful criminal prosecution. {14} One of the primary purposes of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule is “to deter criminals from intimidating or ‘taking care of potential witnesses.” United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir.2002).

2004Under the facts of this case, what little the record reveals, we have no basis to infer anything about Defendant's motive in absconding and remaining a fugitive, other than the self-evident fact that he fled from the likely consequences of a successful criminal prosecution. {14} One of the primary purposes of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule is "to deter criminals from intimidating or `taking care of' potential witnesses." United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir.2002).

2026Nor does Defendant challenge the district 10 court’s admission of this evidence pursuant to Rule 11-804(B)(5) NMRA— 11 sometimes called the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception 1—which provides a 12 hearsay exception for statements “offered against a party who wrongfully caused the 13 declarant’s unavailability.” Defendant only argues that the district court should have 14 excluded evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Rule 11-403 NMRA, 15 which provides that a court may exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its 16 probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .

2026Nor does Defendant challenge the district 10 court’s admission of this evidence pursuant to Rule 11-804(B)(5) NMRA— 11 sometimes called the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception 1—which provides a 12 hearsay exception for statements “offered against a party who wrongfully caused the 13 declarant’s unavailability.” Defendant only argues that the district court should have 14 excluded evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Rule 11-403 NMRA, 15 which provides that a court may exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its 16 probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .

2020See 2018-NMSC-010 , ¶ 27 (“Our Alvarez-Lopez and Romero analyses gained further support . . . when the United States Supreme Court recognized the common-law forfeiture exception’s codification in the federal rule and added that the constitutional confrontation right must apply as broadly as we had recognized in Romero.” (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 367 )). {26} The Maestas Court held that “wrongdoing, for the purposes of the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception, need not take the form of overt threat of harm; various forms of coercion, persuasion, and control may satisfy the requirement.” 2018-NM

2020People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Mich. 2013); see also Giles, 554 U.S. at 376 ; Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 23-28 , 331 Wis. 2d 440 , 794 N.W.2d 482 ; Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 102, ¶ 10 , 191 P.3d 963 (Wyo. 2008). {28} Rule 11-804(B)(5) provides that “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result” is “not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” We co

2020People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Mich. 2013); see also Giles, 554 U.S. at 376 ; Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 23-28 , 331 Wis. 2d 440 , 794 N.W.2d 482 ; Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 102, ¶ 10 , 191 P.3d 963 (Wyo. 2008). {28} Rule 11-804(B)(5) provides that “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result” is “not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” We co

2020People v. Burns, 832 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Mich. 2013); see also Giles, 554 U.S. at 376 ; Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 23-28 , 331 Wis. 2d 440 , 794 N.W.2d 482 ; Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 102, ¶ 10 , 191 P.3d 963 (Wyo. 2008). {28} Rule 11-804(B)(5) provides that “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result” is “not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” We co

2007See Hallum, 606 N.W.2d at 354-55 (discussing the difference between the two terms). {36} We note that in describing the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, Davis cited to Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 172 , an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which required the prosecution to prove the defendant acted in order to procure the unavailability of a witness.

2007See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___ , 126 S.Ct. at 2280 (indicating that both federal and state courts follow the practice of holding the prosecution to the standard of preponderance of the evidence).

2007See Davis, 547 U.S. at -, 126 S.Ct. at 2280 (indicating that both federal and state courts follow the practice of holding the prosecution to the standard of preponderance of the evidence).

2007See Romero, 2006-NMCA-045, ¶ 45 , 139 N.M. 386 , 133 P.3d 842 .

2007See Romero, 2006-NMCA-045, ¶ 45 , 139 N.M. 386 , 133 P.3d 842 .

2007See generally Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 370-71 (distinguishing the right secured by the Sixth Amendment and the protection of the rules of evidence).

2007See generally Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 370-71 (distinguishing the right secured by the Sixth Amendment and the protection of the rules of evidence).

2006Some courts, however, have referred to the doctrine in terms of "waiver." See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 963 (7th Cir.2002); State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609 , 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan.2004) ("[W]hen confrontation becomes impossible due to the actions of the very person who would assert the right, logic dictates that the right has been waived." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {31} The California Court of Appeal has explained the confusion caused by the use of these two terms as follows: We glean that the intent-to-silence element arises from the erroneous use of

2006Some courts, however, have referred to the doctrine in terms of "waiver." See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 963 (7th Cir.2002); State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609 , 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan.2004) ("[W]hen confrontation becomes impossible due to the actions of the very person who would assert the right, logic dictates that the right has been waived." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {31} The California Court of Appeal has explained the confusion caused by the use of these two terms as follows: We glean that the intent-to-silence element arises from the erroneous use of

2006It seems that the majority of courts have used the term "forfeiture." See, e.g., Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 168 ("Given the overwhelming precedential and policy support for its adoption, we recognize the `forfeiture by wrongdoing' doctrine in the Commonwealth."); Gonzalez, 155 S.W.3d at 609 ("[The defendant] forfeited his right of confrontation under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.").

2006It seems that the majority of courts have used the term “forfeiture.” See, e.g., Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 168 (“Given the overwhelming precedential and policy support for its adoption, we recognize the ‘forfeiture by wrongdoing’ doctrine in the Commonwealth.”); Gonzalez, 155 S.W.3d at 609 (“[The defendant] forfeited his right of confrontation under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.”).