forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in Illinois

2025People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 33 ; see People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 99 (2010) (holding that “so long as the declarant’s statements are relevant and otherwise admissible, statements admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine need not reflect additional indicia of reliability”).

2025People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 33 ; see People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 99 (2010) (holding that “so long as the declarant’s statements are relevant and otherwise admissible, statements admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine need not reflect additional indicia of reliability”).

2021Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 278 . “[W]hen a trial court makes a finding by a preponderance of the evidence, this court will reverse that finding only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.] A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39 . ¶ 83 The trial court admitted Teresa’s third statement of identification to Detective El-Amin under the for

2018See Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 93-99 (applying forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where the declarant was murdered by the defendant); Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 277-78 (remanding for hearing to determine whether, under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the defendant’s threats were intended to and did cause the child declarant to be legally unavailable to testify). ¶ 33 In contrast to the rule, section 115-10.6 of the Code applies exclusively to cases involving the declarant’s murder.

2023However, under the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).

2023However, under the common-law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to - 18 - No. 1-21-0797 confrontation.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).

2021Sidebar 228, 230-31 (2012) (discussing Giles). 2 ¶ 88 Because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is both an exception to the hearsay rule and extinguishes confrontation clause claims on equitable grounds (Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ; Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 ), we hold the trial court properly admitted all three of Teresa’s statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and there was no violation of defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. ¶ 89 CONCLUSION ¶ 90 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. ¶ 91 Affirmed. 2 “This

2021Sidebar 228, 230-31 (2012) (discussing Giles). 2 ¶ 88 Because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is both an exception to the hearsay rule and extinguishes confrontation clause claims on equitable grounds (Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ; Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 ), we hold the trial court properly admitted all three of Teresa’s statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and there was no violation of defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. ¶ 89 CONCLUSION ¶ 90 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. ¶ 91 Affirmed. 2 “This

2025Both the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the admission of the statements did not violate the confrontation clause “because Crawford recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing,” pursuant to which the defendant forfeited his right to confront and cross-examine the victim (declarant), having “committed the murder for which he was on trial, and because his intentional criminal act made [the victim] unavailable to testify.” Id. ¶ 79 The main issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, as const

2025Both the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the admission of the statements did not violate the confrontation clause “because Crawford recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing,” pursuant to which the defendant forfeited his right to confront and cross-examine the victim (declarant), having “committed the murder for which he was on trial, and because his intentional criminal act made [the victim] unavailable to testify.” Id. ¶ 79 The main issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, as const

2010App. 3d at 301 (“any conduct by an accused intended to render a witness against him unavailable to testify is wrongful and may result in forfeiture of the accused’s privilege to be confronted by that witness”); Edwards, 444 Mass, at 540-41, 830 N.E.2d at 171 (“[a] finding that a defendant somehow influenced a witness’s decision not to testify is not required to trigger the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where there is collusion in implementing that decision or planning for its implementation”); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 2000) (“it is the fact that a defen

2010App. 3d at 301 (“any conduct by an accused intended to render a witness against him unavailable to testify is wrongful and may result in forfeiture of the accused’s privilege to be confronted by that witness”); Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540-41 , 830 N.E.2d at 171 (“[a] finding that a defendant somehow influenced a witness’s decision not to testify is not required to trigger the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where there is collusion in implementing that decision or planning for its implementation); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 2000) (“it is the fact that a defen

2010App. 3d at 301 (“any conduct by an accused intended to render a witness against him unavailable to testify is wrongful and may result in forfeiture of the accused’s privilege to be confronted by that witness”); Edwards, 444 Mass, at 540-41, 830 N.E.2d at 171 (“[a] finding that a defendant somehow influenced a witness’s decision not to testify is not required to trigger the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where there is collusion in implementing that decision or planning for its implementation”); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 2000) (“it is the fact that a defen

2010App. 3d at 301 (“any conduct by an accused intended to render a witness against him unavailable to testify is wrongful and may result in forfeiture of the accused’s privilege to be confronted by that witness”); Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540-41 , 830 N.E.2d at 171 (“[a] finding that a defendant somehow influenced a witness’s decision not to testify is not required to trigger the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where there is collusion in implementing that decision or planning for its implementation); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 2000) (“it is the fact that a defen

2023People v. Nixon, 2016 IL App (2d) 130514, ¶ 48 . ¶ 72 Our supreme court has held that “a defendant forfeits his ability to challenge the reliability of the declarant’s statements by the very act of preventing the declarant from testifying,” such that “requiring additional indicia of reliability would undermine the equitable considerations at the very center of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 33 .

2020See also People v. Nixon, 2016 IL App (2d) 130514, ¶ 48 (under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, a defendant who causes the absence of a witness by wrongdoing, forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation).

2010Ed. at 244, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 ; see also In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 42 , 902 N.E.2d 600 (2008) (“[t]he doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may not be employed to deny an accused his confrontation right absent evidence that, when committing the crime or other wrongdoing, the accused was motivated by the desire to prevent the witness from testifying against him at trial”).

2010Ed. at 244, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 ; see also In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 42 , 902 N.E.2d 600 (2008) (“[t]he doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may not be employed to deny an accused his confrontation right absent evidence that, when committing the crime or other wrongdoing, the accused was motivated by the desire to prevent the witness from testifying against him at trial”).

2018See State v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231, 237 (Or. 2014) (forfeiture doctrine applied although the evidence permitted a finding that defendant had - 12 - more than one purpose in killing his wife); People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“That defendant may have also had other motives for the killing (e.g., retribution for infidelity) does not preclude application of the [forfeiture] exception.”).4 ¶ 52 Turning to defendant’s intent as to Stacy, the State’s theory is that defendant murdered Stacy to prevent her from reporting to police defendant’s involvement in Kathleen

2018See State v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231, 237 (Or. 2014) (forfeiture doctrine applied although the evidence permitted a finding that defendant had more than one purpose in killing his wife); People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“That defendant may have also had other motives for the killing (e.g., retribution for infidelity) does not preclude application of the [forfeiture] exception.”). 4 ¶ 52 Turning to defendant’s intent as to Stacy, the State’s theory is that defendant murdered Stacy to prevent her from reporting to police defendant’s involvement in Kathleen’s mur

2018See People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 13 ; People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 394 (1995). ¶ 37 The State’s burden of proof at a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.

2018See People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 13 ; People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 394 (1995). ¶ 37 The State’s burden of proof at a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.

2018See State v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231, 237 (Or. 2014) (forfeiture doctrine applied although the evidence permitted a finding that defendant had - 12 - more than one purpose in killing his wife); People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“That defendant may have also had other motives for the killing (e.g., retribution for infidelity) does not preclude application of the [forfeiture] exception.”).4 ¶ 52 Turning to defendant’s intent as to Stacy, the State’s theory is that defendant murdered Stacy to prevent her from reporting to police defendant’s involvement in Kathleen

2018See State v. Supanchick, 323 P.3d 231, 237 (Or. 2014) (forfeiture doctrine applied although the evidence permitted a finding that defendant had more than one purpose in killing his wife); People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“That defendant may have also had other motives for the killing (e.g., retribution for infidelity) does not preclude application of the [forfeiture] exception.”). 4 ¶ 52 Turning to defendant’s intent as to Stacy, the State’s theory is that defendant murdered Stacy to prevent her from reporting to police defendant’s involvement in Kathleen’s mur

2018See People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 13 ; People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 394 (1995). ¶ 37 The State’s burden of proof at a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.

2018See People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 13 ; People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 394 (1995). ¶ 37 The State’s burden of proof at a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.

2025See Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350 ; Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39 . ¶ 93 As a final observation, we disagree with defendant’s contention that the trial court believed he was “ ‘just a bad guy who got out of control and killed his girlfriend’ ” and “ ‘not to prevent her from doing anything’ ” such that the State did not prove his intent to murder Lewis for the purpose of preventing her testimony (or reporting to police).

2018Admission is dependent on whether the trial court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the witness’s unavailability. “[W]hen a trial court makes a finding by a preponderance of the evidence, this court will reverse that finding only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 348-49 (2006).

2011Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d at 345 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 ; see also People v. Hampton, 363 Ill.App.3d 293, 301 , 299 Ill.Dec. 772 , 842 N.E.2d 1124 (2005) (accepting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine), vacated in part on other grounds, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007). ¶ 107 In fact, our supreme court declined to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as early as 1856 ( Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 427-28 (1856)), despite its English common law roots dating back to 1666 (see Lord Morley's Case, 6 How.

2011Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d at 345 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 ; see also People v. Hampton, 363 Ill.App.3d 293, 301 , 299 Ill.Dec. 772 , 842 N.E.2d 1124 (2005) (accepting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine), vacated in part on other grounds, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007). ¶ 107 In fact, our supreme court declined to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as early as 1856 ( Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 427-28 (1856)), despite its English common law roots dating back to 1666 (see Lord Morley's Case, 6 How.

2026See People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39 (applying the manifest weight standard to the trial court’s admission of hearsay evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine).

2025People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 33 ; see People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 99 (2010) (holding that “so long as the declarant’s statements are relevant and otherwise admissible, statements admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine need not reflect additional indicia of reliability”).

2018The Illinois Supreme Court has explained “that a defendant forfeits his ability to challenge the reliability of the declarant’s statements by the very act of preventing the declarant from testifying,” and “requiring additional indicia of reliability would undermine the equitable considerations at the very center of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.” Id. ¶ 33 (citing Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 98 ).

2018The Illinois Supreme Court has explained "that a defendant forfeits his ability to challenge the reliability of the declarant's statements by the very act of preventing the declarant from testifying," and "requiring additional indicia of reliability would undermine the equitable considerations at the very center of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine." Id. ¶ 33 (citing Hanson , 238 Ill. 2d at 98 , 345 Ill.Dec. 395 , 939 N.E.2d 238 ).

2019See People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 64 ; Nixon, 2016 IL App (2d) 130514, ¶ 50 . ¶ 80 After reviewing the record in this case, we cannot say that defendant's sixth amendment right to confront Harris was violated, because the trial court correctly determined that Harris's videotaped statement to ASA Coakley was admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. ¶ 81 Without mention of Terry's statements, which we will discuss below, we believe that the State established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant engaged in and acquiesced in conduct that was intended to, and did, p

2018Jan. 1, 2011); People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534 , ¶ 66 n.1 (acknowledging that Illinois Rules of Evidence codified the preexisting common-law rules of evidence); People v. Nixon, 2016 IL App (2d) 130514, ¶ 49 (“Illinois Rules of Evidence codified the existing rules of evidence in this state, including the common-law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing”).

2018"A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented." People v. Deleon , 227 Ill. 2d 322 , 332, 317 Ill.Dec. 843 , 882 N.E.2d 999 (2008). ¶ 54 Based on our review of the evidence, we find the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's wrongful communications with Ghorley caused her to be unavailable so as to render her statements admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to defendant's right of confrontation. ¶

2018The trial court’s finding as to defendant’s intent was not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” DeLeon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332 . ¶ 76 In sum, we find no error in the admission of Kathleen’s and Stacy’s hearsay statements at trial pursuant to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. ¶ 77 II.

2012Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369 . ¶ 19 The circuit court denied the State’s motion in limine to admit 8 of the 14 hearsay statements under the common law doctrine because it believed that section 115-10.6 of the Code codified, and therefore supplanted, the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

2011Williams, 188 Ill.2d at 369 , 242 Ill.Dec. 260 , 721 N.E.2d 539 . ¶ 99 At the heart of the circuit court's July 6 order was its belief that section 115-10.6 of the Code codified, and therefore supplanted, the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

2011Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d at 345 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 ; see also People v. Hampton, 363 Ill.App.3d 293, 301 , 299 Ill.Dec. 772 , 842 N.E.2d 1124 (2005) (accepting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine), vacated in part on other grounds, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007). ¶ 107 In fact, our supreme court declined to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as early as 1856 ( Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 427-28 (1856)), despite its English common law roots dating back to 1666 (see Lord Morley's Case, 6 How.

2011Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d at 345 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 ; see also People v. Hampton, 363 Ill.App.3d 293, 301 , 299 Ill.Dec. 772 , 842 N.E.2d 1124 (2005) (accepting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine), vacated in part on other grounds, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007). ¶ 107 In fact, our supreme court declined to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as early as 1856 ( Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 427-28 (1856)), despite its English common law roots dating back to 1666 (see Lord Morley's Case, 6 How.

2011Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d at 345 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 ; see also People v. Hampton, 363 Ill.App.3d 293, 301 , 299 Ill.Dec. 772 , 842 N.E.2d 1124 (2005) (accepting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine), vacated in part on other grounds, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007). ¶ 107 In fact, our supreme court declined to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as early as 1856 ( Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 427-28 (1856)), despite its English common law roots dating back to 1666 (see Lord Morley's Case, 6 How.

2011Melchor, 362 Ill.App.3d at 345 , 299 Ill.Dec. 8 , 841 N.E.2d 420 ; see also People v. Hampton, 363 Ill.App.3d 293, 301 , 299 Ill.Dec. 772 , 842 N.E.2d 1124 (2005) (accepting the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine), vacated in part on other grounds, 225 Ill.2d 238 , 310 Ill.Dec. 906 , 867 N.E.2d 957 (2007). ¶ 107 In fact, our supreme court declined to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as early as 1856 ( Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 427-28 (1856)), despite its English common law roots dating back to 1666 (see Lord Morley's Case, 6 How.