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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025Under this doctrine, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.” Davis v. Washington, 547 US 813, 833 (2006). 2016This doctrine holds that “one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the right to confrontation.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 833 ( 126 SCt 2266 , 165 LE2d 224) (2006). | 2 | 2 |
Hendrix v. Stategreen2 sentences2023In its response brief, the State contends that “the sentence may need to be vacated and the case remanded to correct a merger issue,” alleging that the 25 It appears the trial court based its ruling in part on evidence presented at or before the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, suggesting that Mahogany had his mother contact Brooks about his appearance in court. 26 Welch v. State, 309 Ga. 875, 879 (2) ( 848 SE2d 846 ) (2020). 27 See id., citing Hendrix v. State, 303 Ga. 525, 529 (2) ( 813 SE2d 339 ) (2018) (holding that even if trial court erred by admitting testimony pursuant to the fo 2023In its response brief, the State contends that “the sentence may need to be vacated and the case remanded to correct a merger issue,” alleging that the 25 It appears the trial court based its ruling in part on evidence presented at or before the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, suggesting that Mahogany had his mother contact Brooks about his appearance in court. 26 Welch v. State, 309 Ga. 875, 879 (2) ( 848 SE2d 846 ) (2020). 27 See id., citing Hendrix v. State, 303 Ga. 525, 529 (2) ( 813 SE2d 339 ) (2018) (holding that even if trial court erred by admitting testimony pursuant to the fo | 2 | 2 |
Hickman v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Hickman v. State, 299 Ga. 267, 272 (4) ( 787 SE2d 700 ) (2016) (citing OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5)). 2017See Hickman v. State, 299 Ga. 267, 272 (4) ( 787 SE2d 700 ) (2016) (citing OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5)). | 2 | 2 |
Welch v. Stategreen2 sentences2023In its response brief, the State contends that “the sentence may need to be vacated and the case remanded to correct a merger issue,” alleging that the 25 It appears the trial court based its ruling in part on evidence presented at or before the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, suggesting that Mahogany had his mother contact Brooks about his appearance in court. 26 Welch v. State, 309 Ga. 875, 879 (2) ( 848 SE2d 846 ) (2020). 27 See id., citing Hendrix v. State, 303 Ga. 525, 529 (2) ( 813 SE2d 339 ) (2018) (holding that even if trial court erred by admitting testimony pursuant to the fo 2023In its response brief, the State contends that “the sentence may need to be vacated and the case remanded to correct a merger issue,” alleging that the 25 It appears the trial court based its ruling in part on evidence presented at or before the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, suggesting that Mahogany had his mother contact Brooks about his appearance in court. 26 Welch v. State, 309 Ga. 875, 879 (2) ( 848 SE2d 846 ) (2020). 27 See id., citing Hendrix v. State, 303 Ga. 525, 529 (2) ( 813 SE2d 339 ) (2018) (holding that even if trial court erred by admitting testimony pursuant to the fo | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedingsgreen2 sentences2020See Anderson v. State, 258 Ga. 70, 73 (11) ( 365 SE2d 421 ) (1988); In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga. App. 349, 351 (3) ( 333 SE2d 389 ) (1985) (“An individual has no constitutional right to appear before the grand jury to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)). 2020See Anderson v. State, 258 Ga. 70, 73 (11) ( 365 SE2d 421 ) (1988); In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga. App. 349, 351 (3) ( 333 SE2d 389 ) (1985) (“An individual has no constitutional right to appear before the grand jury to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jackie McLeodgreen1 sentence2020Because there is no causal connection between Agee’s alleged wrongdoing and Sargent’s unavailability at trial, the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception does not apply.8 See Greene v. State, 303 Ga. 184, 186 (2) ( 811 SE2d 333 ) (2018) (under the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception, a trial court may admit statements “against the party who caused the victim’s absence” (emphasis supplied)); United States v. McLeod, 53 F3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (“A 8 Although Agee’s conduct may have caused Sargent to be unavailable to testify before a grand jury in 1993, she had no right to confront and cross- | 1 | 1 |
Greene v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Because there is no causal connection between Agee’s alleged wrongdoing and Sargent’s unavailability at trial, the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception does not apply.8 See Greene v. State, 303 Ga. 184, 186 (2) ( 811 SE2d 333 ) (2018) (under the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception, a trial court may admit statements “against the party who caused the victim’s absence” (emphasis supplied)); United States v. McLeod, 53 F3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (“A 8 Although Agee’s conduct may have caused Sargent to be unavailable to testify before a grand jury in 1993, she had no right to confront and cross- 2020Because there is no causal connection between Agee’s alleged wrongdoing and Sargent’s unavailability at trial, the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception does not apply.8 See Greene v. State, 303 Ga. 184, 186 (2) ( 811 SE2d 333 ) (2018) (under the forfeiture-by- wrongdoing exception, a trial court may admit statements “against the party who caused the victim’s absence” (emphasis supplied)); United States v. McLeod, 53 F3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (“A 8 Although Agee’s conduct may have caused Sargent to be unavailable to testify before a grand jury in 1993, she had no right to confront and cross- | 1 | 1 |
Tyner v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Tyner v. State, 305 Ga. 326, 330-331 (3) ( 825 SE2d 129 ) (2019). 3. 2020See, e.g., Tyner v. State, 305 Ga. 326, 330-331 (3) ( 825 SE2d 129 ) (2019). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Anderson v. State, 258 Ga. 70, 73 (11) ( 365 SE2d 421 ) (1988); In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga. App. 349, 351 (3) ( 333 SE2d 389 ) (1985) (“An individual has no constitutional right to appear before the grand jury to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)). 2020See Anderson v. State, 258 Ga. 70, 73 (11) ( 365 SE2d 421 ) (1988); In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga. App. 349, 351 (3) ( 333 SE2d 389 ) (1985) (“An individual has no constitutional right to appear before the grand jury to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)). | 1 | 1 |
Reynolds v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi 2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Steven David Montaguegreen1 sentence2014Brittain’s case was tried in 2011, prior to the effective date of Georgia’s new evidence code.30 But assuming, without deciding, that the trial court admitted testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine31 and that the prior evidence code would not have permitted admission of 29 See United States v. Montague, 421 F3d 1099, 1104 (II) (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that trial court’s determination as to applicability of forfeiture-by- wrongdoing doctrine was not clearly erroneous). 30 See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101 (explaining that the provisions of Georgia’s new | 1 | 1 |
Giles v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi 2014Nor does he contend that trial counsel was ineffective in so stipulating. 16 554 U.S. 353 ( 128 SCt 2678 , 171 LE2d 488) (2008). 11 wrongdoing permits the introduction of statements made by a witness who has been “‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.”17 Indeed, Justice Scalia—after briefly describing the founding-era history of this doctrine—succinctly explained in Giles that “[t]he terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifyi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jason Andrew Lopez v. State
green
1 sentence2023At no point did Williams testify in the presence of the jury regarding Mahogany’s Facebook posts. 24 See OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5), providing that “[a] statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness” “shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable to testify as a witness.” See also Lopez v. State, 355 Ga. App. 319 , 320-322 ( 844 SE2d 195 ) (2020) (affirming admission of statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule). 11 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Malcolm v. State
green
2 sentences2018However, with respect to the felony murder counts, these counts were actually “vacated by operation of law” rather than “merged” with malice murder counts for sentencing purposes (see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (4) ( 434 SE2d 479 ) (1993)), which does not affect the sentence imposed, erred in allowing certain statements of one of the deceased victims, Dowdy, to be admitted into evidence at trial under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay (see OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5) of Georgia’s new Evidence Code); and that the State improperly introduced fabricated evidence to 2018However, with respect to the felony murder counts, these counts were actually “vacated by operation of law” rather than “merged” with malice murder counts for sentencing purposes (see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (4) ( 434 SE2d 479 ) (1993)), which does not affect the sentence imposed, erred in allowing certain statements of one of the deceased victims, Dowdy, to be admitted into evidence at trial under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay (see OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5) of Georgia’s new Evidence Code); and that the State improperly introduced fabricated evidence to | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.