8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carrillo v. Rostrogreen2 sentences2001Thus, a pretrial order denying qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because it “implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614 , 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (holding that denial of summary judgment based solely on existence of genuine issues of material fact is not sub 2001Thus, a pretrial order denying qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because it “implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614 , 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (holding that denial of summary judgment based solely on existence of genuine issues of material fact is not sub | 3 | 3 |
King v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2007On the same day, this Court also filed King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2004-NMCA-031, ¶¶ 13, 16-18 , 135 N.M. 206 , 86 P.3d 631 , holding that orders compelling discovery cannot be reviewed by writ of error under Rule 12-503 NMRA. 2007On the same day, this Court also filed King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2004-NMCA-031, ¶¶ 13, 16-18 , 135 N.M. 206 , 86 P.3d 631 , holding that orders compelling discovery cannot be reviewed by writ of error under Rule 12-503 NMRA. | 2 | 2 |
Durrett v. Petritsisgreen2 sentences2008Our appellate rules permit a damages award pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 39-3-27 (1966), “if it is determined that the appeal is frivolous, not in good faith, or merely for purposes of delay, if requested in the briefs or by motion filed within ten (10) days of entry of disposition!)]” Rule 12-403(B)(4) NMRA; see also Durrett v. Petritsis, 82 N.M. 1, 4 , 474 P.2d 487, 490 (1970) (holding, on a petition for damages for taking an appeal alleged to have been taken solely for the purpose of delay and to cause further expense, that “[although we have found the appeal to lack merit, it does not follow th 2008Our appellate rules permit a damages award pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 39-3-27 (1966), “if it is determined that the appeal is frivolous, not in good faith, or merely for purposes of delay, if requested in the briefs or by motion filed within ten (10) days of entry of disposition!)]” Rule 12-403(B)(4) NMRA; see also Durrett v. Petritsis, 82 N.M. 1, 4 , 474 P.2d 487, 490 (1970) (holding, on a petition for damages for taking an appeal alleged to have been taken solely for the purpose of delay and to cause further expense, that “[although we have found the appeal to lack merit, it does not follow th | 1 | 1 |
Knippel v. Northern Communications, Inc.green2 sentences1999See Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614-19 , 845 P.2d 130, 137-42 (1992) (explaining the use of a writ of error as the proper procedure for reviewing collateral orders such as orders denying qualified immunity); see also Knippel v. Northern Communications, Inc., 97 N.M. 401, 402 , 640 P.2d 507, 508 (Ct.App.1982) (noting that motions to dismiss are treated as motions for summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are considered). 1999See Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614-19 , 845 P.2d 130, 137-42 (1992) (explaining the use of a writ of error as the proper procedure for reviewing collateral orders such as orders denying qualified immunity); see also Knippel v. Northern Communications, Inc., 97 N.M. 401, 402 , 640 P.2d 507, 508 (Ct.App.1982) (noting that motions to dismiss are treated as motions for summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are considered). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pincheira v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2007The writ was quashed in a formal opinion filed on January 30, 2004, Pincheira v. Allstate Insurance Co. (Pincheira I), 2004-NMCA-030, ¶ 7 , 135 N.M. 220 , 86 P.3d 645 , wherein this Court determined that the petition for writ of error was untimely filed. 2007The writ was quashed in a formal opinion filed on January 30, 2004, Pincheira v. Allstate Insurance Co. (Pincheira I), 2004-NMCA-030, ¶ 7 , 135 N.M. 220 , 86 P.3d 645 , wherein this Court determined that the petition for writ of error was untimely filed. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Mitchell v. Forsyth
green
2 sentences2001Thus, a pretrial order denying qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because it “implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614 , 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (holding that denial of summary judgment based solely on existence of genuine issues of material fact is not sub 2001Thus, a pretrial order denying qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because it “implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614 , 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (holding that denial of summary judgment based solely on existence of genuine issues of material fact is not sub | 2 | 1999–2001 |
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. 89 v. State Pub. Educ. Dep't
green
1 sentence2018Zuni 1, 2012-NMCA-048 , ¶ 2. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Handmaker v. Henney
green
2 sentences2016Accordingly, review is allowed under the 10 collateral order doctrine only when three requirements are satisfied: “(1) the order 11 must finally determine the disputed question; (2) it must concern an issue that is 12 entirely separate from the merits of the claim; and (3) there must be no effective 13 remedy by appeal.” Handmaker v. Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, ¶ 9 , 128 N.M. 328 , 992 14 P.2d 879 ; accord Rule 12-503(E)(2). 2016Accordingly, review is allowed under the 10 collateral order doctrine only when three requirements are satisfied: “(1) the order 11 must finally determine the disputed question; (2) it must concern an issue that is 12 entirely separate from the merits of the claim; and (3) there must be no effective 13 remedy by appeal.” Handmaker v. Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, ¶ 9 , 128 N.M. 328 , 992 14 P.2d 879 ; accord Rule 12-503(E)(2). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Williams v. Rio Rancho Public Schools
green
2 sentences2016Sch., 2008-NMCA-150, ¶6 , 145 N.M. 214 , 195 P.3d 879 ,(noting that 5 rather than appealing directly from the order in question, a petition for writ of error 6 was filed). 7 {10} Secondly, the collateral order doctrine is a disfavored doctrine, and its 8 application has been severely limited to prevent piecemeal appeals becoming routine. 9 See Williams, 2008-NMCA-150, ¶ 7 . 2016Sch., 2008-NMCA-150, ¶6 , 145 N.M. 214 , 195 P.3d 879 ,(noting that 5 rather than appealing directly from the order in question, a petition for writ of error 6 was filed). 7 {10} Secondly, the collateral order doctrine is a disfavored doctrine, and its 8 application has been severely limited to prevent piecemeal appeals becoming routine. 9 See Williams, 2008-NMCA-150, ¶ 7 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Johnson v. Jones
green
2 sentences2001Thus, a pretrial order denying qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because it “implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614 , 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (holding that denial of summary judgment based solely on existence of genuine issues of material fact is not sub 2001Thus, a pretrial order denying qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because it “implicates rights that will be irretrievably lost, absent immediate review and regardless of the outcome of an appeal from the final judgment.” Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 614 , 845 P.2d 130, 137 (1992); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (holding that denial of summary judgment based solely on existence of genuine issues of material fact is not sub | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cockrell v. Board of Regents of New Mexico State University
green
2 sentences1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill 1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Siegert v. Gilley
green
2 sentences1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill 1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Behrens v. Pelletier
green
2 sentences1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill 1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill 1999See Carrillo, 114 N.M. at 616-19 , 845 P.2d at 139-42 ; Cockrell, 1999-NMCA-073, ¶ 2 , 127 N.M. 478 , 983 P.2d 427 . {13} Moreover, “Harlow and Mitchell make clear that the [qualified immunity] defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely to avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters as discovery.’ ” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 ). “‘Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.’” Siegert v. Gill | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.