petition for writ error in Texas

2009In Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15 (Tex.App.--Tyler 2000, pet. denied), the jury failed to award any attorney’s fees in a breach of contract action in spite of testimony that a reasonable fee would be one-third of the damages recovered.

2002In Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15 (Tex.App.--Tyler 2000, pet. denied), the jury failed to award any attorney's fees in a breach of contract action in spite of testimony that a reasonable fee would be one-third of the damages recovered.

2017Saun- [***LEdHR2A] We granted certiorari to consider the ders v. Reynolds, supra. petitioner's claim that under In re Winship, supra, a fed- The petition for writ of error alleged that "the eral habeas corpus court must [*313] consider not trial Court erred in finding the Petitioner guilty of whether there was any evidence to support a state-court first-degree murder in light of the evidence in- conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to troduced on behalf of the Commonwealth, and on justify a rational trier of the facts to find guilt beyond a unwarranted inferences drawn from th

2015The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment.[6] The court noted that a dissent from the denial of certiorari in a case in this Court had exposed the question whether the constitutional rule of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , might compel a new criterion by which the validity of a state criminal conviction must be tested in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.

2015A petition for writ of error to the Virginia Supreme Court on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction was denied.[4] Page 312 The petitioner then commenced this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, raising the same basic claim.[5] Applying the "no evidence" criterion of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , the District Court found the record devoid of evidence of premeditation, and granted the writ.

2015A petition for writ of error to the Virginia Supreme Court on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction was denied. [Footnote 4] Page 443 U. S. 312 The petitioner then commenced this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, raising the same basic claim. [Footnote 5] Applying the "no evidence" criterion of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 , the District Court found the record devoid of evidence of premeditation, and granted the writ.

2006This is so even though the mandate has not issued in the case and there is a petition for writ of error pending." In re Bohart , 743 F.2d at 321 .

2006This is so even though the mandate has not issued in the case and there is a petition for writ of error pending.” In re Bohart, 743 F.2d at 321 .

1988Roe v. Doe, 607 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Civ.App.— Eastland 1980, no writ); Hillson Steel Products, Inc. v. Wirth, Ltd., 538 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). *231 In her first point of error, Vicki contends that the trial court erred in asserting jurisdiction to grant a default judgment against a non-resident parent when the resident parent failed to plead, prove, or comply with the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 11.51-11.75 (Vernon 1986), on jurisdiction and notice.

1985Hillson Steel Products, Inc. v. Wirth, Ltd., 538 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).

1988Wall, 630 S.W.2d at 495 .

1985Wall v. Wall, 630 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.App. — Ft.

1981Nutter v. Phares, 523 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1975, writ ref d n. r. e.).

1975Nutter v. Phares, 523 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

1965Continental Gin Co. v. Thorndale Mercantile Co., Tex.Com.App., 254 S.W. 939 ; Rittenberry v. Capitol Hotel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 69 S.W.2d 491 (Writ Ref.). ****** For the purposes here involved the judgment in question became final when it was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and the time for filing a motion for rehearing had expired.” We hold that a judgment of conviction for the offense of driving an automobile on a public highway while intoxicated which has been appealed becomes final when the appeal is finally determined by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

1957Continental Gin Co. v. Thorndale Mercantile Co., Tex.Com.App., 254 S.W. 939 ; Rittenberry v. Capitol Hotel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 69 S.W.2d 491 (Writ Ref.).

1965Continental Gin Co. v. Thorndale Mercantile Co., Tex.Com.App., 254 S.W. 939 ; Rittenberry v. Capitol Hotel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 69 S.W.2d 491 (Writ Ref.). ****** For the purposes here involved the judgment in question became final when it was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals and the time for filing a motion for rehearing had expired.” We hold that a judgment of conviction for the offense of driving an automobile on a public highway while intoxicated which has been appealed becomes final when the appeal is finally determined by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

1957Continental Gin Co. v. Thorndale Mercantile Co., Tex.Com.App., 254 S.W. 939 ; Rittenberry v. Capitol Hotel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 69 S.W.2d 491 (Writ Ref.).

1957In Texas Company v. Charles Clark & Co., 112 Tex. 74 , 244 S. W. 995 , our Supreme Court held that there was no distinction, relative to the question here presented, between a refusal and a dismissal of a petition for writ of error.

1957In Texas Company v. Charles Clark & Co., 112 Tex. 74 , 244 S. W. 995 , our Supreme Court held that there was no distinction, relative to the question here presented, between a refusal and a dismissal of a petition for writ of error.

1940In the case of Long v. Martin, 112 Tex. 365 , 247 S.W. 827 , the Supreme Court had under consideration the language of Revised Statutes, art. 1742, wherein it was provided that a petition for writ of error to the Supreme Court “shall be filed with the clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals within thirty days from the overruling of the motion for rehearing.” It was there held that the time for filing the petition began to run from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment overruling the motion for. rehearing and not from the time the order evidencing the same was entered in the Minutes.

1940In the case of Long v. Martin, 112 Tex. 365 , 247 S.W. 827 , the Supreme Court had under consideration the language of Revised Statutes, art. 1742, wherein it was provided that a petition for writ of error to the Supreme Court “shall be filed with the clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals within thirty days from the overruling of the motion for rehearing.” It was there held that the time for filing the petition began to run from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment overruling the motion for. rehearing and not from the time the order evidencing the same was entered in the Minutes.

1937In the recent case of Texas Power & Light Company v. Hilltop Baking Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 78 S.W.(2d) 718 , a like question was involved, and the dismissal of the petition for writ of error necessarily constituted an approval of the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals on the question of limitation.

1937In the recent case of Texas Power & Light Company v. Hilltop Baking Co., 78 S. W. (2d) 718 , a like question was involved, and the dismissal of the petition for writ of error necessarily constituted an approval of the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals on the question of limitation.

1931See “Oil & Gas”, pp. 541-544), in which it was said: “While disapproving so much of the opinion of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals ([Stephenson v. Glass] 276 S. W. 1110 ) as holds that the conveyance of the 20 acres passed an undivided interest in the royalty on the entire 884 acres of land, and as holds that there is any conflict between the cited cases decided by the Commission of Appeals, we refuse this petition for writ of error because proper effect was given to the repudiation of the lessees’ obligations under the original lease.” We will not burden this opinion with an analysis of

1926While disapproving so much of the opinion of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals ( 276 S. W. 1110 ) as holds that the conveyance of the 20 acres passed an undivided interest in the royalty on the entire 884 acres of land, and as holds that there is any conflict between the cited cases decided by the Commission of Appeals, we refuse this petition for writ of error because proper effect was given to the repudiation of the lessees’ obligations under the original lease.

1925Henningsmeyer v. Bank, 109 Texas, 116 , 195 S. W., 1137 , 201 S. W., 652 ; Vinson v. Carter, 106 Texas, 273 , 166 S. W., 363 ; Smith v. Patton, 241 S. W., 109 . -It folloAvs that the petition for writ of error, filed May 5, 1924, should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and it is so ordered.

1922See Vinson v. Carter, 106 Tex. 273 , 166 S. W. 363 ; Henningsmeyer v. Bank, 109 Tex. 116 , 195 S. W. 1137 , 201 S. W. 652 .

1925Hinn v. Gallagher, 114 Texas, 322 , 268 S. W., 132 ; Magouirk v. Williams, 249 S. W., 185 ; Izaguirre v. Evans, 249 S. W., 187 ; Perkins v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 249 S. W., 186 .

1925Hinn v. Gallagher, 114 Tex. -, 268 S. W. 132 ; Magouirk v. Williams (Tex. Com.

1925Henningsmeyer v. Bank, 109 Texas, 116 , 195 S. W., 1137 , 201 S. W., 652 ; Vinson v. Carter, 106 Texas, 273 , 166 S. W., 363 ; Smith v. Patton, 241 S. W., 109 . -It folloAvs that the petition for writ of error, filed May 5, 1924, should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and it is so ordered.

1925Henningsmeyer v. Bank, 109 Texas, 116 , 195 S. W., 1137 , 201 S. W., 652 ; Vinson v. Carter, 106 Texas, 273 , 166 S. W., 363 ; Smith v. Patton, 241 S. W., 109 . -It folloAvs that the petition for writ of error, filed May 5, 1924, should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and it is so ordered.

1925This was, in effect, ruled in the case of Knox v. McElroy [ 103 Tex. 357 ] 127 S. W. 798 , where it was held thatr where the Court of Civil Appeals had stricken out the statement of facts, and thereupon affirmed the judgment, and thereafter rescinded its order striking out such statement, and decided the case on the merits, with the same result, assignments, to be reviewa,ble, must be raised by motion for rehearing in the Court of Civil Appeals.” This decision and tbe one cited are conclusive against our authority to consider tbe question presented.

1925This was, in effect, ruled in the case of Knox v. McElroy [ 103 Tex. 357 ] 127 S. W. 798 , where it was held thatr where the Court of Civil Appeals had stricken out the statement of facts, and thereupon affirmed the judgment, and thereafter rescinded its order striking out such statement, and decided the case on the merits, with the same result, assignments, to be reviewa,ble, must be raised by motion for rehearing in the Court of Civil Appeals.” This decision and tbe one cited are conclusive against our authority to consider tbe question presented.