tribal sovereign immunity in New Mexico

2016We consider the 5 arguments made by Hamaatsa to be based upon inferences too tenuous to apply in the 6 instant case and to further conflate the doctrines of sovereign authority and sovereign 7 immunity. 8 {33} In TTEA the Fifth Circuit concluded that since Kiowa involved a contracts 9 action for money damages, its broad approval of the doctrine of tribal sovereign 10 immunity in that case ought be relegated to its facts. 181 F.3d at 680-81 .

2013In TTEA, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity should not extend further than the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and noted that “[s]tate sovereign immunity does notpreclude declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials.” TTEA, 181 F.3d at 680 .

2013I also disagree with Hamaatsa’s argument that Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 , supports a conclusion that property held in fee simple is subject to local authority, including enforcement, because Sherrill likewise dealt with tribal sovereign authority, not tribal sovereign immunity.

2013I also disagree with Hamaatsa’s argument that Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 , supports a conclusion that property held in fee simple is subject to local authority, including enforcement, because Sherrill likewise dealt with tribal sovereign authority, not tribal sovereign immunity.

2013In Rem Proceedings and Tribal Sovereign Immunity Oneida I The Pueblo cites Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County (Oneida I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d by 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (Oneida II), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Madison County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,__U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam), for the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity bars an in rem proceeding when an Indian tribe owns the property that is the subject of the proceeding.

2013In Rem Proceedings and Tribal Sovereign Immunity Oneida I {41} The Pueblo cites Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County (Oneida I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d by 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (Oneida II), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Madison County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam), for the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity bars an in rem proceeding when an Indian tribe owns the property that is the subject of the proceeding.

2013Yakima Hamaatsa argues that a determination that the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine applies to proceedings in rem conflicts with the United States Supreme Court decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation (Yakima), 502 U.S. 251 (1992).

2013Yakima {46} Hamaatsa argues that a determination that the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine applies to proceedings in rem conflicts with the United States Supreme Court decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation (Yakima), 502 U.S. 251 (1992).

2013The court cited Yakima for the proposition that courts “have recognized distinctions in application of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity based upon the in rem or in personam nature of the proceedings.” Cass Cnty., 2002 ND 83, ¶ 13 .

2013The court cited Yakima for the proposition that courts “have recognized distinctions in application of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity based upon the in rem or in personam nature of the proceedings.” Cass Cnty., 2002 ND 83, ¶ 13 .

2013It held that, regardless, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), controlled the issue of declaratory and injunctive relief.

2013It held that, regardless, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), controlled the issue of declaratory and injunctive relief.

2013In Rem Proceedings and Tribal Sovereign Immunity Oneida I The Pueblo cites Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County (Oneida I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d by 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (Oneida II), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Madison County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,__U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam), for the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity bars an in rem proceeding when an Indian tribe owns the property that is the subject of the proceeding.

2013In Rem Proceedings and Tribal Sovereign Immunity Oneida I {41} The Pueblo cites Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County (Oneida I), 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d by 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (Oneida II), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Madison County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (per curiam), for the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity bars an in rem proceeding when an Indian tribe owns the property that is the subject of the proceeding.

2016The Fifth 11 Circuit relied on this logic once again in Comstock Oil & Gas, refusing to apply tribal 12 sovereign immunity as a bar to actions brought for declaratory or injunctive relief. 13 261 F.3d at 572 .

2011This Court rejected that 19 argument and held, “[t]he principle espoused in Kiowa . . . instructs our determination 5 1 that, absent an express waiver of immunity from suit, the WCA does not have 2 jurisdiction to hear [w]orker’s claim.” Antonio, 2010-NMCA-077, ¶ 13 .

2011This Court rejected that 19 argument and held, “[t]he principle espoused in Kiowa . . . instructs our determination 5 1 that, absent an express waiver of immunity from suit, the WCA does not have 2 jurisdiction to hear [w]orker’s claim.” Antonio, 2010-NMCA-077, ¶ 13 .

2010The first of these two claims is premised on Armijo’s unsupported assertion that “there is no conceivable legitimate government purpose for perpetuation of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, and [its] application results in deprivation of constitutional rights.” This contention ignores the fact that “tribal sovereign immunity [i]s a legitimate legal doctrine of significant historical pedigree.” Hoffman v. Sandia Resort & Casino, 2010-NMCA-034, 116 , 148 N.M. 222 , 232 P.3d 901 . {23} The second argument appears to be a general objection to the very concept of tribal sovereign immunity.

2010The first of these two claims is premised on Armijo’s unsupported assertion that “there is no conceivable legitimate government purpose for perpetuation of the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, and [its] application results in deprivation of constitutional rights.” This contention ignores the fact that “tribal sovereign immunity [i]s a legitimate legal doctrine of significant historical pedigree.” Hoffman v. Sandia Resort & Casino, 2010-NMCA-034, 116 , 148 N.M. 222 , 232 P.3d 901 . {23} The second argument appears to be a general objection to the very concept of tribal sovereign immunity.

2010Padilla, 107 N.M. at 179-80 , 754 P.2d at 850 - 9 51.

2010Id. 12 Plaintiffs argue that if this Court chooses to recognize the doctrine of tribal sovereign 13 immunity, Kiowa reversed Padillaonly insofar as Kiowa dealt with contract cases. 14 We do not agree.

2010See Kiowa Tribe 6 of Okla., 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 7 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 7 , 132 N.M. 207 , 46 P.3d 668 .

2010See Kiowa Tribe 6 of Okla., 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 7 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 7 , 132 N.M. 207 , 46 P.3d 668 .

2010We similarly apply a de novo standard to “the legal question 3 1 of whether an Indian tribe, or an entity under the tribe’s control, possesses sovereign 2 immunity.” Sanchez v. Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc., 2005-NMCA-003, ¶ 4 , 136 N.M. 3 682 , 104 P.3d 548 . 4 Tribal Sovereign Immunity 5 The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is well-established.

2010We similarly apply a de novo standard to “the legal question 3 1 of whether an Indian tribe, or an entity under the tribe’s control, possesses sovereign 2 immunity.” Sanchez v. Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc., 2005-NMCA-003, ¶ 4 , 136 N.M. 3 682 , 104 P.3d 548 . 4 Tribal Sovereign Immunity 5 The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is well-established.