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8 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 2016–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carter v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The appellate-counsel claim fails on the prejudice prong of Strickland because there is no reasonable probability that this omitted issue would have had success on appeal, see Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980 , 998, 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113-14 (1996) (explaining Strickland prejudice in context of appellate-counsel claim), given trial counsel's representation that the issue had been resolved informally and that there was no objection to granting the motion to quash, see Carter, 121 Nev. at 769 , 121 P.3d at 599 ("A party who participates in an alleged error is estopped from raising any objection on a 2018The appellate-counsel claim fails on the prejudice prong of Strickland because there is no reasonable probability that this omitted issue would have had success on appeal, see Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980 , 998, 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113-14 (1996) (explaining Strickland prejudice in context of appellate-counsel claim), given trial counsel's representation that the issue had been resolved informally and that there was no objection to granting the motion to quash, see Carter, 121 Nev. at 769 , 121 P.3d at 599 ("A party who participates in an alleged error is estopped from raising any objection on a | 5 | 5 |
Kirksey v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The appellate-counsel claim fails on the prejudice prong of Strickland because there is no reasonable probability that this omitted issue would have had success on appeal, see Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980 , 998, 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113-14 (1996) (explaining Strickland prejudice in context of appellate-counsel claim), given trial counsel's representation that the issue had been resolved informally and that there was no objection to granting the motion to quash, see Carter, 121 Nev. at 769 , 121 P.3d at 599 ("A party who participates in an alleged error is estopped from raising any objection on a 2018The appellate-counsel claim fails on the prejudice prong of Strickland because there is no reasonable probability that this omitted issue would have had success on appeal, see Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980 , 998, 923 P.2d 1102 , 1113-14 (1996) (explaining Strickland prejudice in context of appellate-counsel claim), given trial counsel's representation that the issue had been resolved informally and that there was no objection to granting the motion to quash, see Carter, 121 Nev. at 769 , 121 P.3d at 599 ("A party who participates in an alleged error is estopped from raising any objection on a | 4 | 5 |
Sherman v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Because we have repeatedly upheld these instructions, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 994 P.2d 700, 712 (2000) (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction where trial court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1208 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) SUPREME COURT OF NEVAPA 12 (0) 1947A AF2±1t. (upholding definition of malice referring to "heart fatally bent on mischief'), postconviction 2017Because we have repeatedly upheld these instructions, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 994 P.2d 700, 712 (2000) (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction where trial court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1208 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) SUPREME COURT OF NEVAPA 12 (0) 1947A AF2±1t. (upholding definition of malice referring to "heart fatally bent on mischief'), postconviction | 2 | 2 |
Leonard v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Because we have repeatedly upheld these instructions, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 994 P.2d 700, 712 (2000) (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction where trial court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1208 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) SUPREME COURT OF NEVAPA 12 (0) 1947A AF2±1t. (upholding definition of malice referring to "heart fatally bent on mischief'), postconviction 2017Because we have repeatedly upheld these instructions, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 994 P.2d 700, 712 (2000) (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction where trial court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1208 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) SUPREME COURT OF NEVAPA 12 (0) 1947A AF2±1t. (upholding definition of malice referring to "heart fatally bent on mischief'), postconviction | 2 | 2 |
Byford v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Because we have repeatedly upheld these instructions, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 994 P.2d 700, 712 (2000) (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction where trial court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1208 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) SUPREME COURT OF NEVAPA 12 (0) 1947A AF2±1t. (upholding definition of malice referring to "heart fatally bent on mischief'), postconviction 2016Because this court had repeatedly upheld those instructions, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 994 P.2d 700, 712 (2000) (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1011 , 965 P.2d 903, 912 (1998) (upholding anti-sympathy instruction where trial court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (upholding equal and exact justice instruction), appellate counsel's failure to challenge the instructions did not fall below an obj | 2 | 2 |
Pellegrini v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883 , 34 P.3d 519, 535 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084 , 1097 n.12 (2018). 2024Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883 , 34 P.3d 519, 535 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084 , 1097 n.12 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Statered2 sentences2016Second, Weber asserts that appellate counsel should have argued that the torture aggravating circumstance failed to sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty because it SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 24 (L)) 1947A e "overlapped with the definition of 'murder by torture." In Hernandez v. State, this court held "the definition of torture murder performs a constitutionally satisfactory narrowing function" and therefore the State is allowed to charge first-degree murder by torture and allege an aggravating circumstance based on the same act or acts of torture. 124 Nev. 97 2016Second, Weber asserts that appellate counsel should have argued that the torture aggravating circumstance failed to sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty because it SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 24 (L)) 1947A e "overlapped with the definition of 'murder by torture." In Hernandez v. State, this court held "the definition of torture murder performs a constitutionally satisfactory narrowing function" and therefore the State is allowed to charge first-degree murder by torture and allege an aggravating circumstance based on the same act or acts of torture. 124 Nev. 97 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rippo v. State
green
1 sentence2024Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883 , 34 P.3d 519, 535 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084 , 1097 n.12 (2018). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.