accuracy of the known standard in New York

2020The opinion testimony by these experts was inadmissible, because the People failed to lay a foundation for the competence of the testimony. "[A]n expert who tests a substance for the presence of cocaine may not rely solely upon a test involving a comparison of the substance at issue to a known standard when the accuracy of the known standard is not established" ( People v Burnett , 245 AD2d 460, 460 ; see People v De La Rosa , 162 AD2d 698, 698 ).

2011Contrary to the defendant’s contention, opinion testimony by the People’s expert that the substance recovered by the police was cocaine was admissible and, thus, the evidence was not legally insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt. “[A]n expert who tests a substance for the presence of cocaine may not rely solely upon a test involving a comparison of the substance at issue to a known standard when the accuracy of the known standard is not established” (People v Burnett, 245 AD2d 460 [1997]; see People v De La Rosa, 162 AD2d 698 [1990]).

2009Contrary to defendant’s assertion, it was not necessary for the expert to establish the accuracy of the known standard she employed in one of three separate tests of the seized substances because she also performed two other tests which did not require comparison with an established standard (see People v Plummer, 24 AD3d 1027, 1029 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 837 [2006]; People v Lopez, 266 AD2d 735, 738 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 922 [2000]).

2005Thus, we conclude that defendant was afforded meaningful representation (see People v Miller, 13 AD3d 890, 892 [2004]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 804, 806-807 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 636 [2004]; People v McDonald, 255 AD2d 688, 688-689 [1998]).

1999Although failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that the substance was a controlled substance (see, People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668, 668-669 ), opinion evidence, however, is nonetheless admissible where additional tests were performed that did not require comparison with a known standard (see, People v Castle, 251 AD2d 891 , lv denied 92 NY2d 923 ; People v Fallen, 249 AD2d 771, 772 , lv denied 92 NY2d 879 ).

1999Although failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that the substance was a controlled substance (see, People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668, 668-669 ), opinion evidence, however, is nonetheless admissible where additional tests were performed that did not require comparison with a known standard (see, People v Castle, 251 AD2d 891 , lv denied 92 NY2d 923 ; People v Fallen, 249 AD2d 771, 772 , lv denied 92 NY2d 879 ).

1999Although failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that the substance was a controlled substance (see, People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668, 668-669 ), opinion evidence, however, is nonetheless admissible where additional tests were performed that did not require comparison with a known standard (see, People v Castle, 251 AD2d 891 , lv denied 92 NY2d 923 ; People v Fallen, 249 AD2d 771, 772 , lv denied 92 NY2d 879 ).

1999Although failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that the substance was a controlled substance (see, People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668, 668-669 ), opinion evidence, however, is nonetheless admissible where additional tests were performed that did not require comparison with a known standard (see, People v Castle, 251 AD2d 891 , lv denied 92 NY2d 923 ; People v Fallen, 249 AD2d 771, 772 , lv denied 92 NY2d 879 ).

1999Although failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that the substance was a controlled substance (see, People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668, 668-669 ), opinion evidence, however, is nonetheless admissible where additional tests were performed that did not require comparison with a known standard (see, People v Castle, 251 AD2d 891 , lv denied 92 NY2d 923 ; People v Fallen, 249 AD2d 771, 772 , lv denied 92 NY2d 879 ).

1999Although failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm means that a proper foundation was not laid for the expert testimony that the substance was a controlled substance (see, People v Miller, 57 AD2d 668, 668-669 ), opinion evidence, however, is nonetheless admissible where additional tests were performed that did not require comparison with a known standard (see, People v Castle, 251 AD2d 891 , lv denied 92 NY2d 923 ; People v Fallen, 249 AD2d 771, 772 , lv denied 92 NY2d 879 ).

1998Because the expert’s opinion was premised in part on a test that did not employ a known standard, i.e., the Duquenois-Levine color test, the testimony identifying the substance as marihuana was admissible (see, People v Rotundo, 194 AD2d 943, 946 , lv denied 82 NY2d 726 ).

1997It is well settled that an expert who tests a substance for the presence of cocaine may not rely solely upon a test involving a comparison of the substance at issue to a known standard when the accuracy of the known standard is not established (see, People v De La Rosa, 162 AD2d 698 ; People v Flores, 138 AD2d 512 ).

1997However, when the expert’s opinion testimony that the substance contained cocaine is not based solely upon comparative tests using known standards but also on a series of other tests not involving known standards, a comparison test may then be relied upon by the expert (see, People v De La Rosa, supra; People v Flores, supra).

1993While the People’s failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm would require the conclusion—if that were the only test performed— that a proper foundation had not been laid for the expert’s opinion as to the nature of the substance, where as here the expert’s testimony was premised in part on tests which do not employ a known standard, the testimony identifying the substance as marihuana was admissible (see, People v De La Rosa, 162 AD2d 698 ; People v Hushie, 145 AD2d 506, 507 , lv denied 73 NY2d 922 ; see also, People v Bolling, 166 AD2d 203 , mod on other grou

1993While the People’s failure to establish the accuracy of the known standard as a reliable norm would require the conclusion—if that were the only test performed— that a proper foundation had not been laid for the expert’s opinion as to the nature of the substance, where as here the expert’s testimony was premised in part on tests which do not employ a known standard, the testimony identifying the substance as marihuana was admissible (see, People v De La Rosa, 162 AD2d 698 ; People v Hushie, 145 AD2d 506, 507 , lv denied 73 NY2d 922 ; see also, People v Bolling, 166 AD2d 203 , mod on other grou