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8 New York opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mossgreen2 sentences2025The plaintiff appeals. "'The doctrine of the law of the case seeks to prevent litigation of issues of law that have already been determined at an earlier stage of the proceeding'" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Moss , 186 AD3d 1753, 1753 , quoting Brownrigg v New York City Hous. 2025The plaintiff appeals. "'The doctrine of the law of the case seeks to prevent litigation of issues of law that have already been determined at an earlier stage of the proceeding'" ( U.S. Bank N.A. v Moss , 186 AD3d 1753, 1753, quoting Brownrigg v New York City Hous. | 1 | 1 |
Citimortgage, Inc. v. Piercegreen2 sentences2025Here, the determination in the order dated October 20, 2022, from which the plaintiff did not appeal, that the ELRAC defendants were shielded from vicarious liability by the Graves Amendment was the law of the case ( see Citimortgage, Inc. v Pierce , 203 AD3d 878, 880 ). 2025Here, the determination in the order dated October 20, 2022, from which the plaintiff did not appeal, that the ELRAC defendants were shielded from vicarious liability by the Graves Amendment was the law of the case ( see Citimortgage, Inc. v Pierce , 203 AD3d 878, 880). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Simpson v. Cyriusgreen2 sentences2025Although this Court is not bound by the law of the case doctrine and may make its own determination ( see Irizarry v Rosselli , 229 AD3d 778 , 780; Vehifax Corp. v Georgilis , 205 AD3d 973 , 975-976), under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the plaintiff's contentions regarding the ELRAC defendants' entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them on the merits ( see Matter of Simpson v Cyrius , 220 AD3d 708, 709 ; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v North Shore Signature Homes, Inc. , 125 AD3 2025Although this Court is not bound by the law of the case doctrine and may make its own determination ( see Irizarry v Rosselli , 229 AD3d 778, 780; Vehifax Corp. v Georgilis , 205 AD3d 973, 975-976), under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the plaintiff's contentions regarding the ELRAC defendants' entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them on the merits ( see Matter of Simpson v Cyrius , 220 AD3d 708, 709; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v North Shore Signature Homes, Inc. , 125 AD3d 7 | 1 | 1 |
Marcotrigiano v. Dental Specialty Assoc., P.C.green2 sentences2025"A defendant who seeks dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations bears the initial burden of proving, prima facie, that the time in which to commence an action has expired" ( Marcotrigiano v Dental Specialty Assoc., P.C. , 209 AD3d 850, 851 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3211[a][5]). 2025"A defendant who seeks dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations bears the initial burden of proving, prima facie, that the time in which to commence an action has expired" ( Marcotrigiano v Dental Specialty Assoc., P.C. , 209 AD3d 850, 851 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3211[a][5]). | 1 | 1 |
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. North Shore Signature Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2025Although this Court is not bound by the law of the case doctrine and may make its own determination ( see Irizarry v Rosselli , 229 AD3d 778 , 780; Vehifax Corp. v Georgilis , 205 AD3d 973 , 975-976), under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the plaintiff's contentions regarding the ELRAC defendants' entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them on the merits ( see Matter of Simpson v Cyrius , 220 AD3d 708, 709 ; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v North Shore Signature Homes, Inc. , 125 AD3 2025Although this Court is not bound by the law of the case doctrine and may make its own determination ( see Irizarry v Rosselli , 229 AD3d 778, 780; Vehifax Corp. v Georgilis , 205 AD3d 973, 975-976), under the circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the plaintiff's contentions regarding the ELRAC defendants' entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them on the merits ( see Matter of Simpson v Cyrius , 220 AD3d 708, 709; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v North Shore Signature Homes, Inc. , 125 AD3d 7 | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen1 sentence2011Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied ELRAC’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, as ELRAC failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). | 1 | 1 |
Kroll v. Parkway Plaza Joint Venturegreen1 sentence2008The willful and contumacious character of Yong’s failure to appear can be inferred from his repeated failure to comply with the court orders directing his appearance, all of which were entered upon consent, and the lack of an adequate excuse for his failure to appear (see Carbajal v Bobo Robo, Inc., 38 AD3d 820, 821-822 [2007]; Xina v City of New York, 13 AD3d 440, 441 [2004]; Kroll v Parkway Plaza Joint Venture, 10 AD3d 633, 633-634 [2004]; Beneficial Mtge. | 1 | 1 |
Xina v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2008The willful and contumacious character of Yong’s failure to appear can be inferred from his repeated failure to comply with the court orders directing his appearance, all of which were entered upon consent, and the lack of an adequate excuse for his failure to appear (see Carbajal v Bobo Robo, Inc., 38 AD3d 820, 821-822 [2007]; Xina v City of New York, 13 AD3d 440, 441 [2004]; Kroll v Parkway Plaza Joint Venture, 10 AD3d 633, 633-634 [2004]; Beneficial Mtge. | 1 | 1 |
Carbajal v. Bobo Robo, Inc.green1 sentence2008The willful and contumacious character of Yong’s failure to appear can be inferred from his repeated failure to comply with the court orders directing his appearance, all of which were entered upon consent, and the lack of an adequate excuse for his failure to appear (see Carbajal v Bobo Robo, Inc., 38 AD3d 820, 821-822 [2007]; Xina v City of New York, 13 AD3d 440, 441 [2004]; Kroll v Parkway Plaza Joint Venture, 10 AD3d 633, 633-634 [2004]; Beneficial Mtge. | 1 | 1 |
Gergis v. Micciogreen1 sentence2008As to those defendants, the plaintiff demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the vehicle operated by Yong and owned by Elrac proceeded into an intersection controlled by a stop sign without yielding the right of way to the approaching vehicle operated by the defendant Lourdes Santana and owned by the defendant Luciano Santana (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 [a]; Gergis v Miccio, 39 AD3d 468, 468-469 [2007]; Laino v Lucchese, 35 AD3d 672 [2006] ). | 1 | 1 |
Leotta v. Plessingergreen1 sentence2006ELRAC failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, arising from Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), that a vehicle involved in a traffic accident is being operated with the permission of the owner (see Leotta v Plessinger, 8 NY2d 449, 461 [1960]; Walls v Zuvic, 113 AD2d 936 [1985]). | 1 | 1 |
Elrac, Inc. v. Wardgreen1 sentence2001The Court of Appeals also held that ELRAC’s standard indemnification clause violated the policy behind the anti-subrogation rule to the extent that ELRAC could seek indemnification from its lessees for minimum coverage (see, ELRAC, Inc. v Ward, supra, at 76). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ferdico v. Zweig
green
1 sentence2020Here, the negligence cause of action the plaintiffs sought to add was palpably insufficient and patently devoid of merit since the ELRAC defendants' purported conduct of "losing the protection of [the Graves Amendment]" was not alleged to constitute, and could not have constituted, a breach of any duty to the plaintiffs, resulting in injury to the plaintiffs ( see Ferdico v Zweig , 82 AD3d 1151, 1154 ; see generally Poon v Nisanov , 162 AD3d 804 , 806). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Titleserv, Inc. v. Zenobio
green
1 sentence2020The plaintiffs demonstrated that the requested discovery was material and necessary to the prosecution of the action, and, contrary to the court's conclusion, document discovery provided by the ELRAC defendants, as well as Barbaria's deposition, were insufficient sources of the information sought by the plaintiffs ( see CPLR 3101[a]; Samide v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn , 16 AD3d 482, 483 ; Titleserv, Inc. v Zenobio , 210 AD2d 314, 316 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Samide v. Roman Catholic Diocese
green
1 sentence2020The plaintiffs demonstrated that the requested discovery was material and necessary to the prosecution of the action, and, contrary to the court's conclusion, document discovery provided by the ELRAC defendants, as well as Barbaria's deposition, were insufficient sources of the information sought by the plaintiffs ( see CPLR 3101[a]; Samide v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn , 16 AD3d 482, 483 ; Titleserv, Inc. v Zenobio , 210 AD2d 314, 316 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cioffi v. S.M. Foods, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Foods, Inc. , 129 AD3d 888 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Laino v. Lucchese
green
1 sentence2008As to those defendants, the plaintiff demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the vehicle operated by Yong and owned by Elrac proceeded into an intersection controlled by a stop sign without yielding the right of way to the approaching vehicle operated by the defendant Lourdes Santana and owned by the defendant Luciano Santana (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142 [a]; Gergis v Miccio, 39 AD3d 468, 468-469 [2007]; Laino v Lucchese, 35 AD3d 672 [2006] ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Walls v. Zuvic
green
1 sentence2006ELRAC failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, arising from Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), that a vehicle involved in a traffic accident is being operated with the permission of the owner (see Leotta v Plessinger, 8 NY2d 449, 461 [1960]; Walls v Zuvic, 113 AD2d 936 [1985]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
ELRAC, Inc. v. Ward
neutral
1 sentence2001The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that because ELRAC “seeks indemnification for sums it has actually paid to the third party, the policy underlying Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 is not undercut by enforcement of the indemnification clause” ( 266 AD2d 500, 501 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
American Home Assurance v. ELRAC, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the indemnification clause was “valid and enforceable,” and that ELRAC had “no obligation to defend or provide primary insurance for the lessee of one of its vehicles” ( 273 AD2d 330, 330-331 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.