grand jury proceeding receives immunity in New York

1997Other courts have observed that the transactional immunity conferred under this statute is so broad that the prosecution, in calling witnesses before a Grand Jury, must proceed with caution, lest it unintentionally bestow such immunity upon a witness for "any transaction concerning which he gave testimony” (see, e.g., Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50, 64 , lv denied 60 NY2d 553 ; People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd on decision below 56 NY2d 916 ).

1996(People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd 56 NY2d 916 ; see also, People v Rappaport, 47 NY2d 308, 313 .) Even if there exists other evidence of the witness’ culpability — evidence wholly independent of, and not derived from, the witness’ Grand Jury testimony — no prosecution is availing if the witness’ testimony concerned the transaction for which that witness’ future prosecution is sought.

1997Other courts have observed that the transactional immunity conferred under this statute is so broad that the prosecution, in calling witnesses before a Grand Jury, must proceed with caution, lest it unintentionally bestow such immunity upon a witness for "any transaction concerning which he gave testimony” (see, e.g., Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50, 64 , lv denied 60 NY2d 553 ; People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd on decision below 56 NY2d 916 ).

1996(People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd 56 NY2d 916 ; see also, People v Rappaport, 47 NY2d 308, 313 .) Even if there exists other evidence of the witness’ culpability — evidence wholly independent of, and not derived from, the witness’ Grand Jury testimony — no prosecution is availing if the witness’ testimony concerned the transaction for which that witness’ future prosecution is sought.

1997Other courts have observed that the transactional immunity conferred under this statute is so broad that the prosecution, in calling witnesses before a Grand Jury, must proceed with caution, lest it unintentionally bestow such immunity upon a witness for "any transaction concerning which he gave testimony” (see, e.g., Matter of Carey v Kitson, 93 AD2d 50, 64 , lv denied 60 NY2d 553 ; People v Williams, 81 AD2d 418 , affd on decision below 56 NY2d 916 ).

1997Immunity and Defendant’s Right To Testify Before the Grand Jury "A witness who gives evidence in a grand jury proceeding receives immunity unless: "[h]e has effectively waived such immunity * * * or "[s]uch evidence is not responsive to any inquiry and is gratuitously given or volunteered by the witness with knowledge that it is not responsive” (CPL 190.40 [2] [a], [b]). "[U]pon giving an answer responsive to any inquiry that has any bearing on the incident, [a witness] receives automatic transactional immunity and can never thereafter be prosecuted for his or her criminal responsibility for t

1994In People v Higley (supra, at 625 ), the Court held that a signed and notarized waiver of immunity presented to the prosecutor by the defendant’s attorney was ineffective because the defendant did not "swear before the Grand Jury that he had in fact executed the waiver or that he waived immunity”.

1987Because defendant’s waiver of immunity was ineffective, his subsequent testimony before the Grand Jury rendered him immune from prosecution for all acts or transactions that were the subject of his testimony (see, People v Chapman, 69 NY2d 497 ).

1981A witness who gives evidence in a grand jury proceeding receives immunity unless: “(a) He has effectively waived such immunity pursuant to section 190.45; or “ (b) Such evidence is not responsive to any inquiry and is gratuitously given or volunteered by the witness with knowledge that it is not responsive.” The language of the statutes, construed as a whole, appears clear: absent a waiver, a witness before the Grand Jury responding directly to questioning legally addressed to him, cannot be convicted of an offense for any transaction concerning which he gave testimony. * Nevertheless, in givi

1981A witness who gives evidence in a grand jury proceeding receives immunity unless: “(a) He has effectively waived such immunity pursuant to section 190.45; or “ (b) Such evidence is not responsive to any inquiry and is gratuitously given or volunteered by the witness with knowledge that it is not responsive.” The language of the statutes, construed as a whole, appears clear: absent a waiver, a witness before the Grand Jury responding directly to questioning legally addressed to him, cannot be convicted of an offense for any transaction concerning which he gave testimony. * Nevertheless, in givi

1981We must bear in mind, too, that the statutes must be interpreted liberally in order that the individual’s rights are adequately guarded (Matter of Anonymous v Arkwright, 5 AD2d 792, 793 ).

1975(People v Ianniello, 21 NY2d 418 ; People v Tomasello, 21 NY2d 143 ; Matter of Gold v Menna, 25 NY2d 475 ; see, also, Felder v New York State Supreme Ct., 44 AD2d 1 .) Defendant’s position is that since she had been compelled on December 18, 1974, to confess before a Grand Jury that her past means of support, until June 4, 1974, was the sale of drugs, the defendant cannot be convicted of any "sale or possession of drugs” on June 4, 1974; that crime being a "transaction, matter or thing concerning which she gave evidence” before the Grand Jury.

1975(People v Ianniello, 21 NY2d 418 ; People v Tomasello, 21 NY2d 143 ; Matter of Gold v Menna, 25 NY2d 475 ; see, also, Felder v New York State Supreme Ct., 44 AD2d 1 .) Defendant’s position is that since she had been compelled on December 18, 1974, to confess before a Grand Jury that her past means of support, until June 4, 1974, was the sale of drugs, the defendant cannot be convicted of any "sale or possession of drugs” on June 4, 1974; that crime being a "transaction, matter or thing concerning which she gave evidence” before the Grand Jury.

1975(People v Ianniello, 21 NY2d 418 ; People v Tomasello, 21 NY2d 143 ; Matter of Gold v Menna, 25 NY2d 475 ; see, also, Felder v New York State Supreme Ct., 44 AD2d 1 .) Defendant’s position is that since she had been compelled on December 18, 1974, to confess before a Grand Jury that her past means of support, until June 4, 1974, was the sale of drugs, the defendant cannot be convicted of any "sale or possession of drugs” on June 4, 1974; that crime being a "transaction, matter or thing concerning which she gave evidence” before the Grand Jury.