maritime claim in New York

2000Federal maritime law provides that where some defendants settle and others do not, the nonsettling defendants’ liability should be calculated with reference to the jury’s allocation of proportionate responsibility, without regard to the amount of the settlement (see, McDermott, Inc. v AmClyde, 511 US 202 ).

1990The facts, as established in a previous appeal (Milam v Gibson & Cushman, 81 AD2d 555 ), reveal that, in 1973, plaintiff seaman commenced this general maritime action against defendant Gibson & Cushman of New York, Inc. seeking monetary damages for personal injuries sustained in September 1967.

1968(Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F. 2d 205 , cert. den. 380 U. S. 943 ; Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F. 2d 204 , cert, den. 382 U. S. 938 .) Finally, and in any event, the complaint should not have been dismissed on motion since it states a cause of action bottomed on defendant’s failure to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work.

1968(Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F. 2d 205 , cert. den. 380 U. S. 943 ; Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F. 2d 204 , cert, den. 382 U. S. 938 .) Finally, and in any event, the complaint should not have been dismissed on motion since it states a cause of action bottomed on defendant’s failure to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work.

1968(Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F. 2d 205 , cert. den. 380 U. S. 943 ; Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F. 2d 204 , cert, den. 382 U. S. 938 .) Finally, and in any event, the complaint should not have been dismissed on motion since it states a cause of action bottomed on defendant’s failure to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work.

1968(Huff v. Matson Navigation Co., 338 F. 2d 205 , cert. den. 380 U. S. 943 ; Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F. 2d 204 , cert, den. 382 U. S. 938 .) Finally, and in any event, the complaint should not have been dismissed on motion since it states a cause of action bottomed on defendant’s failure to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work.

1952This maritime rule is of ancient origin and has been applied in many cases, but this Court has never expressly applied it to non-collision cases.” (Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp. [1952], 342 U. S. 282, 284 .) The Supreme Court then went on to declare the collision rule of contribution inapplicable in noncollision cases.

1952This maritime rule is of ancient origin and has been applied in many cases, but this Court has never expressly applied it to non-collision cases.” (Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp. [1952], 342 U. S. 282, 284 .) The Supreme Court then went on to declare the collision rule of contribution inapplicable in noncollision cases.

1929By the Seamen’s Act of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. ch. 153, § 20), it was provided that “ in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall not be held to be fellow-servants with those under their authority.” This language proved to be inadequate to substitute the common-law measure of liability for personal injuries for the maritime rule of limited liability in the case of seamen (Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 ), and was probably appropriate only to the relief of seamen in any event.

1929(Yaconi v. Brady & Gioe, Inc., 246 N. Y. 300 .) It was, however, a gesture in the direction of wider responsibility on the part of the master for the negligence of his servants.

1920Since the amendment to the Federal act saving to claimants the rights under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, group 8 of section 2 was re-enacted and this case is within the letter and spirit of the group. * Charlton v. Hilton-Dodge Transportation Co. ( 178 App. Div. 385 ) was with reference to a maritime claim before the amendment, and the Workmen’s Compensation Law could not apply to it.

1898Navano v. Van Wort ( 64 Barb. 205 ) was a proceeding hy mandamus to compel payment for water meters furnished without public notice and previous |>roposals.

1874The case of The Belfast ( 7 Wall. 624 ), holding that a maritime claim does not arise upon a contract for material and supplies furnished, to a vessel in her home port, is examined in Brookman v. Hamill, and the remark of the learned justice in the “ Belfast” case, is applied only to cases in which the contract is not maritime, and not as intending to decide, that claims for supplies, &c., if furnished at the home port, were not of a maritime nature.

1874A similar criticism, in effect, was later made by the same court, in Vose v. Cockcroft ( 44 N. Y. 415 , 420 ; see also Sheppard v. Steele, ubi sup).