reasonable application standard in New York

2025LLC v Minck , 5 Misc 3d 61 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]).

2025LLC v Minck , 5 Misc 3d 61 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2004]).

2025Fund Socy., FSB v Zabrowsky , 212 AD3d 866 [2023]) and raises an issue of fact as to whether the process server satisfied the reasonable application standard before resorting to conspicuous place service ( see RPAPL 735 [1]; Martine Assoc.

2025Fund Socy., FSB v Zabrowsky , 212 AD3d 866 [2023]) and raises an issue of fact as to whether the process server satisfied the reasonable application standard before resorting to conspicuous place service ( see RPAPL 735 [1]; Martine Assoc.

2025Landlord never made a motion pursuant to CPLR 308 (5) alleging that personal service was impracticable ( see City of New York v Clark , 234 AD2d 120 [1996]; 255 Huguenot St.

2025Landlord never made a motion pursuant to CPLR 308 (5) alleging that personal service was impracticable ( see City of New York v Clark , 234 AD2d 120 [1996]; 255 Huguenot St.

2018Realty Co. v Gliwa , 92 AD2d 602 [1983]), even if they might not have otherwise been sufficient for purposes of obtaining a money judgment ( see Borg v Feeley , 56 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50834[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017]; Avgush v Berrahu , 17 Misc 3d 85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).

2018Realty Co. v Gliwa , 92 AD2d 602 [1983]), even if they might not have otherwise been sufficient for purposes of obtaining a money judgment ( see Borg v Feeley , 56 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50834[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017]; Avgush v Berrahu , 17 Misc 3d 85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).

2018Realty Co. v Gliwa , 92 AD2d 602 [1983]), even if they might not have otherwise been sufficient for purposes of obtaining a money judgment ( see Borg v Feeley , 56 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50834[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017]; Avgush v Berrahu , 17 Misc 3d 85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).

2018Realty Co. v Gliwa , 92 AD2d 602 [1983]), even if they might not have otherwise been sufficient for purposes of obtaining a money judgment ( see Borg v Feeley , 56 Misc 3d 128 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50834[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2017]; Avgush v Berrahu , 17 Misc 3d 85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]).

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

2017Under these circumstances, the monetary portion of the default final judgment was a nullity ( see Oppenheim v Spike , 107 Misc 2d at 56 ), and must be vacated.

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

2017While these two attempts, one of which was during normal working hours, were sufficient to satisfy the reasonable application standard of RPAPL § 735 ( see Eight Assoc. v [*2] Hynes , 102 AD2d 746 [1984], affd 65 NY2d 739 [1985]; SBS Owners, Inc. v Kelly , 19 Misc 3d 141 [A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50938[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2008]), they were insufficient to establish the due diligence required to obtain personal jurisdiction over tenant ( see Barnes v City of New York , 70 AD2d 580 [1979], affd 51 NY2d 906 [1980]; Matter of McGreevy v Simon , 220 AD2d 713 [1995]; Bleier v Heschel , 128 AD2d 662 [1

1972Equity makes a reasonable application of the rule by requiring whatever fair dealing requires under all the circumstances of the particular case, but it does not permit the rule to become a shield for wrongdoing.” (See, also, Heckscher v. Edenborn, 203 N. Y. 210, 227-228 .) The application of these well-established rules to the instant case presents clearly that plaintiff Frances Williams should not as a condition of rescission pay the amount of the note.

1955J., in Shirley v. Larkin Co. ( 239 N. Y. 94, 96 ).

1918(Thomas v. Evans, 105 N. Y. 601 .) Respondent makes no contention here that the well was not needed for the business of the company, or that it does not enhance the value of the property to the extent of its" cost.