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8 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1973–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Colten v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1981Corp. v City of Albany, 2 NY2d 690, 696; Strohm v Town of Islip, 206 NYS2d 452 ; Leroy Franz, Inc. v City of New Rochelle, 124 NYS2d 525 ; 5 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations [3d ed], § 15.24.) As was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Colten v Kentucky ( 407 US 104, 110 ): “The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. 1978It is a well-known principle of law that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the Court.” (Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 610 ; see, also, United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21 .) "The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness” (Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 ). | 4 | 8 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen1 sentence2003(See, Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 [1972].) “A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” (Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109 [1972].) However, requiring that laws be written with a sufficient degree of specificity does not mean that we should expect mathematical certainty. | 1 | 1 |
Trio Distributor Corp. v. City of Albanygreen1 sentence1981Corp. v City of Albany, 2 NY2d 690, 696; Strohm v Town of Islip, 206 NYS2d 452 ; Leroy Franz, Inc. v City of New Rochelle, 124 NYS2d 525 ; 5 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations [3d ed], § 15.24.) As was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Colten v Kentucky ( 407 US 104, 110 ): “The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Griggs Rainesgreen1 sentence1978It is a well-known principle of law that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the Court.” (Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 610 ; see, also, United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21 .) "The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness” (Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Petrillo
green
2 sentences1975(United States v Petrillo, 332 US 1 [1947].) As our Supreme Court recently said 'The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. 1973(United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 [1947].) As our.Supreme Court recently said “The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. | 3 | 1973–1986 |
People v. Newton
green
1 sentence1986It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” (Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 .) "A criminal statute must define conduct to be punished but impossible standards are not required.” (People v Obertance, 105 Misc 2d 558, 559-560 ; People v Newton, 73 Misc 2d 854, 856 ; United States v Petrillo, 332 US 1 .) Penal Law § 165.07 does just that. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Obertance
green
1 sentence1986It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.” (Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 .) "A criminal statute must define conduct to be punished but impossible standards are not required.” (People v Obertance, 105 Misc 2d 558, 559-560 ; People v Newton, 73 Misc 2d 854, 856 ; United States v Petrillo, 332 US 1 .) Penal Law § 165.07 does just that. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
green
1 sentence1978It is a well-known principle of law that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the Court.” (Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 610 ; see, also, United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21 .) "The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness” (Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 ). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Pagnotta
green
1 sentence1975It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.’ (Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110 [1972]).” Bearing in mind the well-established principle that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment (People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333, 337 ) this court is satisfied that the use of the language "materially aids” is not unconstitution | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.