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8 New York opinions name it 3 courts 2006–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dua v. New York City Department of Parksgreen2 sentences2019Thus, the [R]evised [R]ules satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of promoting a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation" Dua, 84 AD3d at 597-598 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). 2019Thus, the [R]evised [R]ules satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of promoting a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation" Dua, 84 AD3d at 597-598 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). | 2 | 2 |
Town of Islip v. Cavigliagreen2 sentences2019Concerning the protection of free speech afforded by the New York Constitution (art I, § 8), the EMV Rules are content-neutral restrictions, in that "they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and relat[e] only to the time, place, and manner of expression" ( Matter of Town of Islip v Caviglia , 73 NY2d 544, 557 [1989]). 2019Concerning the protection of free speech afforded by the New York Constitution (art I, § 8), the EMV Rules are content-neutral restrictions, in that "they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and relat[e] only to the time, place, and manner of expression" ( Matter of Town of Islip v Caviglia , 73 NY2d 544, 557 [1989]). | 2 | 2 |
Bush v. Veragreen2 sentences2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285, 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 921). 2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285 , 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982 ; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918 ; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 92 | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285, 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 921). 2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285 , 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982 ; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918 ; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 92 | 1 | 1 |
Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commissiongreen2 sentences2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285, 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 921). 2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285 , 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982 ; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918 ; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 92 | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285, 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 921). 2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285 , 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982 ; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918 ; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 92 | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. Huntgreen2 sentences2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285, 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 921). 2025The United States Supreme Court has "assumed" that complying with section 2 of the FVRA is a compelling interest, but also held that "when a State invokes § 2 to justify race-based districting, 'it must show (to meet the narrow tailoring requirement) that it had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that the statute required its action'" ( Wisconsin Legislature v Wisconsin Elections Comm'n , 595 US at 402 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Cooper v Harris , 581 US 285 , 292; see Bush v Vera , 517 US 952, 979-982 ; Shaw v Hunt , 517 US 899, 908-918 ; Miller v Johnson , 515 US at 92 | 1 | 1 |
Grutter v. Bollingerred1 sentence2020If this were strict scrutiny analysis, the majority would be correct that the HSTPA is not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest (see Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 326 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
City of Ladue v. Gilleogreen1 sentence2013Further, chapter 57A’s limitations on offsite commercial signs and billboards are not impermissibly underinclusive, a principle based on the recognition that “an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of speech may represent a governmental attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people” (City of Ladue, 512 US at 51 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Coloradogreen1 sentence2013Here, because the regulations are content neutral and permit a substantial scope for commercial expression, the tailoring requirement is satisfied “even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal” (Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703, 726 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. Rock Against Racismgreen1 sentence2011Thus, the revised rules satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of promoting “a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation” (Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 799 [1989]; cf. Time Sq. | 1 | 1 |
Time Square Books, Inc. v. City of Rochestergreen1 sentence2011Books v City of Rochester, 223 AD2d 270, 276 [1996]; People ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Oceanview Home for Adults, Inc. v. Zucker
green
1 sentence2025We do not need to resolve these thorny questions, though, because we hold that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the regulations{**43 NY3d at 530} "deny" or "make unavailable" housing on the basis of a person's disability ( see 42 USC § 3604 [f] [1]). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rivers v. Katz
green
1 sentence2006While Rivers v Katz (supra) states that a determination of incapacity is a uniquely judicial function, it does not purport to require that the determination of whether, taking into consideration all relevant considerations, the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the individual’s liberty interest, be decided in a judicial forum. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.