value judgment supporting immunity in New York

2024Moreover, such "immunity . . . presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality's procedures, because the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies[,] and exercises no judgment or discretion" ( Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d 676, 681 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Santaiti v Town of Ramapo , 162 AD3d 921 , 928; Normanskill Cr., LLC v Town of Bethlehem , 160 AD3d 1249 , 1252-1253).

2021The basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery for injury becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion ( see Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d 676, 681 ; Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d at 485 ; Normanskill Cr., LLC v Town of Bethlehem , 160 AD3d 1249 , 1252).

2021The basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery for injury becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion ( see Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d 676, 681 ; Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d at 485 ; Normanskill Cr., LLC v Town of Bethlehem , 160 AD3d 1249 , 1252).

2018Furthermore, the availability of the governmental immunity defense requires "that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality's procedures, because the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion'" ( Johnson v City of New York , 15 NY3d 676, 681 , quoting Haddock v City of New York , 75 NY2d at 485 ; see Connolly v Long Is.

2026"Moreover, such immunity . . . presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality's procedures, because the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies, and exercises no judgment or discretion" (<i>Walker-Rodriguez v City of New York</i>, 231 AD3d at 1092 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; <i>see</i> <i>Devlin v City of New York</i>, 193 AD3d 819, 821 ; <i>Owens v City of New York</i>, 183 AD3d 903, 906-907 ; <i

2024The basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery for injury becomes irrelevant where the municipality [*9]violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion" ( Devlin v City of New York , 193 AD3d 819, 821 [citation omitted]).

2021Immunity is not available unless the municipality establishes that the action taken actually resulted from discretionary decision-making, meaning the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results ( see Valdez v City of New York , 18 NY3d at 79-80 ; Normanskill Cr., LLC v Town of Bethlehem , 160 AD3d at 1252).

2017Nevertheless, the professional judgment rule “presupposes *1626 that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures, because ‘the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrevelant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion’” (Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 [emphasis added]; see Valdez, 18 NY3d at 80 ; Lubecki v City of New York, 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]).

2026"Moreover, such immunity . . . presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality's procedures, because the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies, and exercises no judgment or discretion" (<i>Walker-Rodriguez v City of New York</i>, 231 AD3d at 1092 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; <i>see</i> <i>Devlin v City of New York</i>, 193 AD3d 819, 821 ; <i>Owens v City of New York</i>, 183 AD3d 903, 906-907 ; <i

2026"Moreover, such immunity . . . presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality's procedures, because the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies, and exercises no judgment or discretion" (<i>Walker-Rodriguez v City of New York</i>, 231 AD3d at 1092 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; <i>see</i> <i>Devlin v City of New York</i>, 193 AD3d 819, 821 ; <i>Owens v City of New York</i>, 183 AD3d 903, 906-907 ; <i

2024The governmental function immunity defense "is based on sound reasons of public policy in allowing government officials to execute their duties free from fear of vindictive or retaliatory damage suits" ( Kelleher v Town of Southampton , 306 AD2d 247, 248 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[W]hen both the special duty requirement and the governmental function immunity defense are asserted in a negligence case, the rule that emerges is that government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to t

2017Here, we conclude that defendants established as a matter of law that the police officers’ conduct in firing the CS gas canisters into the building involved the exercise of professional judgment, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 ; Arias v City of New York, 22 AD3d 436, 437 [2005]; cf. Lubecki, 304 AD2d at 234-235 ).

2017Here, we conclude that defendants established as a matter of law that the police officers’ conduct in firing the CS gas canisters into the building involved the exercise of professional judgment, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 ; Arias v City of New York, 22 AD3d 436, 437 [2005]; cf. Lubecki, 304 AD2d at 234-235 ).

2017Nevertheless, the professional judgment rule “presupposes *1626 that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures, because ‘the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrevelant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies and exercises no judgment or discretion’” (Johnson, 15 NY3d at 681 [emphasis added]; see Valdez, 18 NY3d at 80 ; Lubecki v City of New York, 304 AD2d 224, 233-234 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]).

2010Immunity under the professional judgment rule "`reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury'" ( Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309, 313 [1991], quoting Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478, 484 [1990]). *681 This immunity, however, presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compli