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8 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Delorean Motor Company, Debtor. David W. Allard, Jr. v. Howard L. Weitzman, an Individualgreen2 sentences2019Section 959 is a limited exception to the Barton doctrine that permits suits against a trustee or receiver for actions taken while "carrying on business." However, Section 959 "does not apply to suits against the trustee for actions taken while administering the estate." Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (May 3, 1993). 28 U.S.C. 959 is inapplicable to these facts, it does not provide an exception to the leave requirement for appellant. {¶ 14} Appellant also argues that the Barton case itself provides an exception to the leave requirement for a situation involvi 2019Section 959 is a limited exception to the Barton doctrine that permits suits against a trustee or receiver for actions taken while "carrying on business." However, Section 959 "does not apply to suits against the trustee for actions taken while administering the estate." Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (May 3, 1993). 28 U.S.C. 959 is inapplicable to these facts, it does not provide an exception to the leave requirement for appellant. {¶ 14} Appellant also argues that the Barton case itself provides an exception to the leave requirement for a situation involvi | 1 | 1 |
Muratore v. Darrgreen2 sentences2007Cf. Barton v. Barbour (1881), 104 U.S. 126 , 128 , 14 Otto 126 (stating that, as a matter of federal common law, "[i]t is a general rule that before suit is brought against a receiver leave of court by which he was appointed must be obtained"); see, also, Muratore v. Darr (C.A.1, 2004), 375 F.3d 140 , 147 (applying the Barton doctrine to bar a party from suing a bankruptcy trustee in federal district court without prior permission of the bankruptcy court even though the bankruptcy case was closed). {¶ 22} Here, because the trial court's injunction against suing the receiver lacked specificity 2007Cf. Barton v. Barbour (1881), 104 U.S. 126 , 128 , 14 Otto 126 (stating that, as a matter of federal common law, "[i]t is a general rule that before suit is brought against a receiver leave of court by which he was appointed must be obtained"); see, also, Muratore v. Darr (C.A.1, 2004), 375 F.3d 140 , 147 (applying the Barton doctrine to bar a party from suing a bankruptcy trustee in federal district court without prior permission of the bankruptcy court even though the bankruptcy case was closed). {¶ 22} Here, because the trial court's injunction against suing the receiver lacked specificity | 1 | 1 |
State v. Porterfieldgreen2 sentences2007See, generally, State v. Porterfield , 106 Ohio St.3d 5 , 2005-Ohio-3095 , at ¶ 11 (instructing courts to objectively and thoroughly examine a writing to determine its meaning when confronted with an allegation of ambiguity and only when a definitive meaning proves elusive should a court employ rules for construing ambiguous language). {¶ 23} In Chilcote v. Gleason Constr. 2007See, generally, State v. Porterfield , 106 Ohio St.3d 5 , 2005-Ohio-3095 , at ¶ 11 (instructing courts to objectively and thoroughly examine a writing to determine its meaning when confronted with an allegation of ambiguity and only when a definitive meaning proves elusive should a court employ rules for construing ambiguous language). {¶ 23} In Chilcote v. Gleason Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barton v. Barbour
green
2 sentences2007Cf. Barton v. Barbour (1881), 104 U.S. 126 , 128 , 14 Otto 126 (stating that, as a matter of federal common law, "[i]t is a general rule that before suit is brought against a receiver leave of court by which he was appointed must be obtained"); see, also, Muratore v. Darr (C.A.1, 2004), 375 F.3d 140 , 147 (applying the Barton doctrine to bar a party from suing a bankruptcy trustee in federal district court without prior permission of the bankruptcy court even though the bankruptcy case was closed). {¶ 22} Here, because the trial court's injunction against suing the receiver lacked specificity 2007Cf. Barton v. Barbour (1881), 104 U.S. 126 , 128 , 14 Otto 126 (stating that, as a matter of federal common law, "[i]t is a general rule that before suit is brought against a receiver leave of court by which he was appointed must be obtained"); see, also, Muratore v. Darr (C.A.1, 2004), 375 F.3d 140 , 147 (applying the Barton doctrine to bar a party from suing a bankruptcy trustee in federal district court without prior permission of the bankruptcy court even though the bankruptcy case was closed). {¶ 22} Here, because the trial court's injunction against suing the receiver lacked specificity | 2 | 2007–2014 |
State v. Barton
green
2 sentences2011Moreover, counsel used that evidence in the penalty phase to argue that Short did not deserve death. {¶ 72} Barton states: “Presentation of any mitigating evidence during either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial relieves the trial court of the duty to conduct an Ashworth inquiry.” (Emphasis added.) 108 Ohio St.3d 402 , 2006-Ohio-1324 , 844 N.E.2d 307 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2011Moreover, counsel used that evidence in the penalty phase to argue that Short did not deserve death. {¶ 72} Barton states: “Presentation of any mitigating evidence during either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial relieves the trial court of the duty to conduct an Ashworth inquiry.” (Emphasis added.) 108 Ohio St.3d 402 , 2006-Ohio-1324 , 844 N.E.2d 307 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Satterfield v. Malloy
green
2 sentences2019In Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir.2012), the Tenth Circuit discussed the ultra vires exception to the Barton doctrine. 2019In Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir.2012), the Tenth Circuit discussed the ultra vires exception to the Barton doctrine. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Barton. v. Barton
green
1 sentence2017Greene No. 2015-CA-53, 2016-Ohio-5264, at ¶ 25 . {¶ 110} In Barton II, we also rejected Barton’s claim of judicial misconduct, noting that “the proper method by which to raise such allegations is by a grievance filed before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, not by a brief filed before this court.” Id. at ¶ 32. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hartford v. Hartford
green
1 sentence2016Consequently, the trial court’s determination of the issue is entitled to great weight[.]” Id. at 85 . {¶ 20} Barton’s motion for relief from judgment alleges several claims of “fraud -10- upon the court” committed by his ex-wife, 13 officers of the court, this court, and the Supreme Court of Ohio. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Clyde Thomas Carter v. Bob Rogers
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 889 , citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 , 26 L.Ed. 672 (1881). “ ‘ “The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have an effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” ’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id., quoting Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249 , 1253 (11th Cir.2000). {¶ 78} In discussing this issue, the bankruptcy court specifically mentioned the –25– litigation in the case before us, which it had designated as the “ ‘Building Litigation.’ ” In re Hindu Templ 2014Id. at 889 , citing Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 , 26 L.Ed. 672 (1881). “ ‘ “The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have an effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” ’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id., quoting Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249 , 1253 (11th Cir.2000). {¶ 78} In discussing this issue, the bankruptcy court specifically mentioned the –25– litigation in the case before us, which it had designated as the “ ‘Building Litigation.’ ” In re Hindu Templ | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Whitaker v. Annamalai (In re Hindu Temple & Community Center of Georgia, Inc.)
green
2 sentences2014The bankruptcy court noted that: “These preposterous and scurrilous accusations show the utter lack of respect that Mr. Annamalai has for our judicial system and the rules that govern it, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 888 . {¶ 77} The bankruptcy court further considered whether the federal litigation violated the Barton doctrine, which precludes lawsuits against bankruptcy receivers or trustees without the prior approval of the bankruptcy court. 2014The bankruptcy court noted that: “These preposterous and scurrilous accusations show the utter lack of respect that Mr. Annamalai has for our judicial system and the rules that govern it, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 888 . {¶ 77} The bankruptcy court further considered whether the federal litigation violated the Barton doctrine, which precludes lawsuits against bankruptcy receivers or trustees without the prior approval of the bankruptcy court. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Vance
green
2 sentences2007State v. Vance (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 56 , 58-59 , 647 N.E.2d 851 ; State v. Ferguson , Defiance App. No. 4-01-34, 2002-Ohio-1763 . 2007State v. Vance (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 56 , 58-59 , 647 N.E.2d 851 ; State v. Ferguson , Defiance App. No. 4-01-34, 2002-Ohio-1763 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.