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60 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. City of Stowgreen2 sentences2024The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants: (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain view doctrine; and (g) administrative search State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, fn. 4 (1992). {¶14} The “stop-and-frisk doctrine” originates in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E | 5 | 14 |
State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975green2 sentences2022A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless one of the following judicially-recognized exceptions applies: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine.” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 10. 2022A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless one of the following judicially-recognized exceptions applies: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine.” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 10. | 4 | 40 |
State v. Pricegreen2 sentences2009Those exceptions are: "(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; *** (f) the plain view doctrine[;] or (g) an administrative search[.]" (Quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Price (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 464 , 467 . {¶ 11} Probable cause for an arrest exists where at the moment of the arrest, from the information known to the arresting officers based on reasonably trustworthy *Page 6 information, a reasonably 2008Those exceptions are: "(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; * * * (f) the plain view doctrine[;] or (g) an administrative search[.]" (Quotations and citations omitted.) Price , 134 Ohio App.3d at 467 . {¶ 20} Motley argues that the warrantless entry violated his constitutional rights. | 2 | 9 |
State v. McGeegreen2 sentences2026State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶23} This matter involves evidence discovered from the search of a purse located inside an automobile which was not attributed to the driver of the vehicle at issue, but to the passenger. 2025State v. McGee, 2013-Ohio-4165, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 (1985). {¶51} It is important to consider that the analysis pertaining to the warrant exceptions applies only to the seizure of these phones, as they were searched pursuant to a signed warrant. | 2 | 6 |
City of Xenia v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E 2017City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 , 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988). {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court explicitly recognized the following seven exceptions to the requirement a warrant be obtained prior to a search: {¶22} (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; {¶23} (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; {¶24} (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; {¶25} (d) hot pursuit; {¶26} (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; {¶27} (f) the plain view doctrine; and {¶28} (g) administrative search. {¶29} Stone v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 165 , 593 N.E | 1 | 4 |
State v. Barnesgreen1 sentence2024“The rule permits the State to remove the taint from ill-gotten evidence by establishing that the unlawful act from which the evidence resulted was ‘not a sine qua non of its discovery.’” State v. Barnes, 2017-Ohio-7284, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting U.S. v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974). {¶31} For this exception to the exclusionary rule to apply, the State must establish “(1) that the police possessed the leads making the discovery inevitable at the time of the misconduct and (2) that the police were actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation prior to the misconduct.” Barnes at | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pinckneygreen1 sentence2024This exception “permits a police officer to ‘stop or detain an individual without probable cause when the officer has a reasonable suspicion * * * that criminal activity is afoot.’” State v. Pinckney, 2015-Ohio-3899, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 2010-Ohio-2854 , ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Urdialesgreen1 sentence2024The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants: (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain view doctrine; and (g) administrative search State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, fn. 4 (1992). {¶14} The “stop-and-frisk doctrine” originates in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keithgreen1 sentence2024“The rule permits the State to remove the taint from ill-gotten evidence by establishing that the unlawful act from which the evidence resulted was ‘not a sine qua non of its discovery.’” State v. Barnes, 2017-Ohio-7284, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting U.S. v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974). {¶31} For this exception to the exclusionary rule to apply, the State must establish “(1) that the police possessed the leads making the discovery inevitable at the time of the misconduct and (2) that the police were actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation prior to the misconduct.” Barnes at | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2018See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 143– 144, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153 , 166–167, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995). {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 00011 7 cause to search and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain-view doctrine; or (g) an administrative search. 2018See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 143– 144, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153 , 166–167, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995). {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 00011 7 cause to search and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain-view doctrine; or (g) an administrative search. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hinesgreen1 sentence2017"An officer may initiate a protective search when, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable suspicion the person is armed." Hines at 167, 634 N.E.2d 654 , citing State v. Bobo , 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 16} In addition to the stop-and-frisk doctrine under Terry , the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that "consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights" is also an exception to the search warrant requirement. | 1 | 1 |
| Chimel v. Californiared | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baron v. Meloni
green
2 sentences2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S 2013The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 164, fn. 4 ., 593 N.E.2d 294 (1992 | 6 | 1997–2018 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2024The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the general rule requiring search warrants: (a) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain view doctrine; and (g) administrative search State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. City of Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, fn. 4 (1992). {¶14} The “stop-and-frisk doctrine” originates in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 2017The burden would have then shifted to the state to go forward with evidence that the search came within the so-called stop and frisk exception as pronounced by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , [ 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]. | 5 | 1981–2024 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). {¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain-view doctrine; or (g) an administrative search. 2019Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). {¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain-view doctrine; or (g) an administrative search. | 5 | 2006–2019 |
Hiegel v. Hill
green
2 sentences2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S 2013The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 164, fn. 4 ., 593 N.E.2d 294 (1992 | 5 | 1997–2018 |
Gleason v. United States
green
2 sentences2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S 2013The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 164, fn. 4 ., 593 N.E.2d 294 (1992 | 4 | 1999–2018 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008As held in State v. Applegate (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 348 , 1994-Ohio-356 : "A warrantless police entry into a private residence is not unlawful if made upon exigent circumstances, a `specifically established and well-delineated exceptio[n]' to the search warrant requirement.' Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347 , 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 , 585 . `The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385 , 392-393 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 2413 , 57 L.E 2008As held in State v. Applegate (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 348 , 1994-Ohio-356 : "A warrantless police entry into a private residence is not unlawful if made upon exigent circumstances, a `specifically established and well-delineated exceptio[n]' to the search warrant requirement.' Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347 , 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 , 585 . `The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385 , 392-393 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 2413 , 57 L.E | 4 | 1999–2008 |
State v. Penn
green
2 sentences1996In Penn , the Supreme Court recognized the warrant requirement exceptions as "(a) * * * search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain view doctrine.” Id., 61 Ohio St.3d at 723-724 , 576 N.E.2d at 793 . 3 . 1992In State v. Penn (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 720 , 576 N.E.2d 790 , we listed the “judicially recognized exceptions” to the search warrant requirement: “ ‘(a) A search incident to a lawful arrest; “ ‘(b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; “ ‘(c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; “ ‘(d) hot pursuit; “ ‘(e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or “ ‘(f) the plain view doctrine.” Id. at 723-724 , 576 N.E.2d at 793 , quoting State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975 (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 19 OBR 42, 43, 482 N.E.2d 606, 608 . | 4 | 1992–2001 |
United States v. Donald P. Rohrig
green
2 sentences2004(Quotations and citations omitted). {¶ 17} "[E]xigent circumstances generally must include the necessity for immediate action that will `protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury,' or will protect a governmental interest which outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected privacy interest." Id., citing Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385 , 392-393 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 , certiorari denied (1984), 469 U.S. 1040 , 105 S.Ct. 521 , 83 L.Ed.2d 409 ; U.S. v. Rohrig (C.A. 6, 1996), 98 F.3d 1506 , 1515-18 . {¶ 18} While the City has not challenged the factual determination 1999Although there is no precise list of all the exigent circumstances that might justify a warrantless search, exigent circumstances generally must include the necessity for immediate action that will “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury,” Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 , or will protect a governmental interest that outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected privacy interest, see Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1517-1518 . | 3 | 1999–2004 |
Whirlpool Corp. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1996In Penn , the Supreme Court recognized the warrant requirement exceptions as "(a) * * * search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain view doctrine.” Id., 61 Ohio St.3d at 723-724 , 576 N.E.2d at 793 . 3 . 1992In State v. Penn (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 720 , 576 N.E.2d 790 , we listed the “judicially recognized exceptions” to the search warrant requirement: “ ‘(a) A search incident to a lawful arrest; “ ‘(b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; “ ‘(c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; “ ‘(d) hot pursuit; “ ‘(e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or “ ‘(f) the plain view doctrine.” Id. at 723-724 , 576 N.E.2d at 793 , quoting State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975 (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 19 OBR 42, 43, 482 N.E.2d 606, 608 . | 2 | 1992–1996 |
United States v. Thomas Griffin and Catherine Tucker
green
1 sentence2024“The rule permits the State to remove the taint from ill-gotten evidence by establishing that the unlawful act from which the evidence resulted was ‘not a sine qua non of its discovery.’” State v. Barnes, 2017-Ohio-7284, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting U.S. v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974). {¶31} For this exception to the exclusionary rule to apply, the State must establish “(1) that the police possessed the leads making the discovery inevitable at the time of the misconduct and (2) that the police were actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation prior to the misconduct.” Barnes at | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Kessler
green
2 sentences2022“The state bears the burden of proving that one of these exceptions applies in order for evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search to survive a motion to suppress.” State v. Smith, 73 Ohio App.3d 471, 475 , 597 N.E.2d 1132 (6th Dist.1991), citing State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , 373 N.E.2d 1252 (1978). 2022“The state bears the burden of proving that one of these exceptions applies in order for evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search to survive a motion to suppress.” State v. Smith, 73 Ohio App.3d 471, 475 , 597 N.E.2d 1132 (6th Dist.1991), citing State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , 373 N.E.2d 1252 (1978). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2022“The state bears the burden of proving that one of these exceptions applies in order for evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search to survive a motion to suppress.” State v. Smith, 73 Ohio App.3d 471, 475 , 597 N.E.2d 1132 (6th Dist.1991), citing State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , 373 N.E.2d 1252 (1978). 2022“The state bears the burden of proving that one of these exceptions applies in order for evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search to survive a motion to suppress.” State v. Smith, 73 Ohio App.3d 471, 475 , 597 N.E.2d 1132 (6th Dist.1991), citing State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , 373 N.E.2d 1252 (1978). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 143– 144, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153 , 166–167, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995). {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 00011 7 cause to search and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain-view doctrine; or (g) an administrative search. 2018See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 143– 144, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153 , 166–167, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995). {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable Licking County, Case No. 18 CA 00011 7 cause to search and the presence of exigent circumstances; (f) the plain-view doctrine; or (g) an administrative search. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Bobo
green
2 sentences2017"An officer may initiate a protective search when, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable suspicion the person is armed." Hines at 167, 634 N.E.2d 654 , citing State v. Bobo , 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 16} In addition to the stop-and-frisk doctrine under Terry , the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that "consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights" is also an exception to the search warrant requirement. 2017"An officer may initiate a protective search when, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable suspicion the person is armed." Hines at 167, 634 N.E.2d 654 , citing State v. Bobo , 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 16} In addition to the stop-and-frisk doctrine under Terry , the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that "consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights" is also an exception to the search warrant requirement. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Atchley, 07ap-412 (12-27-2007)
green
1 sentence2014No. 07AP-412, 2007-Ohio-7009, ¶ 6 , citing State v. Price, 134 Ohio App.3d 464, 468 (9th Dist.1999). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2011State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975 (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 19 OBR 42, 482 N.E.2d 606 ; Stone v. Stow (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 164 , 593 N.E.2d 294, fn. 4 ; State v. Moore (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 734 N.E.2d 804 . 2011State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975 (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 19 OBR 42, 482 N.E.2d 606 ; Stone v. Stow (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 156, 164 , 593 N.E.2d 294, fn. 4 ; State v. Moore (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 734 N.E.2d 804 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Payton v. New York green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Beck v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2009Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 . "[P]robable cause does not require a prima facie showing of criminal activity; rather, the standard requires only a showing that a probability of criminal activity exists. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences2009Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 586-587 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 ; citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 ,, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; State v. Welch (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 88 , 91 , 480 N.E.2d 384 . {¶ 9} The following exceptions to the search warrant requirement have been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (3) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (4) hot pursuit; (5) probable cause to search; (6) the presence of exigent circumstances; *Page 6 and (7) the plain 2009Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 586-587 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 ; citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 ,, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; State v. Welch (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 88 , 91 , 480 N.E.2d 384 . {¶ 9} The following exceptions to the search warrant requirement have been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (3) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (4) hot pursuit; (5) probable cause to search; (6) the presence of exigent circumstances; *Page 6 and (7) the plain | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Welch
green
2 sentences2009Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 586-587 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 ; citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 ,, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; State v. Welch (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 88 , 91 , 480 N.E.2d 384 . {¶ 9} The following exceptions to the search warrant requirement have been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (3) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (4) hot pursuit; (5) probable cause to search; (6) the presence of exigent circumstances; *Page 6 and (7) the plain 2009Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 586-587 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 ; citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 ,, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; State v. Welch (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 88 , 91 , 480 N.E.2d 384 . {¶ 9} The following exceptions to the search warrant requirement have been recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (3) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (4) hot pursuit; (5) probable cause to search; (6) the presence of exigent circumstances; *Page 6 and (7) the plain | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Lewis L. Wayne v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Wayne v. United States green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Applegate green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Applegate green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Lee v. Northwestern R. R. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Golly, 89481 (2-7-2008) neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Howard, Unpublished Decision (9-24-2004) neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Davis v. Fulcomer green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Thomas v. Brown green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Wilmshurst v. New Motor Vehicle Board green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| City of Columbus v. I.O.R.M., Sioux Tribe-Redman Club green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Carter v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Adams v. Williams green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Wong Sun v. United States green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.