ignored factors in Ohio

2022He claims that this finding was at least partially erroneous as “the court ignored the factors under [R.C. 2929.12(C)] that there really was no victim to the offense[,] * * * that there was [no] strong provocation of this particular offense[,] [and that] * * * there was no physical harm threatened or caused to a person or property.” He further maintains that the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.12(D)-(E), relating to his likelihood of recidivism, were “inconsistent with the rest of the record.” {¶14} Although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentenc

2022Furthermore, “an appellate court’s determination that the record does not support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Id. at ¶ -7- Case No. 3-22-04 32.

2017The trial court ignored the requirement of compensatory damages for the awarding of punitive damages, see Niskanen , 122 Ohio St.3d 486 , 2009-Ohio-3626 , 912 N.E.2d 595 , at ¶ 12, and thus erred in denying the Catalanottos' motion for new trial on the basis that the judgment was contrary to law. {¶ 20} The Catalanottos' first assignment of error as it pertains to the punitive damages award on Ms. Byrd's assault counterclaim is sustained.

2017The trial court ignored the requirement of compensatory damages for the awarding of punitive damages, see Niskanen , 122 Ohio St.3d 486 , 2009-Ohio-3626 , 912 N.E.2d 595 , at ¶ 12, and thus erred in denying the Catalanottos' motion for new trial on the basis that the judgment was contrary to law. {¶ 20} The Catalanottos' first assignment of error as it pertains to the punitive damages award on Ms. Byrd's assault counterclaim is sustained.

2013Beville has not demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider the factors or that the sentence was inconsistent with such factors, nor is there anything in the record showing that the court ignored the factors, especially given the foregoing discussion of its consideration of Beville’s criminal record and the statements given at the sentencing hearing. {¶17} Beville also argues that the court did not find that the maximum sentence “was consistent with the purposes of R.C. 2929.11.” {¶18} Regarding sentencing, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in Foster that trial courts have “full discreti

2013Beville has not demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider the factors or that the sentence was inconsistent with such factors, nor is there anything in the record showing that the court ignored the factors, especially given the foregoing discussion of its consideration of Beville’s criminal record and the statements given at the sentencing hearing. {¶17} Beville also argues that the court did not find that the maximum sentence “was consistent with the purposes of R.C. 2929.11.” {¶18} Regarding sentencing, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in Foster that trial courts have “full discreti

2003The record reveals that the trial court considered the factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.12 , as evidenced by its statement that it had "considered * * * the seriousness and recidivism factors relevant to the offense and offender pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 [.]" With this pronouncement, we conclude that the trial court satisfied its duty to consider the R.C. 2929.12 factors, as "[t]he Code does not specify that the sentencing judge must use specific language or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors."

2001Id.

1995If a court follows this rule strictly it will give effect only to the intention it finds expressed or implied in the instrument before it, thereby avoiding any tendency to redraft a provision in order to give effect to what it conceives to have been the actual intent of the testator, or its view of what the testator would have intended if he had thought of every contingency.” Carr v. Stradley (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 220, 227 , 6 O.O.3d 469, 473 , 371 N.E.2d 540, 545 , where the court approved and followed Townsend’s Exrs. v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477 .

1995If a court follows this rule strictly it will give effect only to the intention it finds expressed or implied in the instrument before it, thereby avoiding any tendency to redraft a provision in order to give effect to what it conceives to have been the actual intent of the testator, or its view of what the testator would have intended if he had thought of every contingency.” Carr v. Stradley (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 220, 227 , 6 O.O.3d 469, 473 , 371 N.E.2d 540, 545 , where the court approved and followed Townsend’s Exrs. v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477 .