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8 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bostongreen2 sentences2006Specifically, the Court noted as follows: "Another dilemma in applying Evid.R. 803(4) is whether a statement by a child to a psychologist, counselor, social worker, minister, etc., is admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception." Id. at 122. {¶ 12} Since Boston was decided, Ohio appellate courts have unanimously found that the statements of children to social workers and counselors are admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4). 1994The Boston court continued, 46 Ohio St.3d at 122-123 , 545 N.E.2d at 1234 -1235: “Another dilemma in applying Evid.R. 803(4) is whether a statement by a child to a psychologist, counselor, social worker, minister, etc., is admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dever
green
2 sentences2015State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 401, 414 , 596 N.E.2d 436 (1992) (admitting a four-year-old alleged sexual abuse victim’s statement to a physician identifying Defendant as her abuser under Evid.R. 803(4), the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay -6- rule); State v. Cressel, 2d Dist. 2015State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 401, 414 , 596 N.E.2d 436 (1992) (admitting a four-year-old alleged sexual abuse victim’s statement to a physician identifying Defendant as her abuser under Evid.R. 803(4), the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay -6- rule); State v. Cressel, 2d Dist. | 2 | 2006–2015 |
State v. Eastham
green
2 sentences1994“In [State v.] Eastham [ (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 307 ], at 312, 530 N.E.2d [409], at 413, Justice [Herbert R.] Brown noted in his concurrence that the Staff Note to *530 Evid.R. 803(4) stated that the rule was derived from the assumption that a person will be truthful about his physical condition to a physician because of the risk of harmful treatment resulting from untruthful statements. 1989In Eastham, supra, at 312 , 530 N.E. 2d at 413 , Justice Brown noted in his concurrence that the Staff Note to Evid. | 2 | 1989–1994 |
State v. Cressel
neutral
1 sentence2015Montgomery No. 25979, 2014-Ohio-3353, ¶ 35 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Brazzon, Unpublished Decision (11-14-2003)
green
1 sentence2008No. 2001-T-0050, 2003-Ohio-6088 , at ¶ 20 , quoting State v. Jett (Mar. 31, 1998), 11th Dist. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr.
green
1 sentence2003"Rule 803(4) `abolished the [common-law] distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only: the latter usually refers to a doctor who is consulted only in order to testify as a witness.'" Morgan v. Foretich (C.A. 4, 1988), 846 F.2d 941 , 950 , quoting United States v. Iron Shell (C.A. 8, 1980), 633 F.2d 77 , 83 , certiorari denied 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). {¶ 29} In Ohio, the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule was adopted with the same intention of abolishing the distinction between medical ev | 1 | 2003–2003 |
cluster 506074
green
1 sentence2003"Rule 803(4) `abolished the [common-law] distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only: the latter usually refers to a doctor who is consulted only in order to testify as a witness.'" Morgan v. Foretich (C.A. 4, 1988), 846 F.2d 941 , 950 , quoting United States v. Iron Shell (C.A. 8, 1980), 633 F.2d 77 , 83 , certiorari denied 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). {¶ 29} In Ohio, the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule was adopted with the same intention of abolishing the distinction between medical ev | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Eades v. United States
green
1 sentence2003"Rule 803(4) `abolished the [common-law] distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of diagnosis only: the latter usually refers to a doctor who is consulted only in order to testify as a witness.'" Morgan v. Foretich (C.A. 4, 1988), 846 F.2d 941 , 950 , quoting United States v. Iron Shell (C.A. 8, 1980), 633 F.2d 77 , 83 , certiorari denied 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). {¶ 29} In Ohio, the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule was adopted with the same intention of abolishing the distinction between medical ev | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pointer v. Texas
green
1 sentence1992Id., 46 Ohio St.3d at 115 , 545 N.E.2d at 1228 . 4 Among the many issues discussed in Boston which either are not relevant to the instant case, or will not be revisited, are: (1) a child's competency to testify as a witness and Evid.R. 601(A); (2) unavailability of a child witness and Evid.R. 804(A)(2); (3) the admissibility of excited utterances under Evid.R. 803(2) in child abuse prosecutions; (4) the use of expert testimony in child abuse cases, Evid.R. 702, 703, 704, and 705; (5) whether a statement by a child to someone other than a medical doctor can be admissible under Evid.R. 803(4), t | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.