post-conviction relief hearing in Ohio

2019Based on the trial court’s observations of the testimony and evidence presented at the post-conviction relief hearing, we conclude that this determination was supported by competent credible evidence. {¶54} “The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to the ‘“effective assistance of counsel”’–that is, representation that does not fall ‘below an objective standard of reasonableness’ in light of ‘prevailing professional norms.”’” Bobby v. Van Hook, 588 U.S. 4 (2009), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).

2018With regard to each of the other post-conviction contentions, Wannemacher's cross examination at trial and his testimony at the post-conviction-relief hearing both reflect significant preparation to show he was familiar with and inquired about each of the contentions raised in post-conviction, and he was able to obtain several concessions from the State's witnesses. {¶ 61} In the case of Flick v. Warren , 465 Fed.Appx. 461 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated in a 1998 shaken-baby death case that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel to decide not to further see

2018Under those circumstances, "effective assistance of counsel does not require counsel to continue contacting experts until he has found one." Id. at 464 .

2011Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶20} Nevertheless, “a post-conviction relief hearing is not warranted for claims that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal.” State v. Yarbrough (Apr. 30, 2001), 3d Dist.

2011Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 . {¶20} Nevertheless, “a post-conviction relief hearing is not warranted for claims that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal.” State v. Yarbrough (Apr. 30, 2001), 3d Dist.

2011No. 17-2000-10, at *4, citing State v. Reynolds (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 , 679 N.E.2d 1131 .

2011No. 17-2000-10, at *4, citing State v. Reynolds (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 , 679 N.E.2d 1131 .

2000However, it is important to note that Dr. Schwab conceded that the antibiotic which Eskew had been taking "might, to some degree, have inhibited the growth of the gonorrhea in the culture medium; but it's impossible to say what the extent of that inhibitory effect would be * * *." In addressing this conflicting testimony from the post-conviction relief hearing, it is well-established that "the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 39 Ohio Op.2d 366 , paragraph one of the syllab

2000However, it is important to note that Dr. Schwab conceded that the antibiotic which Eskew had been taking "might, to some degree, have inhibited the growth of the gonorrhea in the culture medium; but it's impossible to say what the extent of that inhibitory effect would be * * *." In addressing this conflicting testimony from the post-conviction relief hearing, it is well-established that "the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts." State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 39 Ohio Op.2d 366 , paragraph one of the syllab

2000As this court has recognized, "[a]n appellate court abuses its discretion when it substitutes its judgment for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of witnesses." State v. Kerr (Nov. 1, 1996), Montgomery App. No. 15648, unreported, citing State v. Walker (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 208 , 9 Ohio Op.3d 152 .

2000As this court has recognized, "[a]n appellate court abuses its discretion when it substitutes its judgment for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of witnesses." State v. Kerr (Nov. 1, 1996), Montgomery App. No. 15648, unreported, citing State v. Walker (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 208 , 9 Ohio Op.3d 152 .

1999To demonstrate prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty * * *." Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 , followed in State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521 , 524 .

1999To demonstrate prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty * * *." Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 , followed in State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521 , 524 .

1999State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 107 , syllabus.

1999To demonstrate prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty * * *." Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 , followed in State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521 , 524 .

1999State v. Moore (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 748 , 752 .