law indulges presumption in Oklahoma

1967It is not sufficient that the testator was influenced by the beneficiaries in the ordinary affairs of life, or that he was surrounded by them and in confidential relations with them at the time of its execution.” This is re-affirmed in In re Lillie’s Estate, supra; In re Martin’s Estate, Okl., 261 P.2d 603 , and In re Fletcher’s Estate, Okl., 269 P.2d 349 .

1967It is not sufficient that the testator was influenced by the beneficiaries in the ordinary affairs of life, or that he was surrounded by them and in confidential relations with them at the time of its execution.” This is re-affirmed in In re Lillie’s Estate, supra; In re Martin’s Estate, Okl., 261 P.2d 603 , and In re Fletcher’s Estate, Okl., 269 P.2d 349 .

1967In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary the law indulges in the presumption that a claim for compensation comes within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. 85 O.S.1961, § 27(1); Platner v. Bill Moore Chevrolet Co., Okl., 400 P.2d 148 .

1967This court in that case *1018 applied very stringent rules to such a situation, as follows: “Where one stands in the relationship of attorney to the testator at the time the will is made, and is also the principal beneficiary under the will, the fiduciary relationship being of the highest trust, the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence was used to procure the will, and the burden is on such beneficiary to show the contrary.” We adhere to the principles enunciated in In Cook’s Estate, 71 Okl. 94 , 175 P. 507 , which are: “Undue influence, such as will invalidate a will, must be

1967This court in that case *1018 applied very stringent rules to such a situation, as follows: “Where one stands in the relationship of attorney to the testator at the time the will is made, and is also the principal beneficiary under the will, the fiduciary relationship being of the highest trust, the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence was used to procure the will, and the burden is on such beneficiary to show the contrary.” We adhere to the principles enunciated in In Cook’s Estate, 71 Okl. 94 , 175 P. 507 , which are: “Undue influence, such as will invalidate a will, must be

1966In support of this assignment, defendant cites Dollie v. State, Okl.Cr., 316 P.2d 208 , in which the following instruction was given: “You are instructed that the law indulges in no presumption, nor is a jury permitted to indulge in any presumption, that it is more probably that a person previously convicted of crime will commit a subsequent crime.

1953Cr. 367 , 255 P. 2d 284 , it was held; “Marriage does not take from the wife her general capacity to commit crime, but casts on her the duty of obedience to her husband, and, except as to crimes *138 named in Penal Code, 21 O.S. 1951 § 157, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the law indulges a presumption that when she committed the act charged in the presence and with the assent of her husband, it is the result of restraint or coercion.

1939“In some jurisdictions the presumption of coercion has been abolished by statute, and married women are made fully liable for their criminal acts, see State v. Renslow, 211 Iowa, 642 , 230 N.W. 316 , 71 A.L.R. 1111 , while in other jurisdictions they have been expressly declared incapable of committing crimes, except felonies, when acting under the threats, command, or coercion of their husbands.

1939“In some jurisdictions the presumption of coercion has been abolished by statute, and married women are made fully liable for their criminal acts, see State v. Renslow, 211 Iowa, 642 , 230 N.W. 316 , 71 A.L.R. 1111 , while in other jurisdictions they have been expressly declared incapable of committing crimes, except felonies, when acting under the threats, command, or coercion of their husbands.

1931In all, the burden is upon the defendant obtaining the advantage through such fiduciary relationship to vindicate the transaction.” In Hunter v. Battiest, 79 Okla. 248 , 192 Pac. 575 , this court held: “Where one stands in the relationship of attorney to the testator at the time the will is made, and is also the principal beneficiary under the will, the fiduciary relationship being of the highest trust, the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence was used to procure the will, and the burden is on such beneficiary to show the contrary.

1931In all, the burden is upon the defendant obtaining the advantage through such fiduciary relationship to vindicate the transaction.” In Hunter v. Battiest, 79 Okla. 248 , 192 Pac. 575 , this court held: “Where one stands in the relationship of attorney to the testator at the time the will is made, and is also the principal beneficiary under the will, the fiduciary relationship being of the highest trust, the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence was used to procure the will, and the burden is on such beneficiary to show the contrary.

1921Counsel-for plaintiffs in error concede the applicability of these rules .to the case at bar, but say that under the rules laid' down by this court in Gidney v. Chapple, 26 Okla. 737 , 110 Pac. 1100 , the findings of the trial court on the question of undue influence are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and should be set aside— “(1) .Because Mr. Parmenter stood in the relation' of . attorney and almost that of spiritual adviser, fiduciary relations of the highest trust, and he is'the. executor and the Scientist ChúrCh the sole beneficiary, and under such' circumstances the law indu

1921Counsel-for plaintiffs in error concede the applicability of these rules .to the case at bar, but say that under the rules laid' down by this court in Gidney v. Chapple, 26 Okla. 737 , 110 Pac. 1100 , the findings of the trial court on the question of undue influence are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and should be set aside— “(1) .Because Mr. Parmenter stood in the relation' of . attorney and almost that of spiritual adviser, fiduciary relations of the highest trust, and he is'the. executor and the Scientist ChúrCh the sole beneficiary, and under such' circumstances the law indu

1910Mowry v. Norman, supra; Campbell v. Carlisle et al., 162 Mo. 634 , 63 S. W. 701 ; Hegney v. Head et al., 126 Mo. 619 , 29 S. W. 587 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 ; Gay et al. v. Gillilan et al., 92 Mo. 250 , 5 S. W. 7 , 1 Am.

1910Mowry v. Norman, supra; Campbell v. Carlisle et al., 162 Mo. 634 , 63 S. W. 701 ; Hegney v. Head et al., 126 Mo. 619 , 29 S. W. 587 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 ; Gay et al. v. Gillilan et al., 92 Mo. 250 , 5 S. W. 7 , 1 Am.

1910Mowry v. Norman, supra; Campbell v. Carlisle et al., 162 Mo. 634 , 63 S. W. 701 ; Hegney v. Head et al., 126 Mo. 619 , 29 S. W. 587 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 ; Gay et al. v. Gillilan et al., 92 Mo. 250 , 5 S. W. 7 , 1 Am.

1910Mowry v. Norman, supra; Campbell v. Carlisle et al., 162 Mo. 634 , 63 S. W. 701 ; Hegney v. Head et al., 126 Mo. 619 , 29 S. W. 587 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 ; Gay et al. v. Gillilan et al., 92 Mo. 250 , 5 S. W. 7 , 1 Am.

1910Mowry v. Norman, supra; Campbell v. Carlisle et al., 162 Mo. 634 , 63 S. W. 701 ; Hegney v. Head et al., 126 Mo. 619 , 29 S. W. 587 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 ; Gay et al. v. Gillilan et al., 92 Mo. 250 , 5 S. W. 7 , 1 Am.

1910Treating the admitted part of the foregoing statement as evidential facts pertinent to the transaction between Gidney and Chappie, we find them dealing with each other at the time the instruments herein involved were executed with the burden upon Gidney to show the mental capacity of the testatrix and the legal execution of the will (Mowry et al. v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173 , 103 S. W. 15 ; Goodfellow et al. v. Shannon et al., 197 Mo. 271 , 94 S. W. 979 ; Gardner on Wills, art. 321; Schouler on Wills, art. 170) for the following reasons: (1) Because Gidney stood in the relation of attorney to Mrs.

1910Treating the admitted part of the foregoing statement as evidential facts pertinent to the transaction between Gidney and Chappie, we find them dealing with each other at the time the instruments herein involved were executed with the burden upon Gidney to show the mental capacity of the testatrix and the legal execution of the will (Mowry et al. v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173 , 103 S. W. 15 ; Goodfellow et al. v. Shannon et al., 197 Mo. 271 , 94 S. W. 979 ; Gardner on Wills, art. 321; Schouler on Wills, art. 170) for the following reasons: (1) Because Gidney stood in the relation of attorney to Mrs.

1910Treating the admitted part of the foregoing statement as evidential facts pertinent to the transaction between Gidney and Chappie, we find them dealing with each other at the time the instruments herein involved were executed with the burden upon Gidney to show the mental capacity of the testatrix and the legal execution of the will (Mowry et al. v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173 , 103 S. W. 15 ; Goodfellow et al. v. Shannon et al., 197 Mo. 271 , 94 S. W. 979 ; Gardner on Wills, art. 321; Schouler on Wills, art. 170) for the following reasons: (1) Because Gidney stood in the relation of attorney to Mrs.

1910Treating the admitted part of the foregoing statement as evidential facts pertinent to the transaction between Gidney and Chappie, we find them dealing with each other at the time the instruments herein involved were executed with the burden upon Gidney to show the mental capacity of the testatrix and the legal execution of the will (Mowry et al. v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173 , 103 S. W. 15 ; Goodfellow et al. v. Shannon et al., 197 Mo. 271 , 94 S. W. 979 ; Gardner on Wills, art. 321; Schouler on Wills, art. 170) for the following reasons: (1) Because Gidney stood in the relation of attorney to Mrs.

1910Mowry v. Norman, supra; Campbell v. Carlisle et al., 162 Mo. 634 , 63 S. W. 701 ; Hegney v. Head et al., 126 Mo. 619 , 29 S. W. 587 ; Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357 ; Gay et al. v. Gillilan et al., 92 Mo. 250 , 5 S. W. 7 , 1 Am.