Director rule in Oregon

8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
Marvin Wood Products v. Callowgreen orctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005It also rejected claimant’s argument that employer should have challenged Lipman’s report on the basis of OAR 436-035-0250(3)(b), reasoning that “In Marvin Wood Products v. Callow, 171 Or App 175, 183 [, 14 P3d 686 ] (2000), the court explained that, under the current statutory scheme, the hearing before the ALJ is on the reconsideration record made before the Department of Consumer and Business Services and is limited to the 393 issues raised on reconsideration. 2005It also rejected claimant’s argument that employer should have challenged Lipman’s report on the basis of OAR 436-035-0250(3)(b), reasoning that “In Marvin Wood Products v. Callow, 171 Or App 175, 183 [, 14 P3d 686 ] (2000), the court explained that, under the current statutory scheme, the hearing before the ALJ is on the reconsideration record made before the Department of Consumer and Business Services and is limited to the 393 issues raised on reconsideration.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

Case	Cited	Years
SAIF Corporation v. Miguez red orctapp · 2012 1 sentence 2018Cf. SAIF v. Miguez , 249 Or.	1	2018–2018
State v. Gaines green or · 2009 2 sentences 2013In conducting that inquiry, we employ our method of statutory construction set out in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009), to ascertain the legislature’s intent. 2013In conducting that inquiry, we employ our method of statutory construction set out in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009), to ascertain the legislature’s intent.	1	2013–2013
DeJonge v. Mutual of Enumclaw green or · 1992 1 sentence 2005DeJonge, 315 Or at 242 .	1	2005–2005
Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc. green or · 2000 2 sentences 2001On judicial review, claimant does not argue that the statute permitting the Director to promulgate a case-specific “rule” deprives her of procedural due process, cf. Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or 362 , 15 P3d 548 (2000) (procedures for determining extent of permanent disability deprive claimant of procedural due process), nor does she argue that the Director’s rule fails to address the facts of her particular case, see Shubert v. Blue Chips, 330 Or 554 , 9 P3d 114 (2000) (temporary rule under ORS 656.726(4)(f)(C) must address claimant’s particular situation). 2001On judicial review, claimant does not argue that the statute permitting the Director to promulgate a case-specific “rule” deprives her of procedural due process, cf. Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or 362 , 15 P3d 548 (2000) (procedures for determining extent of permanent disability deprive claimant of procedural due process), nor does she argue that the Director’s rule fails to address the facts of her particular case, see Shubert v. Blue Chips, 330 Or 554 , 9 P3d 114 (2000) (temporary rule under ORS 656.726(4)(f)(C) must address claimant’s particular situation).	1	2001–2001
Shubert v. Blue Chips green or · 2000 2 sentences 2001On judicial review, claimant does not argue that the statute permitting the Director to promulgate a case-specific “rule” deprives her of procedural due process, cf. Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or 362 , 15 P3d 548 (2000) (procedures for determining extent of permanent disability deprive claimant of procedural due process), nor does she argue that the Director’s rule fails to address the facts of her particular case, see Shubert v. Blue Chips, 330 Or 554 , 9 P3d 114 (2000) (temporary rule under ORS 656.726(4)(f)(C) must address claimant’s particular situation). 2001On judicial review, claimant does not argue that the statute permitting the Director to promulgate a case-specific “rule” deprives her of procedural due process, cf. Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or 362 , 15 P3d 548 (2000) (procedures for determining extent of permanent disability deprive claimant of procedural due process), nor does she argue that the Director’s rule fails to address the facts of her particular case, see Shubert v. Blue Chips, 330 Or 554 , 9 P3d 114 (2000) (temporary rule under ORS 656.726(4)(f)(C) must address claimant’s particular situation).	1	2001–2001
Gallino v. Courtesy Pontiac-Buick-GMC green orctapp · 1993 2 sentences 1997However, claimant does not make that argument on review. [1] In Gallino v. Courtesy Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 124 Or.App. 538 , 863 P.2d 530 (1993), we referred to the director of the Department of Insurance and Finance (DIF), which has since been renamed the Department of Consumer and Business Services. [2] For example, while his case was pending before the Board, claimant moved that this court determine whether we had jurisdiction outside of the contested case process to pass on the validity of the rule at issue. 1997However, claimant does not make that argument on review. [1] In Gallino v. Courtesy Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 124 Or.App. 538 , 863 P.2d 530 (1993), we referred to the director of the Department of Insurance and Finance (DIF), which has since been renamed the Department of Consumer and Business Services. [2] For example, while his case was pending before the Board, claimant moved that this court determine whether we had jurisdiction outside of the contested case process to pass on the validity of the rule at issue.	1	1997–1997
Bono v. State Accident Insurance green or · 1984 2 sentences 1985If the worker leaves work the day of the injury, that day shall be considered the first day of the three-day period." [7] ORS 656.138(1) states: "All persons registered as apprentices or trainees and participating in related instruction classes conducted by a school district, community college district or education service district in accordance with the requirements of ORS chapter 660 or section 50, title 29, United States Code as of September 13, 1975, are considered as workers of the school district, community college district or education service district subject to ORS 656.001 to 656.794. 1985If the worker leaves work the day of the injury, that day shall be considered the first day of the three-day period." [7] ORS 656.138(1) states: "All persons registered as apprentices or trainees and participating in related instruction classes conducted by a school district, community college district or education service district in accordance with the requirements of ORS chapter 660 or section 50, title 29, United States Code as of September 13, 1975, are considered as workers of the school district, community college district or education service district subject to ORS 656.001 to 656.794.	1	1985–1985
State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Broadway Cab Co. green orctapp · 1981 2 sentences 1982However, such matters do not include any proceeding under ORS 656.248 or any proceeding resulting therefrom.” 4 In SAIF v. Broadway Cab Co., 52 Or App 689 , 629 P2d 829 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981), we stated: “It is clear that the only specific subject matter for a referee’s activities on February 12, 1980, in connection with Workers’ Compensation under the quoted statutes was in ‘cases, disputes and controversies regarding matters concerning a claim * * similarly, the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction on July 23, 1980, was to review ‘appealed orders of referees in controversies concerning a 1982However, such matters do not include any proceeding under ORS 656.248 or any proceeding resulting therefrom.” 4 In SAIF v. Broadway Cab Co., 52 Or App 689 , 629 P2d 829 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981), we stated: “It is clear that the only specific subject matter for a referee’s activities on February 12, 1980, in connection with Workers’ Compensation under the quoted statutes was in ‘cases, disputes and controversies regarding matters concerning a claim * * similarly, the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction on July 23, 1980, was to review ‘appealed orders of referees in controversies concerning a	1	1982–1982

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.726 (5) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.482 (4) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.268 (4) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005 (3) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.210 (3) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.214 (3) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.273 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

MO 62 (1927–2024) NJ 42 (1954–2025) IL 14 (1977–2026) CA 13 (1974–2023) DC 11 (1985–2008) CO 9 (1943–1986) OR 8 (1982–2018) HI 7 (2001–2024) MN 6 (1984–2026) NY 5 (1931–2025) OH 4 (1996–2011) MA 4 (1977–2011) GA 4 (1936–1954) KS 4 (1968–2003) WA 4 (2010–2013) TX 3 (2007–2020) ND 3 (2002–2004) NE 3 (2001–2016) VA 2 (2000–2025) ID 2 (2016–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check