Director analysis in District of Columbia

2008Further, neither the Director in Pope, nor the CRB in Sullivan and its progeny, came to grips with the “expressio unius” analysis suggested in Korineck, 835 F.2d at 43-44, in Murray, 588 N.E.2d at 857 , and in the Compensation Order in Sullivan; or with the principle, aptly articulated by Professor Larson, that “at a given moment, a man can be no more than totally disabled.” 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 59.41 (1981) (quoted in Pacific Motor Trucking, 666 P.2d at 1369 ) (emphasis added); or with the authorities to the contrary, e.g., Latino, 234 N.E.2d at 914-15 .

2008Further, neither the Director in Pope, nor the CRB in Sullivan and its progeny, came to grips with the " expressio unius " analysis suggested in Korineck, 835 F.2d at 43-44, in Murray, 588 N.E.2d at 857 , and in the Compensation Order in Sullivan; or with the principle, aptly articulated by Professor Larson, that " at a given moment, a man can be no more than totally disabled. " 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 59.41 (1981) (quoted in Pacific Motor Trucking, 666 P.2d at 1369 ) (emphasis added); or with the authorities to the contrary, e.g., Latino, 234 N.E.2d at 914-15 .

2008Further, neither the Director in Pope, nor the CRB in Sullivan and its progeny, came to grips with the “expressio unius” analysis suggested in Korineck, 835 F.2d at 43-44, in Murray, 588 N.E.2d at 857 , and in the Compensation Order in Sullivan; or with the principle, aptly articulated by Professor Larson, that “at a given moment, a man can be no more than totally disabled.” 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 59.41 (1981) (quoted in Pacific Motor Trucking, 666 P.2d at 1369 ) (emphasis added); or with the authorities to the contrary, e.g., Latino, 234 N.E.2d at 914-15 .

2008Further, neither the Director in Pope, nor the CRB in Sullivan and its progeny, came to grips with the " expressio unius " analysis suggested in Korineck, 835 F.2d at 43-44, in Murray, 588 N.E.2d at 857 , and in the Compensation Order in Sullivan; or with the principle, aptly articulated by Professor Larson, that " at a given moment, a man can be no more than totally disabled. " 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 59.41 (1981) (quoted in Pacific Motor Trucking, 666 P.2d at 1369 ) (emphasis added); or with the authorities to the contrary, e.g., Latino, 234 N.E.2d at 914-15 .

2008Further, neither the Director in Pope, nor the CRB in Sullivan and its progeny, came to grips with the “expressio unius” analysis suggested in Korineck, 835 F.2d at 43-44, in Murray, 588 N.E.2d at 857 , and in the Compensation Order in Sullivan; or with the principle, aptly articulated by Professor Larson, that “at a given moment, a man can be no more than totally disabled.” 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 59.41 (1981) (quoted in Pacific Motor Trucking, 666 P.2d at 1369 ) (emphasis added); or with the authorities to the contrary, e.g., Latino, 234 N.E.2d at 914-15 .

2008Further, neither the Director in Pope, nor the CRB in Sullivan and its progeny, came to grips with the " expressio unius " analysis suggested in Korineck, 835 F.2d at 43-44, in Murray, 588 N.E.2d at 857 , and in the Compensation Order in Sullivan; or with the principle, aptly articulated by Professor Larson, that " at a given moment, a man can be no more than totally disabled. " 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 59.41 (1981) (quoted in Pacific Motor Trucking, 666 P.2d at 1369 ) (emphasis added); or with the authorities to the contrary, e.g., Latino, 234 N.E.2d at 914-15 .

2008Co., H & AS No. 85-259 (May 19, 1988), and this court’s decision in Porter v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 625 A.2d 886 (D.C.1993), the ALJ found 1. that “claimant herein has presented substantial evidence of a cognizable injury”; 2. that Ms. McCamey’s “stressors,” i.e., the aggravation of her pre-exist-ing psychological condition, “did arise in the course of her employment,” 2 but 3. that Ms. McCamey failed to satisfy the “objective” standard approved in Porter, i.e., that a person of normal sensibilities with no history of mental illness would have suffered a similar psyc

2008Relying on Porter , the court noted, “psychological injuries are only compensable under the Act if the accident constitutes a sufficient stressor.” Id. at 614 (citing Porter, supra, 625 A.2d at 889 ).

2008In Landesberg , the court affirmed the Director and hearing examiner’s denial of benefits to an employee who claimed she developed post-traumatic stress disorder following a workplace accident involving the closing of Metro bus doors based on findings that (1) the claimant was predisposed to psychological problems, and (2) per a psychiatrist’s opinion, the conditions causing the emotional injury were not “so stressful that a reasonable person not predisposed to psychological injury might suffer the same injury.” 794 A.2d at 613-14 .

2008Relying on Porter , the court noted, “psychological injuries are only compensable under the Act if the accident constitutes a sufficient stressor.” Id. at 614 (citing Porter, supra, 625 A.2d at 889 ).

2003Also, since she had experienced no wage loss, her decision to resign “arose entirely out of her motivation to gain a higher salar^’ rather than, even partly, from the disabling effects of an injury: ‘“at the time [Ms. Franklin] decided to resign, [s]he occupied the same position as any other employee who voluntarily determines to leave his or her employment.’ ” Id. at 1177 (quoting Powers, 566 A.2d at 1069 ).

2003In response to her claim that the original employer (Tricap) was obliged to provide her with light duty work or income-replacing benefits, we explained — in keeping with the Director’s analysis — that the option “of light duty work was not applicable to her case because she left her employment with Tricap almost immediately after her diagnosis.” Id. at 1176 .

2003Also, since she had experienced no wage loss, her decision to resign “arose entirely out of her motivation to gain a higher salar^’ rather than, even partly, from the disabling effects of an injury: ‘“at the time [Ms. Franklin] decided to resign, [s]he occupied the same position as any other employee who voluntarily determines to leave his or her employment.’ ” Id. at 1177 (quoting Powers, 566 A.2d at 1069 ).

2002The Director’s Interpretation In addition to the statutory language, both the Director and the hearing examiner relied heavily on our decision in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Haden, supra. 7 Haden involved an employee who was injured when he fell into an open manhole.

2001The portion of the Act to which petitioner points provides in pertinent part that “[i]f an employee receives an injury, which combined with a previous occupational or nonoccupational disability or physical impairment causes substantially greater disability ... the liability of the employer shall be as if the subsequent injury alone caused the subsequent amount of disability....” (Emphasis added.) Our decision in Daniel, supra at 208 , noted that neither the Director nor the hearing examiner of DOES “cited this provision [Section 36-308(6)(A) ], or explained any basis for not applying it under