Director motion in Illinois

2005See also Transamerica Insurance Co. v. South , 125 F.3d 392, 398-400 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Illinois law, the court found a policy's insolvency exclusion, which excluded coverage of claims "arising out of insolvency *** of any organization (directly or indirectly) in which the Insured has placed or obtained coverage or in which an insured has placed the funds of a client ***," applied where the insured encouraged clients to buy annuities from a company that later became insolvent).

2005See also Transamerica Insurance Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 398-400 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Illinois law, the court found a policy’s insolvency exclusion, which excluded coverage of claims arising out of insolvency of any organization (directly or indirectly) in which the insured has placed or obtained coverage or in which an insured has placed the funds of a client, applied where the insured encouraged clients to buy annuities from a company that later became insolvent).

2005Contrary to plaintiff's contention, those denials do not establish "an existing standard" or practice by which the Director denies such motions "as a matter of course." See Traff v. Fabro , 337 Ill.

2005Contrary to plaintiffs contention, those denials do not establish “an existing standard” or practice by which the Director denies such motions “as a matter of course.” See Traff v. Fabro, 337 Ill.

2005Our supreme court has stated that "[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute." People v. Woodard , 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 , 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997).

2005Our supreme court has stated that "[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute." People v. Woodard , 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 , 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997).

2023This timeline shows that allowing postjudgment interest - 29 - No. 1-21-1370 could open liquidation proceedings up to potential gamesmanship by claimants, who could increase their claim amounts by using various delay tactics. “[J]udgment interest that is awarded pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely preserves the value of the liquidated obligation by compensating the judgment creditor for delays in payment.” Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ill. 2d 282, 295 (1993).

2020See People v. Stevenson, 2011 IL App (1st) 093413, ¶ 43 (“[A]fter a notice of appeal is filed with a reviewing court, appellate jurisdiction attaches instanter; the lower court loses jurisdiction and any actions taken by it when it has no jurisdiction are null and void.”) Accordingly, we vacate the court’s June 13, 2019, order denying defendant’s motion to reconsider. ¶ 17 We turn now to the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on the Director’s motion to dismiss, which was filed pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)).

2020A motion under section 2-619.1 permits a party to “combine a section 2-615 motion to dismiss based upon a plaintiff's substantially insufficient pleadings with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss based upon certain defects or defenses.” Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill.

2009Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).

1977Colletti v. Pate (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (“diminution of sentences on account of good conduct”); City of Evanston v. Wazau (1936), 364 Ill. 198, 204 (“sufficiency of the equipment required by this act for safe operation on public highways”).) We therefore hold that the legislature has sufficiently identified both the harm sought to be prevented by the Director’s rule-making power and the means (standard terms which comply with section 143) intended to be available to remedy that harm.

1977Colletti v. Pate (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (“diminution of sentences on account of good conduct”); City of Evanston v. Wazau (1936), 364 Ill. 198, 204 (“sufficiency of the equipment required by this act for safe operation on public highways”).) We therefore hold that the legislature has sufficiently identified both the harm sought to be prevented by the Director’s rule-making power and the means (standard terms which comply with section 143) intended to be available to remedy that harm.