expansive test in Oregon

2017See Goodwin, 457 US at 377 (stating that “subconscious [] motivat[ions]” might be part of a “vindictive *** judicial response” to a defendant’s appeal). 3 But the Court has not indicated that those theories justify applying the expansive rule urged by defendant.

2017See Goodwin, 457 US at 377 (stating that “subconscious[ ] motivat[ions]” might be part of a “vindictive * * * judicial response” to a defendant’s appeal).3 But the Court has not indicated that those theories justify applying the expansive rule urged by defendant.

2021At least on this record, that approach “would stretch the meaning of the phrases ‘connected together’ or ‘common scheme or plan’ to a level of generality that equates the expansive standard for relevance in OEC 401 with the connectedness between offenses required in ORS 132.560 (1)(b)(C).” Johnson, 199 Or App at 316 (citation omitted).

2018We held that "[t]o accept the state's position would stretch the meaning of the phrases 'connected together' or 'common scheme or plan' to a level of generality that equates the expansive standard for relevance * * * with the connectedness between offenses required in ORS 132.560(1)(b)(C), rendering almost useless *97 the tests in subparagraphs (1)(b)(A) and (1)(b)(B)." Id.

2014See Moeller et ux v. Multnomah County, 218 Or 413, 425-27 , 345 P2d 813 (1959) (contrasting Oregon Constitution’s takings clause with those of states that include “damage” provisions, which has led *355 those states to extend compensation to a broader range of cases); see generally Patterson v. Horsefly Irrigation Dist., 157 Or 1, 18 , 69 P2d 282 (1937) (emphasizing that “unnecessary damage,” as often occurs from negligence, is at odds with exercise of eminent domain power, which arises from necessity of taking private property for public purpose).

2014See Moeller et ux v. Multnomah County, 218 Or 413, 425-27 , 345 P2d 813 (1959) (contrasting Oregon Constitution’s takings clause with those of states that include “damage” provisions, which has led *355 those states to extend compensation to a broader range of cases); see generally Patterson v. Horsefly Irrigation Dist., 157 Or 1, 18 , 69 P2d 282 (1937) (emphasizing that “unnecessary damage,” as often occurs from negligence, is at odds with exercise of eminent domain power, which arises from necessity of taking private property for public purpose).

2014See Moeller et ux v. Multnomah County, 218 Or 413, 425-27 , 345 P2d 813 (1959) (contrasting Oregon Constitution’s takings clause with those of states that include “damage” provisions, which has led *355 those states to extend compensation to a broader range of cases); see generally Patterson v. Horsefly Irrigation Dist., 157 Or 1, 18 , 69 P2d 282 (1937) (emphasizing that “unnecessary damage,” as often occurs from negligence, is at odds with exercise of eminent domain power, which arises from necessity of taking private property for public purpose).

2014See Moeller et ux v. Multnomah County, 218 Or 413, 425-27 , 345 P2d 813 (1959) (contrasting Oregon Constitution’s takings clause with those of states that include “damage” provisions, which has led *355 those states to extend compensation to a broader range of cases); see generally Patterson v. Horsefly Irrigation Dist., 157 Or 1, 18 , 69 P2d 282 (1937) (emphasizing that “unnecessary damage,” as often occurs from negligence, is at odds with exercise of eminent domain power, which arises from necessity of taking private property for public purpose).

2005To accept the state’s position would stretch the meaning of the phrases “connected together” or “common scheme or plan” to a level of generality that equates the expansive standard for relevance in OEC 401, see, e.g., Trook v. Sagert, 171 Or 680, 688, 690 , 138 P2d 900 (1943) (evidence is relevant when it “will advance the search for truth” or “throws some light on the issue”), with the connectedness between offenses required in ORS 132.560(l)(b)(C), rendering almost useless the tests in subparagraphs (l)(b)(A) and (l)(b)(B).

2005To accept the state’s position would stretch the meaning of the phrases “connected together” or “common scheme or plan” to a level of generality that equates the expansive standard for relevance in OEC 401, see, e.g., Trook v. Sagert, 171 Or 680, 688, 690 , 138 P2d 900 (1943) (evidence is relevant when it “will advance the search for truth” or “throws some light on the issue”), with the connectedness between offenses required in ORS 132.560(l)(b)(C), rendering almost useless the tests in subparagraphs (l)(b)(A) and (l)(b)(B).

2000For example, Justice Scalia, writing alone, noted that the particular facts presented — where the declarant, after being threatened that he faced extreme sanctions unless he “broke family ties,” admitted that he was guilty of robbery but shifted sole blame for the murder to the defendant — created a “paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation.” Lilly, 527 US at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).