inadequate warning in Oregon

2011See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 130 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (explaining that the court “consistently has rejected challenges to statutes under Article I, section 20, when the statutes themselves have created the alleged classes”); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US 1, 10 , 112 S Ct 2326 , 120 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (explaining that “unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legi

2011See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 130 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (explaining that the court “consistently has rejected challenges to statutes under Article I, section 20, when the statutes themselves have created the alleged classes”); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US 1, 10 , 112 S Ct 2326 , 120 L Ed 2d 1 (1992) (explaining that “unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legi

2024Page Keeton et al, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 41, 266 (5th ed 1984))); Haas, 370 Or at 750-51 (same).

2024See, e.g., Turnidge, 359 Or at 470 n 61 (the “sub- stantial factor” test applies in those circumstances where the “but for” test “provides an inadequate test of cause-in- fact” (citing W.

2020However, an inadequate inquiry does not conclusively demon- strate that there was a deprivation of that right.” Smith II, 190 Or App at 580 (emphasis added).

2016In that situation, a person’s conduct is considered a factual cause of the harm as long as it was “a substantial factor in bringing it about.” Id.; see also Joshi v. Providence Health System, 342 Or 152, 161-62 , 149 P3d 1164 (2006) (citing *471 statement with approval; observing that, in Oregon, both “but for” and “substantial factor” tests apply).

2016In that situation, a person’s conduct is considered a factual cause of the harm as long as it was “a substantial factor in bringing it about.” Id.; see also Joshi v. Providence Health System, 342 Or 152, 161-62 , 149 P3d 1164 (2006) (citing *471 statement with approval; observing that, in Oregon, both “but for” and “substantial factor” tests apply).

1996See Fugate v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 135 Or App 168, 171 , 897 P2d 328 (1995) (although a jury may not reach a verdict solely through speculation or guess work, “it must be able to ‘apply the ordinary experience of mankind’ to the facts and draw reasonable inferences” (quoting Law v. Kemp, 276 Or 581, 585-86 , 556 P2d 109 (1976)).

1996See Fugate v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 135 Or App 168, 171 , 897 P2d 328 (1995) (although a jury may not reach a verdict solely through speculation or guess work, “it must be able to ‘apply the ordinary experience of mankind’ to the facts and draw reasonable inferences” (quoting Law v. Kemp, 276 Or 581, 585-86 , 556 P2d 109 (1976)).

1996See Fugate v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 135 Or App 168, 171 , 897 P2d 328 (1995) (although a jury may not reach a verdict solely through speculation or guess work, “it must be able to ‘apply the ordinary experience of mankind’ to the facts and draw reasonable inferences” (quoting Law v. Kemp, 276 Or 581, 585-86 , 556 P2d 109 (1976)).

1996See Fugate v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 135 Or App 168, 171 , 897 P2d 328 (1995) (although a jury may not reach a verdict solely through speculation or guess work, “it must be able to ‘apply the ordinary experience of mankind’ to the facts and draw reasonable inferences” (quoting Law v. Kemp, 276 Or 581, 585-86 , 556 P2d 109 (1976)).