inadequate warning in California

2017Courts have held that failure to instruct on the requisite mental state for aiding and abetting liability-so-called " Beeman error"-constitutes federal constitutional error because it omits a required element. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 , 13-14, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 710 P.2d 392 , discussing People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 , 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 [knowledge of perpetrator's intent and intent to aid and abet the offense are required elements of aiding and abetting].) In contrast, an inadequate instruction on natural and probable consequences liability does not nece

2017Courts have held that failure to instruct on the requisite mental state for aiding and abetting liability-so-called " Beeman error"-constitutes federal constitutional error because it omits a required element. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 , 13-14, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 710 P.2d 392 , discussing People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 , 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 [knowledge of perpetrator's intent and intent to aid and abet the offense are required elements of aiding and abetting].) In contrast, an inadequate instruction on natural and probable consequences liability does not nece

2017Courts have held that failure to instruct on the requisite mental state for aiding and abetting liability-so-called " Beeman error"-constitutes federal constitutional error because it omits a required element. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 , 13-14, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 710 P.2d 392 , discussing People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 , 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 [knowledge of perpetrator's intent and intent to aid and abet the offense are required elements of aiding and abetting].) In contrast, an inadequate instruction on natural and probable consequences liability does not nece

2017Courts have held that failure to instruct on the requisite mental state for aiding and abetting liability-so-called " Beeman error"-constitutes federal constitutional error because it omits a required element. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 , 13-14, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 710 P.2d 392 , discussing People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 , 560, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60 , 674 P.2d 1318 [knowledge of perpetrator's intent and intent to aid and abet the offense are required elements of aiding and abetting].) In contrast, an inadequate instruction on natural and probable consequences liability does not nece

2023Such a limit on conditional reversals promotes the child’s interest in avoiding the delay and instability that results from orders for additional inquiry “without any showing whatsoever that the interests protected by the ICWA are implicated in any way.” (In re Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431 .) The interests of Indian tribes are also recognized in that a parent’s potential lack of knowledge regarding their Indian ancestry will be appropriately considered because a parent’s equivocal response can be properly weighed against any other meaningful information that may be available t

2022Such a limit on conditional reversals promotes the child’s interest in avoiding the delay and instability that results from orders for additional inquiry “without any showing whatsoever that the interests protected by the ICWA are implicated in any way.” (In re Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431 .) The interests of Indian tribes are also recognized in that a parent’s potential lack of knowledge regarding their Indian ancestry will be appropriately considered because a parent’s equivocal response can be properly weighed against any other meaningful information that may be available t

2020(Bates, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 446 .) But it does not automatically follow that FIFRA preempts such claims since section 136v(b) prohibits only state-law labeling and packaging requirements that are “ ‘in addition to or different from’ ” FIFRA’s packaging and labeling requirements.

2020(Bates, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 446 .) But it does not automatically follow that FIFRA preempts such claims since section 136v(b) prohibits only state-law labeling and packaging requirements that are “ ‘in addition to or different from’ ” FIFRA’s packaging and labeling requirements.

2017In Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 , 920 P.2d 1347 ( Carlin ), the California Supreme Court explained the difference between strict liability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn, stating that, unlike negligent failure to warn, " '[s]trict liability is not concerned with the standard of due care or the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct....' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1112, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 , 920 P.2d 1347 .) The court gave examples illustrating that a manufacturer could be held liable under strict *135 liability principles even if its fail

2017In Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104 , 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 , 920 P.2d 1347 ( Carlin ), the California Supreme Court explained the difference between strict liability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn, stating that, unlike negligent failure to warn, " '[s]trict liability is not concerned with the standard of due care or the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct....' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 1112, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 , 920 P.2d 1347 .) The court gave examples illustrating that a manufacturer could be held liable under strict *135 liability principles even if its fail

2016Indeed, “a defendant who represents himself virtually never improves his situation or achieves a better result than would trained counsel. [Citation.]” (People v. Rivers, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051 ; see also Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 13 p. 834 [“It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts”].) We conclude that the trial court’s inadequate inquiry resulted in no harm.

2016Indeed, “a defendant who represents himself virtually never improves his situation or achieves a better result than would trained counsel. [Citation.]” (People v. Rivers, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051 ; see also Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 13 p. 834 [“It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts”].) We conclude that the trial court’s inadequate inquiry resulted in no harm.

1979In such a case a trial judge may find it necessary to explain more fully to the jury the legal meaning of ‘defect’ or ‘defective.’ . . .” On page 427 of 20 Cal.3d the Barker opinion discusses plaintiff’s burden and his right to a definition of “defect.” It states: “In Cronin , we reaffirmed the basic formulation of strict tort liability doctrine set forth in Greenman [v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 ( 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 , 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 )]: ‘ “A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspe

1969(Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 64 ; Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 340, 350-352 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 322 ], and authorities cited therein; Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 793, 799-800 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 143 ]; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California (Nov. 1966) 18 Hastings L.J. 9 , 22-26, 36-38; 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 ; 2 Rest.2d Torts, § 402A, com. h, pp. 351-352.) Plaintiff urges that a warning which does not warn of the extent of injury possible if its cautionary advice is not followed is an inadequate warning,

2026(See Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281 (Cunningham); U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) He also asserts that the trial court conducted an inadequate inquiry when he requested that new counsel be substituted under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) due to his attorney’s alleged failure to 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 1 provide effective representation.

2024(Id. at p. 77.) Thus, “the question of whether a different warning could have prevented the plaintiff’s injury in some manner other than by changing the physician’s decision to prescribe — e.g., by prompting the physician to pass along a more detailed warning, or to reduce the dosage — was not before the Mason court.” (Guenther v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. (M.D.Fla. 2014) 990 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1304 .) Finally, while several federal court decisions on which Somatics relies seem to focus on the physician’s prescribing decision, most do not consider whether 20 HIMES v. SOMATICS, LLC Opinion of

2024(Plant Society, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at 63 p. 626.) As described above, the FEIR analyzed those resources in detail, including by addressing the Tribe’s DEIR comments.

2024(See id. at pp. *16–*17.) The case on which Sager relied, Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Mason (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2009) 27 So.3d 75 , in fact found that the inadequate warning could not be a cause of the patient’s injuries because the physician was already aware of the risk.

2024We recognize that an EIR must set forth all substantial or potentially substantial environmental impacts of a project, resolving every fair argument that can be made about possible significant effects (Visalia Retail, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 13 ), and that a post-EIR discussion cannot make up for an inadequate analysis in the EIR itself (League to Save Lake Tahoe v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63 , 107).

2024“The ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families, and by permitting tribal participation in dependency proceedings. [Citations.] A major purpose of the ICWA is to protect ‘Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ ” (In re A.W. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662 .) Child welfare agencies and juvenile courts “have an affirmative and continuing duty” in every dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA applie

2022(In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148 , 1160–1162.) Father claims the Department and juvenile court made an inadequate inquiry because maternal uncle was not asked about any possible Indian ancestry, and the court never asked the parents if there was a reason to believe A.R. was an Indian child, relying instead on the parents’ ICWA forms.

2017In the Illinois case, the defendant was advised-and indicated he understood-that he would lose his " ' constitutional right to a jury trial in this case, and this case will then be heard and decided by this court without a jury[ ].' " ( Brown , supra , 214 Ill.Dec. 433 , 661 N.E.2d at p. 297 .) In finding the waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent as to the penalty phase, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that it was "incumbent upon the trial judge to admonish the defendant in order to clarify the scope of his intended jury waiver," and that "at a minimum the trial judge should have *22

2017In the Illinois case, the defendant was advised-and indicated he understood-that he would lose his " ' constitutional right to a jury trial in this case, and this case will then be heard and decided by this court without a jury[ ].' " ( Brown , supra , 214 Ill.Dec. 433 , 661 N.E.2d at p. 297 .) In finding the waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent as to the penalty phase, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that it was "incumbent upon the trial judge to admonish the defendant in order to clarify the scope of his intended jury waiver," and that "at a minimum the trial judge should have *22

2017In Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104 (Carlin), the California Supreme Court explained the difference between strict liability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn, stating that, unlike negligent failure to warn, ―‗[s]trict liability is not concerned with the standard of due care or the reasonableness of a manufacturer‘s conduct. . . .‘ 14 Though it did not involve failure to warn, the decision in Lambert, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1179 , is to the same effect regarding the preclusive effect of a defense verdict on strict liability.

2017In Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104 (Carlin), the California Supreme Court explained the difference between strict liability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn, stating that, unlike negligent failure to warn, ―‗[s]trict liability is not concerned with the standard of due care or the reasonableness of a manufacturer‘s conduct. . . .‘ 14 Though it did not involve failure to warn, the decision in Lambert, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1179 , is to the same effect regarding the preclusive effect of a defense verdict on strict liability.

2017In the Illinois case, the defendant was advised-and indicated he understood-that he would lose his " ' constitutional right to a jury trial in this case, and this case will then be heard and decided by this court without a jury[ ].' " ( Brown , supra , 214 Ill.Dec. 433 , 661 N.E.2d at p. 297 .) In finding the waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent as to the penalty phase, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that it was "incumbent upon the trial judge to admonish the defendant in order to clarify the scope of his intended jury waiver," and that "at a minimum the trial judge should have *22