probability standard (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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probability standard in Oregon

8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Castrogreen
orctapp · 2004 · cited in 3 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2013–2024
2 sentences

2024Probable cause exists when the facts, as set forth in the affidavit, along with any reasonable inferences, could “permit a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 269 , 192 P3d 1283 , adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473 , 198 P3d 937 (2008); see State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the sear

2024Probable cause exists when the facts, as set forth in the affidavit, along with any reasonable inferences, could “permit a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 269 , 192 P3d 1283 , adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473 , 198 P3d 937 (2008); see State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the sear

23
State v. Wilsongreen
orctapp · 2001 · cited in 4 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2012–2024
2 sentences

2013See Wilson, 178 Or App at 166-67 (“To be sufficient, an affidavit in support of a warrant must permit a conclusion by a neutral and detached magistrate that the items specified in the warrant will probably be found in a specified place to be searched.”); State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (explaining that the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the search will be found at the specified location” (emphasis in original)).

2012The probability standard “requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a certainty.” State v. Wilson, 178 Or App 163, 167 , 35 P3d 1111 (2001) (citations omitted).

14
State v. Goodmangreen
or · 1999 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Further, defendant notes that, although Hatten “reiterated his training and experience and further concluded that[,] based on that expertise, drug-related evidence would be found in defendant’s car,” he “never specifically connects his training and experience to defendant’s home.” See State v. Goodman, 328 Or 318, 328 , 975 P2d 458 (1999) (“Facts derived from training and experience may contribute [the] necessary factual nexus in a determination of probable cause.”).

2013Further, defendant notes that, although Hatten “reiterated his training and experience and further concluded that[,] based on that expertise, drug-related evidence would be found in defendant’s car,” he “never specifically connects his training and experience to defendant’s home.” See State v. Goodman, 328 Or 318, 328 , 975 P2d 458 (1999) (“Facts derived from training and experience may contribute [the] necessary factual nexus in a determination of probable cause.”).

11
Ashley v. Hoytgreen
orctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002See Ashley v. Hoyt, 139 Or.App. 385, 391-97 , 912 P.2d 393 (1996) ("a reasonable probability" that the "result would have been different" is too rigorous a standard).

2002See Ashley v. Hoyt, 139 Or.App. 385, 391-97 , 912 P.2d 393 (1996) ("a reasonable probability" that the "result would have been different" is too rigorous a standard).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Castilleja green
or · 2008
2 sentences

2024Probable cause exists when the facts, as set forth in the affidavit, along with any reasonable inferences, could “permit a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 269 , 192 P3d 1283 , adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473 , 198 P3d 937 (2008); see State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the sear

2024Probable cause exists when the facts, as set forth in the affidavit, along with any reasonable inferences, could “permit a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 269 , 192 P3d 1283 , adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473 , 198 P3d 937 (2008); see State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the sear

22024–2024
State v. Castilleja green
or · 2008
2 sentences

2024Probable cause exists when the facts, as set forth in the affidavit, along with any reasonable inferences, could “permit a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 269 , 192 P3d 1283 , adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473 , 198 P3d 937 (2008); see State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the sear

2024Probable cause exists when the facts, as set forth in the affidavit, along with any reasonable inferences, could “permit a neutral and detached magistrate to determine that seizable evidence probably would be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 269 , 192 P3d 1283 , adh’d to on recons, 345 Or 473 , 198 P3d 937 (2008); see State v. Castro, 194 Or App 109, 115 , 93 P3d 815 (2004) (the probability standard requires that the information in the affidavit “must be such that a reasonable person could conclude that it is more likely than not that the objects of the sear

22024–2024
State v. Miller green
orctapp · 2013
2 sentences

2024We view the affidavit “ ‘in a commonsense, nontechnical and realistic fashion’ with ‘doubtful cases * * * to be resolved by deferring to an issuing magistrate’s deter- mination of probable cause.’ ” State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 516-17 , 295 P3d 158 (2013) (quoting State v. Wilson, 178 Or App 163, 167 , 35 P3d 1111 (2001)).

2024We view the affidavit “ ‘in a commonsense, nontechnical and realistic fashion’ with ‘doubtful cases * * * to be resolved by deferring to an issuing magistrate’s deter- mination of probable cause.’ ” State v. Miller, 254 Or App 514, 516-17 , 295 P3d 158 (2013) (quoting State v. Wilson, 178 Or App 163, 167 , 35 P3d 1111 (2001)).

22024–2024
State v. Johns green
or · 1986
2 sentences

2019In Johns , the court observed that legal commentators had split on the number of prior acts required to invoke the doctrine, with some concluding that, "to resort to the probability doctrine the proponent must have evidence of more than one prior similar instance of conduct," and others asserting that even a single similar act would have logical relevance on the issue of intent. 301 Or. at 554 -55 , 725 P.2d 312 .

2019In Johns , the court observed that legal commentators had split on the number of prior acts required to invoke the doctrine, with some concluding that, "to resort to the probability doctrine the proponent must have evidence of more than one prior similar instance of conduct," and others asserting that even a single similar act would have logical relevance on the issue of intent. 301 Or. at 554 -55 , 725 P.2d 312 .

12019–2019
Horn v. Hill green
orctapp · 2002
1 sentence

2003Horn, 180 Or App at 148 .

12003–2003
Matter of Field green
or · 1978
2 sentences

1994If the violation is likely to recur, removal is appropriate." In the Matter of Field supra, 281 Or. at 635 , 576 P.2d 348 .

1994If the violation is likely to recur, removal is appropriate." In the Matter of Field supra, 281 Or. at 635 , 576 P.2d 348 .

11994–1994

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.545 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 43 (1917–2026) IL 24 (1880–2026) TX 18 (1932–2025) NY 13 (1875–2025) WA 11 (1947–2025) KY 11 (1941–1992) MA 9 (1888–2015) NM 8 (1937–2017) OR 8 (1994–2024) CT 7 (1987–2001) DC 6 (1970–2025) LA 6 (1935–2016) KS 5 (2013–2022) OH 5 (2018–2024) AZ 5 (1993–2024) RI 4 (1986–2012) MO 4 (1925–2001) PA 4 (1937–2007) FL 4 (1988–2011) MI 3 (1907–2020) DE 3 (1990–2019) UT 3 (1990–2020) MD 3 (1986–2002) VT 2 (1986–1991) CO 2 (1990–1990) NJ 2 (1996–2019) WY 2 (1979–1991) MN 2 (1982–2007) ME 2 (2020–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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