probability claim in California

2024Section 425.16 therefore establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation. [Citation.] In doing so, section 425.16 seeks to limit the costs of defending against such a lawsuit.’ ” (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642 .) “A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be sub

2024Section 425.16 therefore establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment- like procedure at an early stage of the litigation. [Citation.] In doing so, section 425.16 seeks to limit the costs of defending against such a lawsuit.’ [Citation.]” (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642 .) “A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue

2021An attorney’s “‘choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197 .) Because “we cannot eliminate the probability that defense counsel had valid tactical reasons for not objecting” (People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 ) to playing the full video interview, including Bonilla’s interrogation methods as a whole, Garcia’s IAC claim has no merit. 2.

2016But, “we cannot eliminate the probability that defense counsel had valid tactical reasons for not objecting.” (People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 .) Trial counsel may have acted tactically by allowing Zuniga to testify Vizcarra and Hernandez had been convicted of the June 21, 2011, offenses with gang enhancements in lieu of the prosecution seeking to present evidence underlying those convictions in the current trial.

1958At page 270 the court stated: “It is likewise settled that it is not the probability of a violation of rules against remoteness or restraints on alienation that brings such rules into operation, but only the bare possibility as such possibility exists at the date of the inception of the trust.” In the Estate of Sahlender, 89 Cal.App.2d 329 [ 201 P.2d 69 ], there was involved a remainder bequest to the possible issue of one Dora, who was 55 years of age and a childless widow at the time of the death of the grantor.

1958At page 270 the court stated: “It is likewise settled that it is not the probability of a violation of rules against remoteness or restraints on alienation that brings such rules into operation, but only the bare possibility as such possibility exists at the date of the inception of the trust.” In the Estate of Sahlender, 89 Cal.App.2d 329 [ 201 P.2d 69 ], there was involved a remainder bequest to the possible issue of one Dora, who was 55 years of age and a childless widow at the time of the death of the grantor.

2025We acknowledge that in Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018 (Fabian L.), the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s decision to set a section 366.26 hearing at the six-month review stage despite the father’s substantive progress in his court-ordered treatment.

2025DISCUSSION A. Section 425.16 and Standard of Review The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871 , 883– 884.) “A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plainti

2021An attorney’s “‘choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197 .) Because “we cannot eliminate the probability that defense counsel had valid tactical reasons for not objecting” (People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 ) to playing the full video interview, including Bonilla’s interrogation methods as a whole, Garcia’s IAC claim has no merit. 2.

2021Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Regarding section 425.16, the California Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘section 425.16 sets out a procedure for striking complaints in harassing lawsuits that are commonly known as SLAPP suits . . . , which are brought to challenge the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech rights.’ (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 196 .) A cause of action arising from a person’s act 17 in furtherance of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connecti

2020Reversal is appropriate under Watson review only if “ ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ [we are] of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) Kamron concedes in her opening brief that our Supreme Court has held that we review alleged instructional errors involving the defense of voluntary intoxication under the Watson probability test.

2015(Carter, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1540 .) Because our interpretation avoids the absurd result of a compassionate release statute under which virtually no prisoner could ever qualify for release, and it effectuates rather than thwarts the money saving purpose of the statute, we must adopt it.

2014The first three of five elements are usually 11 stated as follows, and they seem to include some causation considerations in terms of a probability requirement: " ' "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." ' " (Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 ; italics added.) In Marsh, we relied on statements in Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1159 , as cl

2014The first three of five elements are usually 11 stated as follows, and they seem to include some causation considerations in terms of a probability requirement: " ' "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." ' " (Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 ; italics added.) In Marsh, we relied on statements in Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1159 , as cl

2014The first three of five elements are usually 11 stated as follows, and they seem to include some causation considerations in terms of a probability requirement: " ' "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." ' " (Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 ; italics added.) In Marsh, we relied on statements in Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1159 , as cl

2014The first three of five elements are usually 11 stated as follows, and they seem to include some causation considerations in terms of a probability requirement: " ' "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." ' " (Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 ; italics added.) In Marsh, we relied on statements in Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page 1159 , as cl

1996Appellant relies on the first, People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], The Rivers court opined that an instruction which told the jury it could accept the testimony of the prosecution’s sole percipient witness based on a probability standard was “somewhat suspect.” (Id., at p. 1046.) However, it also noted that the correctness of jury instructions is determined from the entire charge.

1996Appellant relies on the first, People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], The Rivers court opined that an instruction which told the jury it could accept the testimony of the prosecution’s sole percipient witness based on a probability standard was “somewhat suspect.” (Id., at p. 1046.) However, it also noted that the correctness of jury instructions is determined from the entire charge.

1996The Rivers jury properly received CALJIC No. 2.90 on reasonable doubt, including the mandate to decide the case based on “ ‘the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence’ ” and further was directed per CALJIC No. 1.01 to “ ‘consider the instructions as a whole and in light of all the others.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1046 , citing People v. Salas (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 903 ].) For this and other reasons, the Rivers court rejected the defendant’s challenge to CALJIC No. 2.21.2.

1996The Rivers jury properly received CALJIC No. 2.90 on reasonable doubt, including the mandate to decide the case based on “ ‘the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence’ ” and further was directed per CALJIC No. 1.01 to “ ‘consider the instructions as a whole and in light of all the others.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1046 , citing People v. Salas (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 903 ].) For this and other reasons, the Rivers court rejected the defendant’s challenge to CALJIC No. 2.21.2.

1990(LeMons v. Regents of University of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d 869, 876 .) If, after consideration of such factors, and such other factors as may be relevant in a particular case, there is a probability that an error in instruction misled the jury, and that the correct instruction might have resulted in a verdict more favorable to the appellant, the judgment should be reversed.

1990(Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d 663, 673-674 .) *123 a) The Degree of Conflict on the Evidence of Whether the Danger Which Caused James’s Injury Was Obvious or Readily Observable, Whether Harm to Him From Such Danger Was Foreseeable Despite the Obviousness of the Danger, and on Whether He Was Required to Encounter the Danger Because of His Employment Here, the evidence was uncontradicted that the danger, i.e., the pieces of concrete mixed with dirt, was obvious—plaintiff so testified himself.

1989(Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, supra, 625 F.2d 1313 , 1319.) As observed by the court in U.S. v. Establishment Inspection of: Jeep Corp., supra, “ ‘the evidence of a specific violation required to establish administra *631 tive probable cause, while less than that needed to show a probability of a violation, must at least show that the proposed inspection is based upon a reasonable belief that a violation has been or is being committed. . . .

1989This requirement is met by a showing of specific evidence sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation.’ ” ( 836 F.2d at p. 1027 , quoting West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan (11th Cir. 1982) 689 F.2d 950 .) However, to say that the same degree of probable cause is not required is not to say that no consideration need be given to the concerns focused on in the criminal setting.

1989This requirement is met by a showing of specific evidence sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation.’ ” ( 836 F.2d at p. 1027 , quoting West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan (11th Cir. 1982) 689 F.2d 950 .) However, to say that the same degree of probable cause is not required is not to say that no consideration need be given to the concerns focused on in the criminal setting.

1988Moreover, we believe that the fact that the Avis computer was used to retrieve information rather than perform calculations necessitates less scrutiny into the nature of the computer.” (People v. Mormon, supra, 422 N.E.2d at p. 1073 .) Finally, although the Bovio court reversed the conviction due to erroneous admission of computer evidence, it did so primarily because “[s]ystems, like the one apparently in question, which perform calculations must be scrutinized more thoroughly than those systems which merely retrieve information.” (People v. Bovio, supra, 455 N.E.2d at p. 833 .) *640 Analysis