8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1883–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his 2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his | 1 | 1 |
Jerominski v. Fowler, Dick & Walkergreen2 sentences1988Because the testimony by a party at a prior trial or deposition does not necessarily serve the procedural purpose of eliminating the need for proof of the facts to which it attests in the same way that a fact admitted in a stipulation does, only testimony which is unequivocal and clear will be treated as a judicial admission: The rule that a plaintiff is bound by his own testimony "has been limited to situations in which a party's testimony amounts to such a stipulation or waiver as to have the force of a judicial admission, and has been said to apply only if a party's testimony is clear and u 1988Because the testimony by a party at a prior trial or deposition does not necessarily serve the procedural purpose of eliminating the need for proof of the facts to which it attests in the same way that a fact admitted in a stipulation does, only testimony which is unequivocal and clear will be treated as a judicial admission: The rule that a plaintiff is bound by his own testimony "has been limited to situations in which a party's testimony amounts to such a stipulation or waiver as to have the force of a judicial admission, and has been said to apply only if a party's testimony is clear and u | 1 | 1 |
Greater Valley Terminal Corp. v. Goodmangreen2 sentences1988Because the testimony by a party at a prior trial or deposition does not necessarily serve the procedural purpose of eliminating the need for proof of the facts to which it attests in the same way that a fact admitted in a stipulation does, only testimony which is unequivocal and clear will be treated as a judicial admission: The rule that a plaintiff is bound by his own testimony "has been limited to situations in which a party's testimony amounts to such a stipulation or waiver as to have the force of a judicial admission, and has been said to apply only if a party's testimony is clear and u 1988Because the testimony by a party at a prior trial or deposition does not necessarily serve the procedural purpose of eliminating the need for proof of the facts to which it attests in the same way that a fact admitted in a stipulation does, only testimony which is unequivocal and clear will be treated as a judicial admission: The rule that a plaintiff is bound by his own testimony "has been limited to situations in which a party's testimony amounts to such a stipulation or waiver as to have the force of a judicial admission, and has been said to apply only if a party's testimony is clear and u | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Hutchinsongreen2 sentences1988See, e.g., Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118 , 275 A.2d 23 (1971) (deposition testimony that did not contain clear statement of agency was not judicial admission). 1988See, e.g., Thomas v. Hutchinson, 442 Pa. 118 , 275 A.2d 23 (1971) (deposition testimony that did not contain clear statement of agency was not judicial admission). | 1 | 1 |
Deskins v. West Brownsville Boroughgreen1 sentence1981See: Yatzor v. Washingtown Township, 5 Pa. Commw. 291 (1972); Petras v. Union Township, 28 D. & C. 2d 687 (1962), affirmed per curiam 409 Pa. 416 (1963); Masemer v. McSherrystown Borough, 34 D. & C. 2d 205 (1967); compare Deskins v. West Brownsville Borough, 388 Pa. 547 (1957). (6) Although the stipulations seems to qualify plaintiff Williams within the foregoing criteria, there is such substantial inconsistency between such an interpretation of the stipulation and defense counsel’s current allegations in his continuance motion, that we are not satisfied to resolve the case on the basis of the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Protz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2022(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 93a.) In September 2015, this Court decided Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 124 A.3d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (Protz I), affirmed, 161 A.3d 827 (2017) (Protz II). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Protz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2022(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 93a.) In September 2015, this Court decided Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 124 A.3d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (Protz I), affirmed, 161 A.3d 827 (2017) (Protz II). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Belak
green
2 sentences2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his 2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mitchell v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his 2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Nomination Paper of Rogers
neutral
2 sentences2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his 2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi , it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made h | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Commonwealth v. Mitchell
neutral
2 sentences2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made his 2009Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 71-72 , 902 A.2d 430, 461-462 (Pa.2006), reargument denied, 589 Pa. 361 , 909 A.2d 299 (2006), cert denied, Mitchell v. Pennsylvania, 549 U.S. 1169 , 127 S.Ct. 1126 , 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). ¶ 8 In addition, in Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 420 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa.2003), the appellant essentially argued that under Apprendi , it was necessary for the trial court to submit the question of whether the victims of his burglaries had been present during the commission of the offenses for proof beyond a reasonable doubt because this fact made h | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Guzik v. Laurel Ridge Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1984In Guzik v. Laurel Ridge Construction Co., 196 Pa. Superior Ct. 586 , 176 A.2d 183 (1961), where as here there was a referee’s unappealed termination order based upon a stipulation at a hearing on July 31, 1957, that all disability as a result of the accident had ceased as of March 5, 1957, as here there was a subsequent petition to reinstate in support of which claimant’s testimony was that, “notwithstanding the stipulation of Counsel, he had not recovered at the time of the hearing on July 31, 1957.” In ruling that the petition to reinstate should be treated as filed under the first paragrap 1984In Guzik v. Laurel Ridge Construction Co., 196 Pa. Superior Ct. 586 , 176 A.2d 183 (1961), where as here there was a referee’s unappealed termination order based upon a stipulation at a hearing on July 31, 1957, that all disability as a result of the accident had ceased as of March 5, 1957, as here there was a subsequent petition to reinstate in support of which claimant’s testimony was that, “notwithstanding the stipulation of Counsel, he had not recovered at the time of the hearing on July 31, 1957.” In ruling that the petition to reinstate should be treated as filed under the first paragrap | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Petras v. Union Township
green
1 sentence1981See: Yatzor v. Washingtown Township, 5 Pa. Commw. 291 (1972); Petras v. Union Township, 28 D. & C. 2d 687 (1962), affirmed per curiam 409 Pa. 416 (1963); Masemer v. McSherrystown Borough, 34 D. & C. 2d 205 (1967); compare Deskins v. West Brownsville Borough, 388 Pa. 547 (1957). (6) Although the stipulations seems to qualify plaintiff Williams within the foregoing criteria, there is such substantial inconsistency between such an interpretation of the stipulation and defense counsel’s current allegations in his continuance motion, that we are not satisfied to resolve the case on the basis of the | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Yatzor v. Washington Township Commissioners
green
1 sentence1981See: Yatzor v. Washingtown Township, 5 Pa. Commw. 291 (1972); Petras v. Union Township, 28 D. & C. 2d 687 (1962), affirmed per curiam 409 Pa. 416 (1963); Masemer v. McSherrystown Borough, 34 D. & C. 2d 205 (1967); compare Deskins v. West Brownsville Borough, 388 Pa. 547 (1957). (6) Although the stipulations seems to qualify plaintiff Williams within the foregoing criteria, there is such substantial inconsistency between such an interpretation of the stipulation and defense counsel’s current allegations in his continuance motion, that we are not satisfied to resolve the case on the basis of the | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Baity
green
2 sentences1974Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594 , 229 A.2d 922 (1967). *373 The confession was read into the record at the degree of guilt hearing only after a stipulation by defense counsel and the Commonwealth that appellant’s ten page statement was voluntarily given. 1974Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594 , 229 A.2d 922 (1967). *373 The confession was read into the record at the degree of guilt hearing only after a stipulation by defense counsel and the Commonwealth that appellant’s ten page statement was voluntarily given. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Commonwealth v. Garrett
green
2 sentences1974Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594 , 229 A.2d 922 (1967). *373 The confession was read into the record at the degree of guilt hearing only after a stipulation by defense counsel and the Commonwealth that appellant’s ten page statement was voluntarily given. 1974Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594 , 229 A.2d 922 (1967). *373 The confession was read into the record at the degree of guilt hearing only after a stipulation by defense counsel and the Commonwealth that appellant’s ten page statement was voluntarily given. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Johnstown Iron Co. v. Cambria Iron Co.
green
1 sentence1923In Johnstown Iron Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 32 Pa. 241 , there was a grant of a privilege of raising iron ore on the lands of the grantor at a certain price per ton, of which Mr. Justice Woodward said: “It was not a sale of all the ore, notwithstanding the stipulation that the privilege was to be given to none else, because it was to be paid for by the ton, and, of course, no more was sold than should be raised.” In Finnegan v. Stineman, 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 124 , the question was whether the mere recording of a conveyance of the coal stopped the running of the statute of limitations in favor of | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Finnegan v. Pennsylvania Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1923In Johnstown Iron Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 32 Pa. 241 , there was a grant of a privilege of raising iron ore on the lands of the grantor at a certain price per ton, of which Mr. Justice Woodward said: “It was not a sale of all the ore, notwithstanding the stipulation that the privilege was to be given to none else, because it was to be paid for by the ton, and, of course, no more was sold than should be raised.” In Finnegan v. Stineman, 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 124 , the question was whether the mere recording of a conveyance of the coal stopped the running of the statute of limitations in favor of | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Allen v. . St. Louis Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1883Co., 85 N. Y. 473 ; Western Ins. | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.