stipulation error in California

2015(People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1183, fn. 11 .) The trial court may question the defendant about the charged offense or solicit a stipulation from defense counsel that the police report or preliminary hearing transcript provides a factual basis for the plea, as was done here.

2015(People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1183, fn. 11 .) The trial court may question the defendant about the charged offense or solicit a stipulation from defense counsel that the police report or preliminary hearing transcript provides a factual basis for the plea, as was done here.

1974(See In re Etherington (1950) 35 Cal.2d 863, 867 [ 221 P.2d 942 ].) The mother further points out that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court rested upon its finding that, in August 1969, no parent was available to exercise care and control over the children, but that at the present instance she has come to the United States and is willing and capable of exercising such care and control.

1974(See In re Etherington (1950) 35 Cal.2d 863, 867 [ 221 P.2d 942 ].) The mother further points out that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court rested upon its finding that, in August 1969, no parent was available to exercise care and control over the children, but that at the present instance she has come to the United States and is willing and capable of exercising such care and control.

2016(Palmer, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 118 .) In Palmer this occurred during the plea colloquy.

2014(People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118 (Palmer).) Defense counsel has broad authority to stipulate to factual and procedural matters on behalf of a client and such stipulations obviate the need for proof.

2014Such a stipulation or waiver will be ignored, and parol evidence of misrepresentations will be admitted, for the reason that fraud renders the whole agreement voidable, including the waiver provision.’ [Citation.] “Under these principles, California courts have concluded that a variety of contract terms neither bar fraud claims nor establish as a matter of law that reliance upon the defendant’s misrepresentations was unjustifiable. [Citation.] For example, in Hinesley, the plaintiff asserted a fraud claim against his landlord, alleging that when he leased commercial space in a shopping center,

2008(See Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 300-302 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 364 ] (Hinesley), and cases cited therein.) For example, in Hinesley , the plaintiff asserted a fraud claim against his landlord, alleging that when he leased commercial space in a shopping center, the landlord’s agent told him that other units in the shopping center would be occupied by businesses likely to attract heavy “foot traffic.” (Id. at p. 292.) The lease in question contained a provision that expressly accorded the landlord the exclusive right to select other tenants, and recited that the plain

1979(People v. Guzman, 47 Cal.App.3d 380, 389 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 69 ].) To the same effect see People v. Sherren, 89 Cal.App.3d 752, 755 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 828 ], People v. Eastmon, 61 Cal.App.3d 646, 655 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 510 ]; People v. Perry, 271 Cal.App.2d 84, 101 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 725 ]; People v. Gregg, 266 Cal.App.2d 389, 395 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 920 ]; People v. Irvin, 264 Cal.App.2d 747, 763 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 892 ]; People v. Gonzales, 262 Cal.App.2d 286, 290 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; People v. Horn, 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 75 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 578 ] (cert, den., 368 U.S. 846 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 44 , 82 S.Ct. 76 ]); People v. F

1979(People v. Guzman, 47 Cal.App.3d 380, 389 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 69 ].) To the same effect see People v. Sherren, 89 Cal.App.3d 752, 755 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 828 ], People v. Eastmon, 61 Cal.App.3d 646, 655 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 510 ]; People v. Perry, 271 Cal.App.2d 84, 101 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 725 ]; People v. Gregg, 266 Cal.App.2d 389, 395 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 920 ]; People v. Irvin, 264 Cal.App.2d 747, 763 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 892 ]; People v. Gonzales, 262 Cal.App.2d 286, 290 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; People v. Horn, 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 75 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 578 ] (cert, den., 368 U.S. 846 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 44 , 82 S.Ct. 76 ]); People v. F

2024(See Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 [“when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the corporate entity and deem the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons or organizations actually controlling the corporation”].) Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that Burns’s signature on the injunction stipulation as manager of the Crosby Clinic bound that entity to the stipulation was not error.

2021Watts’s own expert, Ruzak, confirmed in response to questioning that “the toe completely cover[ed] the shoulder.” In discussing the stipulation at the hearing on the City’s motion for JNOV, Watts’s counsel never disagreed with the trial court’s reading of the stipulation as establishing that the toe covered the shoulder; rather, counsel asserted that no testimony defined the term “toe.” (See City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 393 [party’s conduct following execution of contract may reveal parties’ understanding and intent].) In fact, the City elicite

2012Article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution requires a stipulation before a commissioner may act as a temporary judge to determine a cause. 6 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this constitutional provision is applicable to the present context of child support enforcement proceedings in which the Department is providing services (see, e.g., §§ 4250-4252), we note the stipulation requirement is deemed satisfied by conduct from which it may be implied (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ]; In re Courtney H. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227

2012Article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution requires a stipulation before a commissioner may act as a temporary judge to determine a cause. 6 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this constitutional provision is applicable to the present context of child support enforcement proceedings in which the Department is providing services (see, e.g., §§ 4250-4252), we note the stipulation requirement is deemed satisfied by conduct from which it may be implied (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ]; In re Courtney H. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227

2012Article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution requires a stipulation before a commissioner may act as a temporary judge to determine a cause. 6 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this constitutional provision is applicable to the present context of child support enforcement proceedings in which the Department is providing services (see, e.g., §§ 4250-4252), we note the stipulation requirement is deemed satisfied by conduct from which it may be implied (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ]; In re Courtney H. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227

2012Article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution requires a stipulation before a commissioner may act as a temporary judge to determine a cause. 6 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this constitutional provision is applicable to the present context of child support enforcement proceedings in which the Department is providing services (see, e.g., §§ 4250-4252), we note the stipulation requirement is deemed satisfied by conduct from which it may be implied (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ]; In re Courtney H. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227

2012Article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution requires a stipulation before a commissioner may act as a temporary judge to determine a cause. 6 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this constitutional provision is applicable to the present context of child support enforcement proceedings in which the Department is providing services (see, e.g., §§ 4250-4252), we note the stipulation requirement is deemed satisfied by conduct from which it may be implied (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ]; In re Courtney H. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227

2012Article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution requires a stipulation before a commissioner may act as a temporary judge to determine a cause. 6 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this constitutional provision is applicable to the present context of child support enforcement proceedings in which the Department is providing services (see, e.g., §§ 4250-4252), we note the stipulation requirement is deemed satisfied by conduct from which it may be implied (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ]; In re Courtney H. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227

2009Such a stipulation or waiver will be ignored, and parol evidence of misrepresentations will be admitted, for the reason that fraud renders the whole agreement voidable, including the waiver provision.’ ”]; Guido v. Koopman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 ] [same].) An award of attorney fees to the successful plaintiff appears to be the primary additional relief available for prevailing on a claim under die CLRA, as well as on claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation and unfair competition.

2009Such a stipulation or waiver will be ignored, and parol evidence of misrepresentations will be admitted, for the reason that fraud renders the whole agreement voidable, including the waiver provision.’ ”]; Guido v. Koopman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 ] [same].) An award of attorney fees to the successful plaintiff appears to be the primary additional relief available for prevailing on a claim under die CLRA, as well as on claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation and unfair competition.

2009(See Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066, 1086 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 ] [“the availability of costs and attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs is integral to making the CLRA an effective piece of consumer legislation, increasing the financial feasibility of bringing suits under the statute”].) Briefing in Fairbanks has been completed, and the case has been scheduled for oral argument on March 4, 2009.

2009(See Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066, 1086 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 988 P.2d 67 ] [“the availability of costs and attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs is integral to making the CLRA an effective piece of consumer legislation, increasing the financial feasibility of bringing suits under the statute”].) Briefing in Fairbanks has been completed, and the case has been scheduled for oral argument on March 4, 2009.

2009In determining the lawfulness of a stipulation that contemplates an equitable remedy, the court should take into account the special nature of equitable remedies. (13 *726 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Equity, § 2, p. 283.) Given their extraordinary nature, equitable remedies are usually unavailable where the remedy at law is adequate, as where damages are quantifiable. ( Id., § 3, pp. 284-285; Morrison v. Land (1915) 169 Cal. 580, 586 [ 147 P. 259 ].) That means that a court must reject a stipulation contemplating an equitable remedy that is contrary to law or public policy, such as whe

2009In determining the lawfulness of a stipulation that contemplates an equitable remedy, the court should take into account the special nature of equitable remedies. (13 *726 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Equity, § 2, p. 283.) Given their extraordinary nature, equitable remedies are usually unavailable where the remedy at law is adequate, as where damages are quantifiable. ( Id., § 3, pp. 284-285; Morrison v. Land (1915) 169 Cal. 580, 586 [ 147 P. 259 ].) That means that a court must reject a stipulation contemplating an equitable remedy that is contrary to law or public policy, such as whe