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8 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burdettegreen2 sentences2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2010Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C)(2)(b) (Supp. 2009) (defining "trafficking in ice, crank, or crack cocaine" and "distribut[ing], sell[ing], manufactur[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to distribute controlled substances within proximity of school" as serious offenses); State v. Williams , 380 S.C. 336, 346 , 669 S.E.2d 640, 646 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The cruel and unusual punishment clause requires that the duration of a sentence not be grossly disproportionate with the severity of the crime."); Id. at 347-48, 669 S.E.2d at 646 ("Our courts have also determined stiff penalties for drug crimes do not viola 2010Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C)(2)(b) (Supp. 2009) (defining "trafficking in ice, crank, or crack cocaine" and "distribut[ing], sell[ing], manufactur[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to distribute controlled substances within proximity of school" as serious offenses); State v. Williams , 380 S.C. 336, 346 , 669 S.E.2d 640, 646 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The cruel and unusual punishment clause requires that the duration of a sentence not be grossly disproportionate with the severity of the crime."); Id. at 347-48, 669 S.E.2d at 646 ("Our courts have also determined stiff penalties for drug crimes do not viola | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brannongreen2 sentences2010Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C)(2)(b) (Supp. 2009) (defining "trafficking in ice, crank, or crack cocaine" and "distribut[ing], sell[ing], manufactur[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to distribute controlled substances within proximity of school" as serious offenses); State v. Williams , 380 S.C. 336, 346 , 669 S.E.2d 640, 646 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The cruel and unusual punishment clause requires that the duration of a sentence not be grossly disproportionate with the severity of the crime."); Id. at 347-48, 669 S.E.2d at 646 ("Our courts have also determined stiff penalties for drug crimes do not viola 2010Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C)(2)(b) (Supp. 2009) (defining "trafficking in ice, crank, or crack cocaine" and "distribut[ing], sell[ing], manufactur[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to distribute controlled substances within proximity of school" as serious offenses); State v. Williams , 380 S.C. 336, 346 , 669 S.E.2d 640, 646 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The cruel and unusual punishment clause requires that the duration of a sentence not be grossly disproportionate with the severity of the crime."); Id. at 347-48, 669 S.E.2d at 646 ("Our courts have also determined stiff penalties for drug crimes do not viola | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKnightgreen2 sentences2008State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 652 , 576 S.E.2d 168, 177 (2003). 2008State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 652 , 576 S.E.2d 168, 177 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2003Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). 2003Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). | 3 | 1986–2003 |
James v. State
green
2 sentences2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 2016Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (C) (Supp. 2015) (stating criminal sexual conduct with minors, first-degree burglary, and attempted murder are "[m]ost serious offense[s]"); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 41 , 515 S.E.2d 525, 529 (1999) ("If a defendant is convicted of one of the [section 17-25-45(C)] triggering offenses, the matter of sentencing becomes the province of the legislature."); State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 69 , 552 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The General Assembly has made the sentencing provisions of section 17- 25-45(A) mandatory."), overruled on other grounds by James v. State, 372 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Kiser
green
2 sentences1993State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441 , 343 S.E. (2d) 292 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 , 107 S.Ct. 94 , 93 L.Ed. (2d) 46 (1986).The length of each of respondent’s license suspensions are not disproportionate to the individual DUI and DUS convictions. 1993State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441 , 343 S.E. (2d) 292 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 , 107 S.Ct. 94 , 93 L.Ed. (2d) 46 (1986).The length of each of respondent’s license suspensions are not disproportionate to the individual DUI and DUS convictions. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Embury v. Supreme Court of Colorado
green
1 sentence1993State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441 , 343 S.E. (2d) 292 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 , 107 S.Ct. 94 , 93 L.Ed. (2d) 46 (1986).The length of each of respondent’s license suspensions are not disproportionate to the individual DUI and DUS convictions. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Union Electric Co. v. Harris
green
1 sentence1993State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441 , 343 S.E. (2d) 292 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 , 107 S.Ct. 94 , 93 L.Ed. (2d) 46 (1986).The length of each of respondent’s license suspensions are not disproportionate to the individual DUI and DUS convictions. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.