scutpa claim in South Carolina

2015The trial court adopted a multi-factor test used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in determining an appropriate civil penalty: “(1) the good or bad faith of the defendants; (2) the injury to the public; (3) the defendant’s ability to pay; (4) the desire to eliminate the benefits derived by a violation; and (5) the necessity of vindicating the authority of [the regulatory agency].” United States v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 662 F.2d 955, 967 (3d Cir.1981). 31 Janssen challenges the penalty award on numerous grounds, including the argument that the total penalty, in

2015The trial court adopted a multi-factor test used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in determining an appropriate civil penalty: “(1) the good or bad faith of the defendants; (2) the injury to the public; (3) the defendant’s ability to pay; (4) the desire to eliminate the benefits derived by a violation; and (5) the necessity of vindicating the authority of [the regulatory agency].” United States v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 662 F.2d 955, 967 (3d Cir.1981). 31 Janssen challenges the penalty award on numerous grounds, including the argument that the total penalty, in

2015See Kreutner v. David, 820 S.C. 288 , 285-86, 465 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1995) (discussing the discovery rule for purposes of triggering the limitations period and finding that where the evidence is overwhelming a reasonable person should have known she might have a claim at a time beyond the statute of limitations, then such claim is time-barred).

2015See Kreutner v. David, 820 S.C. 288 , 285-86, 465 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1995) (discussing the discovery rule for purposes of triggering the limitations period and finding that where the evidence is overwhelming a reasonable person should have known she might have a claim at a time beyond the statute of limitations, then such claim is time-barred).

2026See Mull, 387 S.C. at 488‑89, 693 S.E.2d at 32 (explaining that when section 39‑5‑140(a) is read as a whole, it is clear that "actual damages are distinct from attorney's fees").

2026See Mull, 387 S.C. at 488‑89, 693 S.E.2d at 32 (explaining that when section 39‑5‑140(a) is read as a whole, it is clear that "actual damages are distinct from attorney's fees").

2024See also York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 406 S.C. 67, 88 , 749 S.E.2d 139, 150 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that an arbitration provision identical to the one in Simpson precluding treble damages was unconscionable).

2024See also York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 406 S.C. 67, 88 , 749 S.E.2d 139, 150 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that an arbitration provision identical to the one in Simpson precluding treble damages was unconscionable).

2020See Crary, 329 S.C. at 388 , 496 S.E.2d at 23 (1998) (holding evidence indicating mortgage broker had other opportunities to enter into similar transactions was sufficient evidence to support a finding of a SCUTPA violation); York v. Conway Ford, Inc., 325 S.C. 170, 173 , 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997) (holding allegation of car dealership's alleged misrepresentation of a car's accident history was sufficient to survive directed verdict motion for SCUTPA violation because the dealership was in the business of selling cars; thus, "[c]ertainly the alleged acts or practices have the potential for rep

2020See Crary, 329 S.C. at 388 , 496 S.E.2d at 23 (1998) (holding evidence indicating mortgage broker had other opportunities to enter into similar transactions was sufficient evidence to support a finding of a SCUTPA violation); York v. Conway Ford, Inc., 325 S.C. 170, 173 , 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997) (holding allegation of car dealership's alleged misrepresentation of a car's accident history was sufficient to survive directed verdict motion for SCUTPA violation because the dealership was in the business of selling cars; thus, "[c]ertainly the alleged acts or practices have the potential for rep

2020See Crary, 329 S.C. at 388 , 496 S.E.2d at 23 (1998) (holding evidence indicating mortgage broker had other opportunities to enter into similar transactions was sufficient evidence to support a finding of a SCUTPA violation); York v. Conway Ford, Inc., 325 S.C. 170, 173 , 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997) (holding allegation of car dealership's alleged misrepresentation of a car's accident history was sufficient to survive directed verdict motion for SCUTPA violation because the dealership was in the business of selling cars; thus, "[c]ertainly the alleged acts or practices have the potential for rep

2020See Crary, 329 S.C. at 388 , 496 S.E.2d at 23 (1998) (holding evidence indicating mortgage broker had other opportunities to enter into similar transactions was sufficient evidence to support a finding of a SCUTPA violation); York v. Conway Ford, Inc., 325 S.C. 170, 173 , 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997) (holding allegation of car dealership's alleged misrepresentation of a car's accident history was sufficient to survive directed verdict motion for SCUTPA violation because the dealership was in the business of selling cars; thus, "[c]ertainly the alleged acts or practices have the potential for rep

2018See NationsBank , 320 S.C. at 303 , 465 S.E.2d at 100 ("Once a party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the nonmoving party's case, the nonmoving party may not simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings.").

2018See NationsBank , 320 S.C. at 303 , 465 S.E.2d at 100 ("Once a party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the nonmoving party's case, the nonmoving party may not simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings.").

2017See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 22 , 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the nonmoving party is proper."); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) ("On review, [appellate courts] will affirm a directed verdict where there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged cause of action.").

2017See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 22 , 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the nonmoving party is proper."); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) ("On review, [appellate courts] will affirm a directed verdict where there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged cause of action.").

2017See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 22 , 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the nonmoving party is proper."); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) ("On review, [appellate courts] will affirm a directed verdict where there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged cause of action.").

2017See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 22 , 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the nonmoving party is proper."); Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163 , 612 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) ("On review, [appellate courts] will affirm a directed verdict where there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged cause of action.").