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59 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1998“In the context of a death sentencing hearing, the defendant must prove that counsel’s representation was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 109 (1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 , 80 L. 1998“In the context of a death sentencing hearing, the defendant must prove that counsel’s representation was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 109 (1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 , 80 L. | 5 | 9 |
People v. Perezgreen2 sentences2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 507 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (defendant’s wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 176-77 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was a psychological report prepared by the Department of Corrections during the defendant’s incarceration for a prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 I 2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 507 , 231 Ill.Dec. 557 , *685 696 N.E.2d 1128 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 166 , 213 Ill.Dec. 589 , 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 165 , 204 Ill.Dec. 147 , 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994) (defendant's wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 176-77 , 170 Ill.Dec. 304 , 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was | 4 | 4 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty (People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d 349, 372-75 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence (People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 376 (2000)); (3) it permits the sentencing body to weigh the 2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty ( People v. Davis, 205 Ill.2d 349, 372-75 , 275 Ill.Dec. 781 , 793 N.E.2d 552 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence ( People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 376 , 250 Ill.Dec. 692 , | 4 | 4 |
People v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2001See People v. Thompkins, 191 Ill. 2d 438, 477 (2000). 2001See People v. Thompkins, 191 Ill. 2d 438, 477 (2000) (and cases cited therein). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 507 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (defendant’s wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 176-77 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was a psychological report prepared by the Department of Corrections during the defendant’s incarceration for a prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 I 1995Pierre (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 494, 511 ; People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 334-35 ; People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 1, 20-21 ; People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 107 ; People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, 292 ; People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 220-21 ; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 534-36 .) In Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 , the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury for the death sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary, because he had not been informed that the vote of one juror could preclude imposition of the death penalty. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 507 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (defendant’s wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 176-77 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was a psychological report prepared by the Department of Corrections during the defendant’s incarceration for a prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 I 2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 507 , 231 Ill.Dec. 557 , *685 696 N.E.2d 1128 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 166 , 213 Ill.Dec. 589 , 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 165 , 204 Ill.Dec. 147 , 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994) (defendant's wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 176-77 , 170 Ill.Dec. 304 , 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was | 3 | 4 |
People v. Orangegreen2 sentences2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 507 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (defendant’s wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 176-77 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was a psychological report prepared by the Department of Corrections during the defendant’s incarceration for a prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 I 2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 507 , 231 Ill.Dec. 557 , *685 696 N.E.2d 1128 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 166 , 213 Ill.Dec. 589 , 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 165 , 204 Ill.Dec. 147 , 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994) (defendant's wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 176-77 , 170 Ill.Dec. 304 , 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was | 3 | 4 |
People v. Hamptongreen2 sentences1998“In the context of a death sentencing hearing, the defendant must prove that counsel’s representation was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 109 (1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 , 80 L. 1998"In the context of a death sentencing hearing, the defendant must prove that counsel's representation was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." People v. Hampton, 149 Ill.2d 71, 109 , 171 Ill.Dec. 439 , 594 N.E.2d 291 (1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). | 2 | 5 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty (People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d 349, 372-75 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence (People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 376 (2000)); (3) it permits the sentencing body to weigh the 2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty ( People v. Davis, 205 Ill.2d 349, 372-75 , 275 Ill.Dec. 781 , 793 N.E.2d 552 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence ( People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 376 , 250 Ill.Dec. 692 , | 2 | 4 |
People v. Townsgreen2 sentences2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 507 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (defendant’s wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 176-77 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was a psychological report prepared by the Department of Corrections during the defendant’s incarceration for a prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 I 2002E.g., Towns, 182 Ill.2d at 507 , 231 Ill.Dec. 557 , *685 696 N.E.2d 1128 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 166 , 213 Ill.Dec. 589 , 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 165 , 204 Ill.Dec. 147 , 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994) (defendant's wife was the sole mitigation witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill.2d 168, 176-77 , 170 Ill.Dec. 304 , 592 N.E.2d 984 (1992) (the sole evidence presented in mitigation was | 2 | 4 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2001See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 368-73 ; Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 321-22 ; Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d at 347 . 2001See Williams, 193 Ill.2d at 368-73 , 250 Ill.Dec. 692 , 739 N.E.2d 455 ; Williams, 181 Ill.2d at 321-22 , 229 Ill.Dec. 898 , 692 N.E.2d 1109 ; Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 347 , 135 Ill.Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 . | 2 | 4 |
People v. Griffingreen2 sentences2001People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 403 (1998); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 87 (1997). 2001People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 403 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d 65, 87 , 227 Ill.Dec. 338 , 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2001People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 403 (1998); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 87 (1997). 2001People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 403 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d 65, 87 , 227 Ill.Dec. 338 , 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Brownellgreen2 sentences1983These include the argument that the discretion vested by the statute in the prosecutor to request a death sentencing hearing results in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty ( People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill.2d 508 , cert. dismissed (1980), 449 U.S. 811 , 66 L.Ed.2d 14 , 101 S.Ct. 59 ; People ex rel. 1983These include the argument that the discretion vested by the statute in the prosecutor to request a death sentencing hearing results in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty (People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508 , cert. dismissed (1980), 449 U.S. 811 , 66 L. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Gachogreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 135 (1994); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 260 (1988). 1995On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional rights because: (1) the State received twice as many peremptory challenges as he; (2) his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest; (3) he received deficient representation at a pretrial suppression hearing, the death sentencing hearing, and on direct review; (4) this court, on direct review, held that the rule announced in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221, 262 , applied prospectively; and (5) the jury instructions failed to adequately guide the jury in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences2001People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 337 (1993). 2001People v. Hall, 157 Ill.2d 324, 337 , 193 Ill.Dec. 98 , 626 N.E.2d 131 (1993). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2008An Illinois criminal defendant has a statutory right to choose a jury for the death sentencing hearing, even when convicted at a bench trial. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(d) (West 2006); see People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 155-56 (1996). 2008An Illinois criminal defendant has a statutory right to choose a jury for the death sentencing hearing, even when convicted at a bench trial. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 2006); see People v. Brown, 169 Ill.2d 132, 155-56 , 214 Ill.Dec. 433 , 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Stricklandgreen2 sentences2008While an Illinois criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose a jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the proceedings, the defendant’s right to choose a jury at the death sentencing hearing is wholly statutory. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(d) (West 2006); People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (1992) (collecting cases). 2008While an Illinois criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose a jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the proceedings, the defendant's right to choose a jury at the death sentencing hearing is wholly statutory. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 2006); People v. Strickland, 154 Ill.2d 489, 517 , 182 Ill.Dec. 551 , 609 N.E.2d 1366 (1992) (collecting cases). | 2 | 2 |
People v. MacRigreen2 sentences2008People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 77 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 185 (1996); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 533-34 (1980). 2008People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 77 , 235 Ill.Dec. 589 , 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill.2d 158, 185 , 215 Ill.Dec. 125 , 662 N.E.2d 1265 (1996); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d 508, 533-34 , 38 Ill.Dec. 757 , 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Ware v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 703-04 , 759 A.2d 764, 792 (2000) (“Whether a defendant is to be sentenced by the court or the jury is a decision for the defendant”). 2008See, e.g., Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 703-04 , 759 A.2d 764, 792 (2000) (“Whether a defendant is to be sentenced by the court or the jury is a decision for the defendant”). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Munsongreen2 sentences2008People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 77 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 185 (1996); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 533-34 (1980). 2008People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 77 , 235 Ill.Dec. 589 , 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998); People v. Munson, 171 Ill.2d 158, 185 , 215 Ill.Dec. 125 , 662 N.E.2d 1265 (1996); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d 508, 533-34 , 38 Ill.Dec. 757 , 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ericksongreen2 sentences2008Ed. 2d 340, 351-53 , 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3161-62 (1984); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 289 (1987)), a jury serves two significant functions in a death sentencing hearing. 2008Although not constitutionally required (see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-60 , 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161-62 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 351-53 (1984); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d 271, 289 , Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987)), a jury serves two significant functions in a death sentencing hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Spaziano v. Floridared2 sentences2008Ed. 2d 340, 351-53 , 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3161-62 (1984); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 289 (1987)), a jury serves two significant functions in a death sentencing hearing. 2008Although not constitutionally required (see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-60 , 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3161-62 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 351-53 (1984); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d 271, 289 , Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987)), a jury serves two significant functions in a death sentencing hearing. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kirchnergreen2 sentences2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty (People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d 349, 372-75 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence (People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 376 (2000)); (3) it permits the sentencing body to weigh the 2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty ( People v. Davis, 205 Ill.2d 349, 372-75 , 275 Ill.Dec. 781 , 793 N.E.2d 552 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence ( People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 376 , 250 Ill.Dec. 692 , | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hopegreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Easleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Simmsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Sanchezgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Mooregreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hudsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Fairgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Kitchengreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Morgangreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kuntugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mahaffey
green
2 sentences1999Mahaffey, 165 Ill.2d at 466 , 209 Ill.Dec. 246 , 651 N.E.2d 174 . 1999Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d at 466 . | 5 | 1996–1999 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2010Ed. 2d 556 , 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), because the statute does not require the State, at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. 2010Ed. 2d 556 , 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), because the statute does not require the State, at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. | 4 | 2008–2010 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2010Ed. 2d 435 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), because the statute does not require the State, at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. 2010Ed. 2d 435 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), because the statute does not require the State, at the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. | 3 | 2008–2010 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2000Our conclusion, upon close examination of the statements, the argument in its entirety, and trial counsel’s actions at the death sentencing hearing, is that trial counsel exposed the State’s case to the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57 , 80 L. 2000Our conclusion, upon close examination of the statements, the argument in its entirety, and trial counsel’s actions at the death sentencing hearing, is that trial counsel exposed the State’s case to the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57 , 80 L. | 3 | 1992–2000 |
People v. Gilliam
green
2 sentences2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty (People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d 349, 372-75 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence (People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 376 (2000)); (3) it permits the sentencing body to weigh the 2002However, this court has previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty ( People v. Davis, 205 Ill.2d 349, 372-75 , 275 Ill.Dec. 781 , 793 N.E.2d 552 (2002)); (2) it places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation evidence ( People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 376 , 250 Ill.Dec. 692 , | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2001See Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 368-73 ; Williams, 181 Ill. 2d at 321-22 ; Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d at 347 . 2001See Williams, 193 Ill.2d at 368-73 , 250 Ill.Dec. 692 , 739 N.E.2d 455 ; Williams, 181 Ill.2d at 321-22 , 229 Ill.Dec. 898 , 692 N.E.2d 1109 ; Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 347 , 135 Ill.Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Lewis green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Evans green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Brown green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Pasch green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Christiansen green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Simms green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Henderson green | 2 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Eddmonds green | 2 | 1993–1995 |
| People v. Gaines green | 2 | 1983–1991 |
| Booth v. Maryland red | 2 | 1990–1991 |
| People v. Szabo green | 2 | 1983–1988 |
| Witherspoon v. Illinois green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Kyles v. Whitley green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Foster green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Giglio v. United States green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Brisbon green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. St. Pierre green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Guest green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Peeples green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Madej green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Buggs green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Lewis green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Albanese green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Ramey green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Buchanan v. Kentucky green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Rissley green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Caballero green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Morgan green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Holman green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Caballero green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Walker green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Brisbon green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Owens green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.