concluding clause in Tennessee

1950Clearly the limitation made in the Act now questioned does not contravene either of these sections of our State Constitution, “The registration laws of the state do not prescribe qualifications of electors, but were enacted for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the elected franchise, and are authorized by the concluding clause of Section 1, Art. 4 of the Constitution, ordaining that the General Assembly shall have power to enact laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.” State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn. 198, 201 , 122 S. W. 465 .

1918Into later case, the c'onrt said: “The registration laws of the State do not prescribe qualifications of electors, but were enacted for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the elective franchise, and are authorized by the concluding clause' of section 1, art. 4, of tb Constitution, ordaining that the General Assembly shall have power to enact laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.” State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn., 198 , 122 S. W., 465 .

1937In State Board of Examiners v. Engineering *520 Co., 157 Tenn., 157, 162 , 7 S. W. (2d), 47 , the concluding clause of the caption of the act, Pub.

1937In State Board of Examiners v. Engineering *520 Co., 157 Tenn., 157, 162 , 7 S. W. (2d), 47 , the concluding clause of the caption of the act, Pub.

1934The instant case is thus distinguished from the holding in the recent case of Standard Oil Co. v. People of State of California (February 5, 1934), 54 S. Ct., 381 , 78 L.

1932“The court has power to compel the discovery, and to prevent the transfer, payment, or delivery of the property, and to subject the same to the satisfaction of the judgment or decree, whether such property could, if in the defendant’s possession or with the title vested in him, he levied upon by execution or not.” In construing the first section quoted, this Court, in Porter v. Lee, 88 Tenn., 782, 793 , said: “It is easily to he seen that it is here declared that Chancery, Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to subject property which cannot be reached by execution, and this declaration is, by i

1932“The court has power to compel the discovery, and to prevent the transfer, payment, or delivery of the property, and to subject the same to the satisfaction of the judgment or decree, whether such property could, if in the defendant’s possession or with the title vested in him, he levied upon by execution or not.” In construing the first section quoted, this Court, in Porter v. Lee, 88 Tenn., 782, 793 , said: “It is easily to he seen that it is here declared that Chancery, Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to subject property which cannot be reached by execution, and this declaration is, by i

1932“The court has power to compel the discovery, and to prevent the transfer, payment, or delivery of the property, and to subject the same to the satisfaction of the judgment or decree, whether such property could, if in the defendant’s possession or with the title vested in him, he levied upon by execution or not.” In construing the first section quoted, this Court, in Porter v. Lee, 88 Tenn., 782, 793 , said: “It is easily to he seen that it is here declared that Chancery, Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to subject property which cannot be reached by execution, and this declaration is, by i

1931A. Burke’s name.” In the case of Moore v. Bridges, 161 Tenn., 422 , Chapter 31 of the Acts of 1927, was before the Court for construction, and wherein it is said: “The Act of 1927 does not authorize the seller to stop short of the description unless the property is of such nature that it could not be definitely described.

1909In Madison v. Wade, 88 Ga., 699 , 16 S. E., 21 , it is field that registration adds no qualification to voters, bnt merely serves to identify them as a person qualified to vote.

1909In Madison v. Wade, 88 Ga., 699 , 16 S. E., 21 , it is field that registration adds no qualification to voters, bnt merely serves to identify them as a person qualified to vote.

1908Conceding, however, that he is within its spirit, succeeding to whatever right, if any, his mother had (as is the holding of Dennis v. Dennis, 105 Tenn., 86 , 58 S. W., 284 ), the question then necessarily arises: What right did his mother have?

1908Conceding, however, that he is within its spirit, succeeding to whatever right, if any, his mother had (as is the holding of Dennis v. Dennis, 105 Tenn., 86 , 58 S. W., 284 ), the question then necessarily arises: What right did his mother have?