concluding clause in California

2016(People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 56-57 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4 , 186 P.3d 395 ].) Similarly, the trial court correctly refused to give proposed instruction No. 24C because it was ‘“just an alternative definition to ‘mitigating circumstances.’ ” Proposed instruction No. 26 was a modified version of the concluding instruction governing the conduct of jurors during deliberations.

2016(People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 56-57 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4 , 186 P.3d 395 ].) Similarly, the trial court correctly refused to give proposed instruction No. 24C because it was ‘“just an alternative definition to ‘mitigating circumstances.’ ” Proposed instruction No. 26 was a modified version of the concluding instruction governing the conduct of jurors during deliberations.

2012Proc., § 527.3, subd. (a).) This “existing law governing labor disputes,” the Sears plurality explained, encompassed Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766 , and Lane, supra, 71 Cal'.2d 872, decisions that had “not been overruled or eroded in later cases” and that “established the legality of union picketing on private sidewalks outside a store as a matter of state labor law.” (Sears, at p. 328 (plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.).) The Sears plurality then explained its conclusion about the proper construction of the Moscone Act: “As we noted earlier, subdivision (a) of the Moscone Act requires the

2012Proc., § 527.3, subd. (a).) This ―existing law governing labor disputes,‖ the Sears plurality explained, encompassed Schwartz-Torrance, supra, 61 Cal.2d 766 , and Lane, supra, 71 Cal.2d 872 , decisions that had ―not been overruled or eroded in later cases‖ and that ―established the legality of union picketing on private sidewalks outside a store as a matter of state labor law.‖ (Sears, at p. 328 (plur. opn. of Tobriner, J.).) The Sears plurality then explained its conclusion about the proper construction of the Moscone Act: ―As we noted earlier, subdivision (a) of the 16 Moscone Act requires t

2010Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 103 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 , 900 P.2d 669 ], overruled Seaman’s on this point and held that there is no such cause of action. 17 The case cited in Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at page 760 , footnote 13, Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert (1960) 54 Cal.2d 328 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 353 P.2d 294 ], also apparently involved a general verdict.

2010Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 103 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 , 900 P.2d 669 ], overruled Seaman’s on this point and held that there is no such cause of action. 17 The case cited in Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at page 760 , footnote 13, Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert (1960) 54 Cal.2d 328 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 353 P.2d 294 ], also apparently involved a general verdict.

2010Instead, the purpose of our discussion is to ensure that it does not occur on remand. 15 CACI No. 5012, the concluding instruction for a special verdict form, includes a statement that the jury “must consider each question separately.” 16 Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752, 769 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 686 P.2d 1158 ], formerly recognized a tort cause of action for bad faith denial of the existence of a contract.

2010Instead, the purpose of our discussion is to ensure that it does not occur on remand. 15 CACI No. 5012, the concluding instruction for a special verdict form, includes a statement that the jury “must consider each question separately.” 16 Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752, 769 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 354 , 686 P.2d 1158 ], formerly recognized a tort cause of action for bad faith denial of the existence of a contract.

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008(See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 275 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 758 P.2d 582 ].) In 1921, the age limits set forth in former section 56 of the Civil Code (18 years of age for males, 15 years of age for females) were revised upward to authorize marriage by any unmarried male 21 years or older and any unmarried female 18 years or older (Stats. 1921, ch. 233, § 1, pp. 333-334), and in 1969 these higher age limits were carried over to Civil Code former section 4101.

2008(See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 275 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 758 P.2d 582 ].) In 1921, the age limits set forth in former section 56 of the Civil Code (18 years of age for males, 15 years of age for females) were revised upward to authorize marriage by any unmarried male 21 years or older and any unmarried female 18 years or older (Stats. 1921, ch. 233, § 1, pp. 333-334), and in 1969 these higher age limits were carried over to Civil Code former section 4101.

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008We have explained, however, that “[t]he mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than ‘normal,’ and thus especially deserving of death.” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Thus, “the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant’s crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty.” (Id. at p. 789; see also People v. Ayala, s

2008Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife’s separate property.” As enacted in 1872, former section 55 of the Civil Code further provided: “Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by solemnization, or by a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties, or obligations.'” (Italics added.) In 1895, that statute was amended to delete the italicized language and to add “authorized by this code,” so that the concluding clause of the statute read: “[consent] must be followed by a solemnization authorized by this code.” (Stats. 1895, ch. 129, § 1, p. 121

2008Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife’s separate property.” As enacted in 1872, former section 55 of the Civil Code further provided: “Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by solemnization, or by a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties, or obligations.'” (Italics added.) In 1895, that statute was amended to delete the italicized language and to add “authorized by this code,” so that the concluding clause of the statute read: “[consent] must be followed by a solemnization authorized by this code.” (Stats. 1895, ch. 129, § 1, p. 121

1985(Compare those cases in which the reviewing court could not determine the jury had necessarily resolved a factual question adversely to defendant, including People v. McElheny (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 396, 403-404 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 39 ]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 541 ]; People v. Haney, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 314 .) Finally, in connection with the concluding instruction, CALJIC No. 17.50, the trial judge in this case read all of the possible verdict forms to the jurors; for each count of assault with a firearm, the jury was instructed in part as follows; “Ac

1985(Compare those cases in which the reviewing court could not determine the jury had necessarily resolved a factual question adversely to defendant, including People v. McElheny (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 396, 403-404 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 39 ]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 541 ]; People v. Haney, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 314 .) Finally, in connection with the concluding instruction, CALJIC No. 17.50, the trial judge in this case read all of the possible verdict forms to the jurors; for each count of assault with a firearm, the jury was instructed in part as follows; “Ac

1985(Compare those cases in which the reviewing court could not determine the jury had necessarily resolved a factual question adversely to defendant, including People v. McElheny (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 396, 403-404 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 39 ]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 541 ]; People v. Haney, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 314 .) Finally, in connection with the concluding instruction, CALJIC No. 17.50, the trial judge in this case read all of the possible verdict forms to the jurors; for each count of assault with a firearm, the jury was instructed in part as follows; “Ac

1985(Compare those cases in which the reviewing court could not determine the jury had necessarily resolved a factual question adversely to defendant, including People v. McElheny (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 396, 403-404 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 39 ]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 541 ]; People v. Haney, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 314 .) Finally, in connection with the concluding instruction, CALJIC No. 17.50, the trial judge in this case read all of the possible verdict forms to the jurors; for each count of assault with a firearm, the jury was instructed in part as follows; “Ac

1985The reasonable juror, upon hearing this instruction, would conclude that the list was his or her exclusive “guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision.” (Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 192 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 885 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 ].) This inference could only have been strengthened by the concluding instruction, CALJIC No. 8.89: “After having considered all of the evidence in this case and having taken into account all the applicable factors upon which you have been

1985The reasonable juror, upon hearing this instruction, would conclude that the list was his or her exclusive “guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision.” (Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 192 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 885 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 ].) This inference could only have been strengthened by the concluding instruction, CALJIC No. 8.89: “After having considered all of the evidence in this case and having taken into account all the applicable factors upon which you have been

1984William claims that by construing the interlocutory decree to permit the court to extend spousal support beyond September 1, 1984, the trial court impermissibly departed from the plain meaning of the parties’ stipulated agreement and inserted a term not found therein (citing Apra v. Aureguy (1961) 55 Cal.2d 827, 830 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 361 P.2d 897 ] [pronouncing general rule that “ ‘courts are not empowered under the guise of construction or explanation to depart from the plain meaning of the writing and insert a term or limitation not found therein.’” (Citation omitted.)]) He relies on the

1984William claims that by construing the interlocutory decree to permit the court to extend spousal support beyond September 1, 1984, the trial court impermissibly departed from the plain meaning of the parties’ stipulated agreement and inserted a term not found therein (citing Apra v. Aureguy (1961) 55 Cal.2d 827, 830 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 361 P.2d 897 ] [pronouncing general rule that “ ‘courts are not empowered under the guise of construction or explanation to depart from the plain meaning of the writing and insert a term or limitation not found therein.’” (Citation omitted.)]) He relies on the

1983(See fn. 10, ante.) Finally, whereas section 496, subdivision 2 provides simply that if the basic facts are established the defendant “shall be presumed” to have the requisite guilty knowledge, the instruction given by the court told the jurors that *503 if they found the basic facts “then you shall presume that defendant bought or received such property knowing it to have been stolen unless from all the evidence you have reasonable doubt that defendants knew the property was stolen. ” (Italics added.) This concluding clause—not contained in the statute —could have been interpreted by the juro

1983(See fn. 10, ante.) Finally, whereas section 496, subdivision 2 provides simply that if the basic facts are established the defendant “shall be presumed” to have the requisite guilty knowledge, the instruction given by the court told the jurors that *503 if they found the basic facts “then you shall presume that defendant bought or received such property knowing it to have been stolen unless from all the evidence you have reasonable doubt that defendants knew the property was stolen. ” (Italics added.) This concluding clause—not contained in the statute —could have been interpreted by the juro