8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnellgreen2 sentences2019See Kothmann v. Cook, 113 S.W.3d 471 , 475–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (declining to apply res judicata, reasoning that “[b]ecause of the special and limited nature of the turnover proceeding, Kothmann would not have been entitled to raise those substantive claims against Cook had he attempted to do so”); see also Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 , 799 n.2 & 805 (Tex. 1994) (declining to apply issue preclusion to state-law claims, in part because a federal procedural requirement prevented the plaintiff from bringing its state-law claims in a prior federal suit). 2016In Sysco Food Services, Inc. v. Trapnell, a federal procedural requirement prevented the plaintiff from bringing its state law claims in federal court. 890 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex.1994). | 2 | 3 |
Martinez v. Ryangreen2 sentences2015Id. at 10 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). 2015Id. at 10 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Kothmann v. Cookgreen1 sentence2019See Kothmann v. Cook, 113 S.W.3d 471 , 475–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (declining to apply res judicata, reasoning that “[b]ecause of the special and limited nature of the turnover proceeding, Kothmann would not have been entitled to raise those substantive claims against Cook had he attempted to do so”); see also Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 , 799 n.2 & 805 (Tex. 1994) (declining to apply issue preclusion to state-law claims, in part because a federal procedural requirement prevented the plaintiff from bringing its state-law claims in a prior federal suit). | 1 | 1 |
McCleskey v. Zantgreen2 sentences2015In Schlup, the United States Supreme Court held that Schlup could assert a procedural form of “actual innocence” to overcome the procedural bar against raising subsequent habeas corpus claims in federal court.33 The Court made clear that Schlup’s “constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, . . . and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution, . . . denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.” 34 Schlup’s claim of actual innocence, the Court noted, was offered 2015In Schlup, the United States Supreme Court held that Schlup could assert a procedural form of “actual innocence” to overcome the procedural bar against raising subsequent habeas corpus claims in federal court.33 The Court made clear that Schlup’s “constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, . . . and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution, . . . denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.” 34 Schlup’s claim of actual innocence, the Court noted, was offered | 1 | 1 |
Schlup v. Delored2 sentences2015In Schlup, the United States Supreme Court held that Schlup could assert a procedural form of “actual innocence” to overcome the procedural bar against raising subsequent habeas corpus claims in federal court.33 The Court made clear that Schlup’s “constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, . . . and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution, . . . denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.” 34 Schlup’s claim of actual innocence, the Court noted, was offered 2015In Schlup, the United States Supreme Court held that Schlup could assert a procedural form of “actual innocence” to overcome the procedural bar against raising subsequent habeas corpus claims in federal court.33 The Court made clear that Schlup’s “constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, . . . and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution, . . . denied him the full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution.” 34 Schlup’s claim of actual innocence, the Court noted, was offered | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leland v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1980Therein, we cited Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), as holding that the federal procedural rule requiring the Government to affirmatively prove san *425 ity at the time of the offense was not of constitutional dimension and thus not mandatory on the states. 1980Therein, we cited Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), as holding that the federal procedural rule requiring the Government to affirmatively prove san *425 ity at the time of the offense was not of constitutional dimension and thus not mandatory on the states. | 2 | 1972–1980 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1972He now argues that, even in the absence of proper objections, the court’s charge deprived appellant of “effective assistance of counsel, a fair and impartial trial, due process of law, and equal protection of the law as guaranteed to him by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” His contention is that the Supreme Court of the United States in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970), made the federal procedural rule regarding proof of insanity a constitutional requirement under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 1972He now argues that, even in the absence of proper objections, the court’s charge deprived appellant of “effective assistance of counsel, a fair and impartial trial, due process of law, and equal protection of the law as guaranteed to him by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” His contention is that the Supreme Court of the United States in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970), made the federal procedural rule regarding proof of insanity a constitutional requirement under the due process clause of the Fourteenth | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.