7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2008(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 538 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 , 842 P.2d 1100 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 .) We have done so in recognition of the fact that the federal procedural rule is otherwise. 2008(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 538 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 , 842 P.2d 1100 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 .) We have done so in recognition of the fact that the federal procedural rule is otherwise. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2008(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 538 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 , 842 P.2d 1100 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 .) We have done so in recognition of the fact that the federal procedural rule is otherwise. 2008(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 538 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 , 842 P.2d 1100 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 .) We have done so in recognition of the fact that the federal procedural rule is otherwise. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Proctorgreen2 sentences2008(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 538 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 , 842 P.2d 1100 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 .) We have done so in recognition of the fact that the federal procedural rule is otherwise. 2008(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 538 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 , 842 P.2d 1100 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 .) We have done so in recognition of the fact that the federal procedural rule is otherwise. | 1 | 1 |
Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc.green2 sentences1995(Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d at p. 513 [relying on a long quotation from Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh *1519 Corp. (11th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 ].) The Manetti-Farrow court concluded, “. . . federal procedural issues raised by forum selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests”; thus the federal procedural rule, articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 513 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 ], would control the question of the enforcement of the forum selection clause. 1995(Manetti-Farrow, supra, 858 F.2d at p. 513 .) And what was the federal rule as articulated in The Bremen? | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burtongreen2 sentences1992Federal rules on timeliness of self-representation motions were rejected by our Supreme Court as “too rigid in circumscribing the discretion of the trial court.” (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 854 [ 771 P.2d 1270 ].) Tootick, Rucker and Crawford would not be followed for the same reason. 4 In the footnote, the Supreme Court expanded upon the same theme developed below; that justice might be better served in these cases by joinder rather than severance. 1992Federal rules on timeliness of self-representation motions were rejected by our Supreme Court as “too rigid in circumscribing the discretion of the trial court.” (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 854 [ 771 P.2d 1270 ].) Tootick, Rucker and Crawford would not be followed for the same reason. 4 In the footnote, the Supreme Court expanded upon the same theme developed below; that justice might be better served in these cases by joinder rather than severance. | 1 | 1 |
Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diegogreen2 sentences1992As our Supreme Court has noted, moreover, the “decisions of the lower federal courts on federal questions are merely persuasive. [Citations.]” (Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego (1959) 51 Cal.2d 759, 764 [ 336 P.2d 521 ]; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 780, p. 751.) The cited cases did not address the issues before us, but interpretation of a federal procedural rule, and thus are of limited value here. 1992As our Supreme Court has noted, moreover, the “decisions of the lower federal courts on federal questions are merely persuasive. [Citations.]” (Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego (1959) 51 Cal.2d 759, 764 [ 336 P.2d 521 ]; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 780, p. 751.) The cited cases did not address the issues before us, but interpretation of a federal procedural rule, and thus are of limited value here. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Howard
green
1 sentence2025(Id. at pp. 1536– 1537.) In his appellate brief, Baldridge focuses solely on the observation in Howard that the federal right to be present “for the commencement of trial arguably cannot be waived.” (Howard, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536 .) The Howard court made that observation because of Crosby, which discusses the federal procedural rule, not a constitutional right. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
cluster 782479
green
1 sentence2004(Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 .) Batzel notes, “California lawmakers wanted to protect speakers from the trial itself rather than merely from liability. ... [][].. . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
The Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation
green
1 sentence1995(Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d at p. 513 [relying on a long quotation from Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh *1519 Corp. (11th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 ].) The Manetti-Farrow court concluded, “. . . federal procedural issues raised by forum selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests”; thus the federal procedural rule, articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 513 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 ], would control the question of the enforcement of the forum selection clause. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
red
2 sentences1995(Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d at p. 513 [relying on a long quotation from Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh *1519 Corp. (11th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 ].) The Manetti-Farrow court concluded, “. . . federal procedural issues raised by forum selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests”; thus the federal procedural rule, articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 513 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 ], would control the question of the enforcement of the forum selection clause. 1995(Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d at p. 513 [relying on a long quotation from Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh *1519 Corp. (11th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 ].) The Manetti-Farrow court concluded, “. . . federal procedural issues raised by forum selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests”; thus the federal procedural rule, articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 513 , 92 S.Ct. 1907 ], would control the question of the enforcement of the forum selection clause. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Gilbert
green
2 sentences1973Several years after Roberts , however, we held that the "mere evidence" rule had been fashioned by the United States Supreme Court solely as a federal procedural rule. ( People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , *12 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that "the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California." ( Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as perm 1973(People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that “the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California.” (Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as permitting the plain view seizure of “suspicious objects,” without confining such seizures to stolen property or contraband. 10 In Gilbert eyewitnesses to a bank robbery saw stole | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. Thayer
green
2 sentences1973Several years after Roberts , however, we held that the "mere evidence" rule had been fashioned by the United States Supreme Court solely as a federal procedural rule. ( People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , *12 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that "the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California." ( Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as perm 1973Several years after Roberts , however, we held that the "mere evidence" rule had been fashioned by the United States Supreme Court solely as a federal procedural rule. ( People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , *12 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that "the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California." ( Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as perm | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Hawthorne v. United States
green
2 sentences1973Several years after Roberts , however, we held that the "mere evidence" rule had been fashioned by the United States Supreme Court solely as a federal procedural rule. ( People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , *12 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that "the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California." ( Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as perm 1973(People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that “the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California.” (Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as permitting the plain view seizure of “suspicious objects,” without confining such seizures to stolen property or contraband. 10 In Gilbert eyewitnesses to a bank robbery saw stole | 1 | 1973–1973 |
League of Women Voters of Grand Traverse Area of Michigan v. Smoot
green
2 sentences1973Several years after Roberts , however, we held that the "mere evidence" rule had been fashioned by the United States Supreme Court solely as a federal procedural rule. ( People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , *12 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that "the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California." ( Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as perm 1973(People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that “the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California.” (Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as permitting the plain view seizure of “suspicious objects,” without confining such seizures to stolen property or contraband. 10 In Gilbert eyewitnesses to a bank robbery saw stole | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Thayer v. California
green
2 sentences1973Several years after Roberts , however, we held that the "mere evidence" rule had been fashioned by the United States Supreme Court solely as a federal procedural rule. ( People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , *12 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that "the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California." ( Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as perm 1973(People v. Thayer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 635 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 408 P.2d 108 ], cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 1342 ].) Accordingly we declared that “the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard and has no application in California.” (Id., at p. 642.) The expansive effect of Thayer on Roberts was implicit in our decision in People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690 , where we read Roberts as permitting the plain view seizure of “suspicious objects,” without confining such seizures to stolen property or contraband. 10 In Gilbert eyewitnesses to a bank robbery saw stole | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Gaskins v. United States
green
2 sentences1971In Gaskins v. United States, supra, 265 A.2d 589, 590-592 , the court stated, "[C]onsiderations of equal protection of the laws permeate the entire criminal appellate process.... 1971In Gaskins v. United States, supra, 265 A.2d 589, 590-592 , the court stated, “[C]onsiderations of equal protection of the laws permeate the entire criminal appellate process. . . . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.