8 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brewer v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Brewer, 572 S.W.2d at 721 (questioning of witnesses at revocation of probation hearing by trial court, which maintained an impartial attitude throughout, for purpose of clarifying an issue before court, was permissible); Moore, 275 S.W.3d at 636-37 (trial court’s unobjected-to questions to fingerprint expert, called during punishment phase of arson trial to show that defendant was person previously convicted of felonies alleged in indictment, were not fundamental error; questions merely clarified whether the fingerprint analysis had a potential for misidentification, and did not deprive de 2010See Brewer , 572 S.W.2d at 721 (questioning of witnesses at revocation of probation hearing by trial court, which maintained an impartial attitude throughout, for purpose of clarifying an issue before court, was permissible); Moore , 275 S.W.3d at 636-37 (trial court’s unobjected-to questions to fingerprint expert, called during punishment phase of arson trial to show that defendant was person previously convicted of felonies alleged in indictment, were not fundamental error; questions merely clarified whether the fingerprint analysis had a potential for misidentification, and did not deprive | 2 | 2 |
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Brewer, 572 S.W.2d at 721 (questioning of witnesses at revocation of probation hearing by trial court, which maintained an impartial attitude throughout, for purpose of clarifying an issue before court, was permissible); Moore, 275 S.W.3d at 636-37 (trial court’s unobjected-to questions to fingerprint expert, called during punishment phase of arson trial to show that defendant was person previously convicted of felonies alleged in indictment, were not fundamental error; questions merely clarified whether the fingerprint analysis had a potential for misidentification, and did not deprive de 2010See Brewer , 572 S.W.2d at 721 (questioning of witnesses at revocation of probation hearing by trial court, which maintained an impartial attitude throughout, for purpose of clarifying an issue before court, was permissible); Moore , 275 S.W.3d at 636-37 (trial court’s unobjected-to questions to fingerprint expert, called during punishment phase of arson trial to show that defendant was person previously convicted of felonies alleged in indictment, were not fundamental error; questions merely clarified whether the fingerprint analysis had a potential for misidentification, and did not deprive | 2 | 2 |
Kelly v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Appellant’s trial counsel had questioned this expert on voir dire and objected to his testimony under Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Little v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Little, 991 S.W.2d at 865– 67 (holding State’s failure to inform defendant of fact that expert had lost graphical paperwork from defendant’s blood alcohol test until after expert testified, but before defendant cross-examined expert, did not constitute Brady violation because 13 defendant received information in time to put it to effective use at trial).5 The State introduced into evidence without objection the fingerprint analysis reporting that appellant’s fingerprints did not appear on the gun. | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Stategreen1 sentence1987Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy, Hamilton v. State, 699 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1985, pet. ref’d), but it is not a substitute for an appeal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holmes v. State
green
2 sentences2005Given the fact that fingerprint evidence is accepted as a matter of common knowledge, see Holmes , 135 S.W.3d at 189 , and given Pickell's testimony regarding the fingerprint analysis in this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the fingerprint testimony. 2005Given the fact that fingerprint evidence is accepted as a matter of common knowledge, see Holmes, 135 S.W.3d at 189 , and given Pickell’s testimony regarding the fingerprint analysis in this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the fingerprint testimony. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Mosley v. State
green
1 sentence2006This case is similar to Mosley in that (1) the trial court did not take any curative action and (2) the prosecutor continued with his remarks after the trial court overruled the defense’s objections, making further reference to the fingerprint defense as a “rabbit trail.” Nevertheless, we also conclude, as did the Mosley court, that the third factor, the certainty of conviction without the misconduct , “weighs heavily in favor of the State.” Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.