fingerprint analysis in New York

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014The plaintiffs further contention that the lead detective withheld the report from the grand jury and the Kings County District Attorney’s office (hereinafter the DA’s office) is purely speculative (see Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d at 676 ), and the record does not support his contention that the criminal investigation was conducted in a manner which deviated so egregiously from proper police procedure as to indicate intentional or reckless action by the lead detective (see Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1042-1043 [1980]; cf. Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 522-5

2014The plaintiffs further contention that the lead detective withheld the report from the grand jury and the Kings County District Attorney’s office (hereinafter the DA’s office) is purely speculative (see Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d at 676 ), and the record does not support his contention that the criminal investigation was conducted in a manner which deviated so egregiously from proper police procedure as to indicate intentional or reckless action by the lead detective (see Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1042-1043 [1980]; cf. Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 522-5

2014The plaintiffs further contention that the lead detective withheld the report from the grand jury and the Kings County District Attorney’s office (hereinafter the DA’s office) is purely speculative (see Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d at 676 ), and the record does not support his contention that the criminal investigation was conducted in a manner which deviated so egregiously from proper police procedure as to indicate intentional or reckless action by the lead detective (see Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1042-1043 [1980]; cf. Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 522-5

2014The plaintiffs further contention that the lead detective withheld the report from the grand jury and the Kings County District Attorney’s office (hereinafter the DA’s office) is purely speculative (see Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d at 676 ), and the record does not support his contention that the criminal investigation was conducted in a manner which deviated so egregiously from proper police procedure as to indicate intentional or reckless action by the lead detective (see Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1042-1043 [1980]; cf. Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 522-5

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him, but instead constituted “conflicting evidence uncovered in the course of the police investigation” that was “relevant to the issue of whether guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could have been proven at a criminal trial, not to the initial determination of the existence of probable cause” (Agront v City of New York, 294 AD2d 189, 190 [2002]; see Lewis v Caputo, 20 NY3d 906, 907 [2012]; Medina v City of New York, 102 AD3d 101, 107 [2012]; Carthens v City of New York, 168 AD2d 408 [1990]; cf. Kemp v Lynch,

2014The plaintiffs further contention that the lead detective withheld the report from the grand jury and the Kings County District Attorney’s office (hereinafter the DA’s office) is purely speculative (see Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d at 676 ), and the record does not support his contention that the criminal investigation was conducted in a manner which deviated so egregiously from proper police procedure as to indicate intentional or reckless action by the lead detective (see Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1042-1043 [1980]; cf. Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 522-5

2014The plaintiffs further contention that the lead detective withheld the report from the grand jury and the Kings County District Attorney’s office (hereinafter the DA’s office) is purely speculative (see Strange v County of Westchester, 29 AD3d at 676 ), and the record does not support his contention that the criminal investigation was conducted in a manner which deviated so egregiously from proper police procedure as to indicate intentional or reckless action by the lead detective (see Lee v City of Mount Vernon, 49 NY2d 1041, 1042-1043 [1980]; cf. Haynes v City of New York, 29 AD3d 521, 522-5

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2025The "failure of the police to find latent fingerprints on one of the plastic bags . . . was not exculpatory" ( People v Howard , 261 AD2d 841, 841 [4th Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1020 [1999]; see People v Woodrich , 212 AD2d 998 , 998 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 945 [1995]; cf. People v Dombrowski , 163 AD2d 873, 874 [4th Dept 1990]).

2016That the DNA report did not link plaintiff to the gun does not raise an issue of fact as to probable cause, even if it may have influenced the jury in finding that plaintiff's guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Williams v City of New York , 114 AD3d at 854 [City entitled to summary judgment dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action because the City showed that the suspect was indicted by a grand jury for the subject incident, thus creating a presumption of probable cause, and the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him]).

2016That the DNA report did not link plaintiff to the gun does not raise an issue of fact as to probable cause, even if it may have influenced the jury in finding that plaintiff’s guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see Williams v City of New York, 114 AD3d at 854 [City entitled to summary judgment dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action because the City showed that the suspect was indicted by a grand jury for the subject incident, thus creating a presumption of probable cause, and the fingerprint analysis report did not exonerate him]).

2009The absence of petitioner’s fingerprints on the scissors would be insufficient to defeat the inference of possession established by the fact that they were found in petitioner’s backpack (see Matter of Carter v Goord, 45 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2007]; Matter of Vaughn v Selsky, 276 AD2d 958 , 959 [2000], lv dismissed 96 NY2d 753 [2001]).