first two assignments error in Ohio

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2008The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different." State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 386 , *Page 8 1997-Ohio-52 .

2003State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 386 , 1997-Ohio-52 .

2025Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 51 Ohio St.3d 46 (1990).

2025Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 51 Ohio St.3d 46 (1990).

2025On appeal he raises the following assignments of error: [1.] The Appellant’s conviction for violation of a protection order was based on legally insufficient evidence. [2.] The Appellant’s conviction for violation of a protective order was against the manifest weight of the evidence[.] [3.] Appellant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. {¶14} The first two assignments of error will be considered jointly. {¶15} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises the issue of “whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” Sta

2025Thus, even allowing that the jury credited (at least parts of) Snodgrass’ testimony in acquitting him for Domestic Violence, his conviction for Violating a Protection Order does not constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. {¶21} The first two assignments of error are without merit. {¶22} In the third assignment of error, Snodgrass argues that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. {¶23} “To establish ineffective assistance, [a defendant] must show (1) that defense counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel’s performance fell below a

2025“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine [the court’s] confidence in the outcome.” (Citation omitted.) Id. {¶24} While acknowledging that counsel is presumed competent under Ohio law, State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-156 (1988), and that trial counsel’s efforts secured an acquittal on the felony Domestic Violence count, Snodgrass asserts counsel was ineffective with respect to Violating a Protection Order for failing to question him about what transpired at McDonald’s: “The jury needed to hear and trial counsel needed to firmly establish on direct examination

2023Summit No. 30246, 2023-Ohio-4629 .

2022Stennett claims that the sentence imposed on the underlying felony is reviewable under R.C. 2953.08(G) and paragraph 23 of State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio- 1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231 .

2022Geauga No. 2014–G–3188, 2014-Ohio-5468, ¶ 6 . {¶38} The first two assignments of error in appellant’s brief merely provide citations to authority without offering any argument or any citation to the record.

2022Franklin No. 08AP-627, 2009- Ohio-441, ¶ 12; Parker, 178 Ohio App.3d 574 , 2008-Ohio-5178 , 899 N.E.2d 183, at ¶ 21 . {¶ 71} Because Pelfrey’s motion failed to establish that his delay in filing was due to unavoidable delay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. {¶ 72} Based on the preceding discussion, the first two assignments of error are overruled.

2022Franklin No. 08AP-627, 2009- Ohio-441, ¶ 12; Parker, 178 Ohio App.3d 574 , 2008-Ohio-5178 , 899 N.E.2d 183, at ¶ 21 . {¶ 71} Because Pelfrey’s motion failed to establish that his delay in filing was due to unavoidable delay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. {¶ 72} Based on the preceding discussion, the first two assignments of error are overruled.

2020We disagree. 10 {¶30} “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Citation omitted.) Eastley, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , at ¶ 12.

2020We disagree. 10 {¶30} “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Citation omitted.) Eastley, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 , 2012-Ohio-2179 , 972 N.E.2d 517 , at ¶ 12.

2019State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347 , 2016-Ohio-5487 , 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 75 , citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). {¶ 8} It is well established that the trier of fact, whether in a civil or criminal matter, has the primary duty to decide what weight should be given to the testimony of any witness.

2019State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347 , 2016-Ohio-5487 , 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 75 , citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). {¶ 8} It is well established that the trier of fact, whether in a civil or criminal matter, has the primary duty to decide what weight should be given to the testimony of any witness.

2018In this regard, McDonald’s makes two primary points: (1) the BTA’s highest and best use conclusion was too narrow; and (2) the BTA ignored a nearly identical case that the Ohio Supreme Court decided last year (Rite Aid, 146 Ohio St.3d 173 , 2016-Ohio-371 , 54 N.E.3d 1177 ). {¶ 80} As to the first point, we have already considered the special-purpose exception during our discussion of the first two assignments of error.

2018In this regard, McDonald’s makes two primary points: (1) the BTA’s highest and best use conclusion was too narrow; and (2) the BTA ignored a nearly identical case that the Ohio Supreme Court decided last year (Rite Aid, 146 Ohio St.3d 173 , 2016-Ohio-371 , 54 N.E.3d 1177 ). {¶ 80} As to the first point, we have already considered the special-purpose exception during our discussion of the first two assignments of error.

2018In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective assistance of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , 74 O.O.2d 156 , 341 N.E.2d 304 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

2018In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective assistance of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , 74 O.O.2d 156 , 341 N.E.2d 304 , paragraph four of the syllabus.

2018In State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 , 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995), the Supreme Court of Ohio held, pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.” With respect to appellant's arguments that we have already addressed, we do not find multiple instances of harmless error triggering the cumulative error doctrine.

2018In State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 , 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995), the Supreme Court of Ohio held, pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.” With respect to appellant's arguments that we have already addressed, we do not find multiple instances of harmless error triggering the cumulative error doctrine.

2018State v. Hartman , 2016-Ohio-2883 , 64 N.E.3d 519 , ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). {¶ 60} We agree with the State that, given our resolution of the first two assignments of error, S.J.'s ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails; sufficient evidence supports a finding that S.J. was 14 years old when he raped C.T. for the second time, and the juvenile court accordingly did not err in classifying him as a JOR.

2018Summit No. 26900, 2013-Ohio-5785, ¶ 32 , citing Otten at 340 , where the evidence “weighs heavily against the conviction,” Thompkins at 387 . {¶27} Turner argues that “[i]n this case, the manifest weight of the evidence balances in favor of [Turner].” In his brief, Turner contends that, even though his motion to suppress was 12 not granted, “all of the identification testimony presented at trial was wholly without credibility.” Without pointing to any particular evidence in the record, Turner very briefly reiterates his argument from the first two assignments of error.

2017He argues that the trial court erred in doing so because the State failed to establish that it was surprised by her testimony. {¶ 16} “A ‘hostile witness’ is one who surprises the calling party at trial by turning against that party while testifying.” State v. Johnson, 2015-Ohio-5491 , 55 N.E.3d 648 , ¶ 33 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Darkenwald, 8th Dist.

2017Sixth Assignment of Error {¶50} In his sixth assignment of error, Holton argues that even if we did not find any single error in this case prejudicial, we should find the “cumulative errors” here prejudicial. {¶51} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[a]lthough violations of the Rules of Evidence during trial, singularly, may not rise to the level of prejudicial error, a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of the errors deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial.” State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191 (1987), at syllabus. {¶52} In this case, we have

2017Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc., 89 Ohio St.3d 169 , 729 N.E.2d 726 (2000), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2017Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc., 89 Ohio St.3d 169 , 729 N.E.2d 726 (2000), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2016Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.

2016Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2015Griggs was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 17 years. {¶36} Griggs timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error: {¶37} “[1.] The judge found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. {¶38} “[2.] The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. {¶39} “[3.] The Trial Court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence contrary to R.C. 2929.14 and the purposes and principles of the felony sentencing guidelines and erred by imposing consecutive sentences.” 8 {¶40} We will cons

2015Grainger, Inc. that Civ.R. 41(A) “does not allow for the dismissal of a portion of the claims against a certain defendant.” (Emphasis sic.) 120 Ohio St.3d 142 , 2008-Ohio-5276 , 897 N.E.2d 126, ¶ 18 .

2015Grainger, Inc. that Civ.R. 41(A) “does not allow for the dismissal of a portion of the claims against a certain defendant.” (Emphasis sic.) 120 Ohio St.3d 142 , 2008-Ohio-5276 , 897 N.E.2d 126, ¶ 18 .