59 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 2002–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Gehrisgreen2 sentences2016Gehris, 54 A.3d at 866 (OISA) (emphasis original). 2016Gehris, 54 A.3d at 866 (OISA) (emphasis original). | 3 | 4 |
Peugh v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020At the time he committed this crime, M.G. did not “‘have fair warning’ of the applicable law that now mandates his registration and the terms thereof.” T.S., 231 A.3d at 118 (quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544 (2013)). 2020At the time he committed this crime, L.S. did not “‘have fair warning’ of the applicable law that now mandates his registration and the terms thereof.” T.S., 231 A.3d at 118 (quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544 (2013)). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Gaffneygreen2 sentences2015Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, under the now-expired provisions of Megan’s Law, that lifetime registration requirements are not punitive but remedial in nature, and “[b]ecause we do not view the registration requirements as punitive but, rather, remedial, we do not perceive mandating compliance by offenders who have served their maximum term to be improper.” Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) and Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003). 2015Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, under the now-expired provisions of Megan’s Law, that lifetime registration requirements are not punitive but remedial in nature, and “[b]ecause we do not view the registration requirements as punitive but, rather, remedial, we do not perceive mandating compliance by offenders who have served their maximum term to be improper.” Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) and Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.red2 sentences2019Relying on Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), he challenges the application of a lifetime registration requirement, imposed pursuant to Megan’s Law II that was in effect when he entered a negotiated guilty plea in 2011 to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-Complainant Less than 16 years of Age (“IDSI”).1 Because Appellant’s Petition was untimely filed, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal. ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7). ____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 2019Crooks attempts to satisfy the timeliness exception of section 9545(b)(1)(iii), by arguing that the lifetime registration requirement imposed upon him pursuant to the Sexual Offenders Notification Act (SORNA) is unconstitutional under our Supreme Court's July 19, 2017 decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2016) (holding SORNA’s registration provisions are punitive and retroactive application of SORNA’s provisions violates ex post facto clause of Pennsylvania Constitution). | 1 | 12 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2014As to Appellant’s contention that the lifetime registration requirement is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for rape, this Court recently rejected a similar challenge, stating: [Appellant] relies upon Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003), to support his argument that requiring an individual to register for many years longer than the maximum penalty of the crime itself is excessive and the registration provisions should be struck down as unconstitutional punishment under the state and federal constitutions. 2003As such measures are manifestly in excess of what is needed to ensure compliance, they must be considered punitive, and thus, unconstitutional insofar as they purport to apply to ‘individuals subject to registration under section 9795.1(b)[ ](3),’ that is, sexually violent predators.” Williams, 574 Pa. 487 , 832 A.2d at 985 . (footnote omitted) The Williams court dismissed the attorney general’s argument that sexually violent predator status alone could not lead to a sentence of probation or imprisonment, but that conviction of an independent substantive offense is required — namely failure to | 1 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Bennergreen2 sentences2015For example, in Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa.Super.2004), this Court affirmed, on the merits of that appeal, the denial of a defendant’s “Motion for Hearing Regarding Megan’s Law Applicability” contesting the retroactive application of a lifetime registration requirement. 2015See Com. v. Benner, 853 A.2d 1068, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2004) (although Megan’s Law I was in effect on the dates of defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing, defendant was subject to the lifetime registration requirement of Megan’s Law II). | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Brickergreen2 sentences2019Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Prieto, ___ A.3d ___, 2019 PA Super 79 , *10-*11 (filed March 18, 2019); Commonwealth v. Martin, ___ A.3d ___, 2019 PA Super 69 , *6-*11 (filed March 7, 2019); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371, 376-77 (Pa. Super. 2018). 2019Martin, 205 A.3d at 1250 -52 (citing Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding SORNA’s registration requirements are not governed by the statutory maximum sentences set forth in Chapter 11 of the Crimes Code, and that a lifetime registration requirement authorized by SORNA does not constitute an illegal sentence); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super. 2018) (same)). -4- J-S22026-19 With respect to Appellant’s final claim, the Martin Court was unpersuaded by that defendant’s reliance on Apprendi. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Fleminggreen2 sentences2004The registration period under Megan’s Law II is lifetime registration. ¶ 8 This Court considered the applicability of the lifetime registration requirement under Megan’s Law II to an appellant who committed an offense prior to the effective date of Megan’s Law II in Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234 (Pa.Super.2002). 2004Cf. Fleming, 801 A.2d at 1240 (holding that “the mere fact that Megan’s Law II sets forth a lifetime registration requirement for individuals convicted of committing certain offenses which were subject to a ten-year registration requirement under Megan’s Law I does not effectuate such a change that the registration portion of the statute now has an objective purpose that is punitive.”) Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. ¶ 17 Judgment of sentence AFFIRMED. . 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125. . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Lilleygreen1 sentence2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Wolf, B.green1 sentence2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192 , 1198 (Pa. 2022) (“The question of whether the lifetime registration requirement of Revised Subchapter H is punitive in nature . . . currently remains open.”); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d 805, 813 (Pa. Super. 2022) (upholding Wolf’s registration requirements, despite his argument that Revised Subchapter H is punitive.). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leidiggreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Leidig, 956 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2008) (holding that the trial court’s failure to accurately advise the defendant of the duration of his registration period did not constitute grounds for post-sentence withdrawal of his plea, where the sex offender registration requirements were merely collateral consequences of his plea). - 10 - J-S25010-22 any issue concerning his competency, object to his competency to enter his plea, or “provide any medical opinion concerning his lack of capacity to enter a plea.” TCO at 10 (unnumbered). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of J.B.green1 sentence2023See also Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308 , 310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (observing that courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts pleaded in the petition for review, but also any documents or exhibits attached to it). 3 See Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II), Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (Act 10), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, as amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29 (Act 29). 4 Our Supreme Court held in In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 20 (Pa. 2014), that the lifetime registration requirement for sex offenders | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kellygreen2 sentences2021Rather, it was well within the court’s discretion to find that Osborne’s dislike of the lifetime registration requirement—a requirement he stated he knew at the time of sentencing—did not constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea. “[P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as sentencing-testing devices.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370, 377 (Pa.Super. 2010). 2021A defendant who files a post-sentence motion to withdraw “must demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny [the motion].” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fordgreen1 sentence2020Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations omitted). ____________________________________________ 4 We note that even though Carrigg phrases his claims in terms of the court’s imposition of lifetime registration under SORNA, we clarify that the court is required only to notify a defendant of registration requirements; the registration terms are authorized by the legislature. -3- J-S64028-19 Carrigg first argues his sentence is illegal because a lifetime registration requirement exceeds the statutory maximum penalty for the crimes of child pornography and cri | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Fostergreen1 sentence2020Megan’s Law II required L.S. to register for his lifetime because he was “incarcerated … on or after the effective date of this 7 At that time, Megan’s Law II was in effect, and it imposed a lifetime registration requirement upon L.S. 8 Summary relief, akin to a motion for summary judgment, is properly granted where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Foster, | 1 | 1 |
Jubelirer v. Rendellgreen1 sentence2020Subsequently, M.G. filed the instant application for summary relief.7 Therein, M.G. asserts that he is entitled to relief because the lifetime registration requirement set forth in subchapter I of SORNA II violates the prohibition against 6 M.G. also argues that SORNA II, as applied to him, violates the separation of powers doctrine, places him in double jeopardy, and is fundamentally unfair. 7 “An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania v. Commonwea | 1 | 1 |
Hospital & Healthsystem Ass'n v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020Subsequently, M.G. filed the instant application for summary relief.7 Therein, M.G. asserts that he is entitled to relief because the lifetime registration requirement set forth in subchapter I of SORNA II violates the prohibition against 6 M.G. also argues that SORNA II, as applied to him, violates the separation of powers doctrine, places him in double jeopardy, and is fundamentally unfair. 7 “An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania v. Commonwea | 1 | 1 |
| Weaver v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Northripgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wallsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Com. v. LNgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. MacIasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2024Did the trial court err by denying the post sentence motion where the lifetime registration requirement set forth in revised subchapter H of Sorna constituted an illegal sentence because it is punitive in nature and effectively extends [Photis]’s maximum sentence without a jury’s finding of future dangerousness in a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d. 435 (2000). 2024Did the trial court err by denying the post sentence motion where the lifetime registration requirement set forth in revised subchapter H of Sorna constituted an illegal sentence because it is punitive in nature and effectively extends [Photis]’s maximum sentence without a jury’s finding of future dangerousness in a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d. 435 (2000). | 3 | 2018–2024 |
Alleyne v. United States
green
2 sentences2023Appellant presents the following two issues for our review: 1) Whether the lifetime registration requirement set forth in Revised Subchapter H of SORNA constitutes an illegal sentence because it is punitive in nature and effectively extends Appellant’s maximum sentence without a jury’s finding of future dangerousness in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, [ 570 U.S. 99 (2013)?] 2) Whether SORNA’s Revised Subchapter H’s lifetime registration requirement constitutes an illegal sentence because it violates the federal constitutional prohibition 2019Appellant seemingly attempts to satisfy the timeliness exception of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) by arguing that the lifetime registration requirement imposed upon him pursuant to Megan’s Law II is unconstitutional under our Supreme Court decision in Muniz (holding that SORNA's registration provisions are punitive and that retroactive application of those provisions violates the federal ex post facto clause, as well as the ex post facto clause of Pennsylvania's Constitution) and that his designation as an SVP is unconstitutional under this Court’s subsequent decision in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 | 3 | 2018–2023 |
A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police
green
2 sentences2018In his petition, however, he contends that his term of mandated registration should be reduced pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2016). 2016J-S82015-16 a Tier III offender because he had “[t]wo or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16).3 On appeal, Dow argues the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. August 15, 2016), and A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. August 15, 2016), establish the trial court erred in classifying him as a Tier III offender and imposing a lifetime registration requirement. | 3 | 2016–2018 |
Smith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
green
2 sentences2017On October 20, 2016, the High Court vacated that decision, and remanded this matter for proceedings consistent with Lutz-Morrison, supra. In Lutz-Morrison, the Supreme Court considered the proper construction of language triggering the lifetime registration requirement contained in section 9799.14 of SORNA. 2016J-S82015-16 a Tier III offender because he had “[t]wo or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16).3 On appeal, Dow argues the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. August 15, 2016), and A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. August 15, 2016), establish the trial court erred in classifying him as a Tier III offender and imposing a lifetime registration requirement. | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Strafford
green
2 sentences2021Id. at 172 . 2019Martin, 205 A.3d at 1250 -52 (citing Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding SORNA’s registration requirements are not governed by the statutory maximum sentences set forth in Chapter 11 of the Crimes Code, and that a lifetime registration requirement authorized by SORNA does not constitute an illegal sentence); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super. 2018) (same)). -4- J-S22026-19 With respect to Appellant’s final claim, the Martin Court was unpersuaded by that defendant’s reliance on Apprendi. | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Commonwealth v. Merolla
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 345 . 2012Appellant’s post-sentence motion challenging the lifetime registration requirement was denied by the trial court. 5 The court relied upon Commonwealth v. Merolla, 909 A.2d 337 (Pa.Super.2006) for the position that a defendant convicted of more than one subsection (a) offense (in that case, indecent assault on different minor victims), even if the convictions occur at a single proceeding, is subject to the lifetime registration requirement because, unlike other sentencing schemes, Section 9795.1(b) does not distinguish between offenses that occur separately or sequentially and offenses that ari | 2 | 2012–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Partee
green
2 sentences2015Partee, 86 A.3d at 249 . 2015Routine Megan’s law notifications given during plea or sentencing hearings are not the product of negotiations with the Commonwealth. -7- J-A07007-15 In Partee, this Court found that Partee’s “negotiated plea agreement was structured so that he would only be subject to a ten-year rather than a lifetime reporting requirement,” as evidenced by the fact that “[t]he two charges carrying a lifetime registration requirement were withdrawn by the Commonwealth as part of the negotiations, leaving Appellant subject to the less onerous ten-year reporting requirement ….” Partee, 86 A.3d at 249 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Hainesworth
green
2 sentences2014The Commonwealth filed an Answer asserting that the Petition to Enforce must be treated as a Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),7 and that Stollenwerk was not entitled to collateral relief because the Petition to Enforce was not filed within the jurisdictional time limitations of the PCRA.8 Shortly thereafter, Stollenwerk’s counsel brought to Judge Machen’s attention this Court’s recently issued decision in Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). 2014Although an amendment to SORNA was enacted on March 14, 2014, the amended version retains the lifetime registration requirement. -3- J-A27039-14 Commonwealth filed an Answer asserting that the Petition to Enforce must be treated as a Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),7 and King was not entitled to collateral relief because the Petition to Enforce was not filed within the jurisdictional time limitations of the PCRA.8 In December 2013, King’s counsel filed a Supplement to the Petition to Enforce, bringing to Judge Nauhaus’s attention this Court’s recen | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Burgess v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILA. COUNTY
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Neiman
green
2 sentences2020Megan’s Law III was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). 6 Trooper Webb asserts that the lifetime registration requirement at the time of Petitioner’s relocation to Pennsylvania was pursuant to Megan’s Law III, which was the law in effect in 2007. 2020Megan’s Law III was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). 6 Trooper Webb asserts that the lifetime registration requirement at the time of Petitioner’s relocation to Pennsylvania was pursuant to Megan’s Law III, which was the law in effect in 2007. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Commonwealth v. Butler green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Pennsylvania v. Muniz
green
1 sentence2019He argues the registration requirement constitutes an impermissible ex post facto law under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions5 and violates the “reputation clause” of the Pennsylvania Constitution.6 Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018), Petitioner seeks relief to prevent enforcement of any registration requirement against him upon his release from incarceration. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Rose, S. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
1 sentence2019Martin, 205 A.3d at 1250 -52 (citing Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding SORNA’s registration requirements are not governed by the statutory maximum sentences set forth in Chapter 11 of the Crimes Code, and that a lifetime registration requirement authorized by SORNA does not constitute an illegal sentence); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super. 2018) (same)). -4- J-S22026-19 With respect to Appellant’s final claim, the Martin Court was unpersuaded by that defendant’s reliance on Apprendi. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Miller v. Florida
green
1 sentence2019The Court’s analysis stressed that “individuals are entitled to ‘fair warning’ about what constitutes criminal conduct, and what the punishments for that conduct entail.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1195 (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987); Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015)). “‘Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual’s right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.’” Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (19 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Weinar v. Lex green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Braxton v. Glazer green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Lomas, R. v. Kravitz, J., Pets green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Com. v. Gehris neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Anderson v. McAfoos neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov Inc. v. Pike County Board of Assessment Appeals neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Commonwealth v. Perry green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Coady v. Vaughn green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| California Department of Corrections v. Morales green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Miller green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.