20 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Hughesgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 315. [11] Like the defendant in Gonzalez, McVey argues that because he committed the offense in Count III before the amendment went into effect on July 1, 2001, Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of the lifetime-registration requirement to him. 7 McVey acknowledges that the charging information for Count III alleges that the offense occurred between October 1998 and August 2001, which includes a brief period when the amendment was effective; however, he points out that Count III is based entirely on his admission at trial that he let, J.H. masturbate him, w 2014As Seales, like Jensen, has available to him avenues of relief related to his future dangerousness “in relation to the alternative purpose assigned, protection of the public,” id. at 321 , we find the seventh factor weighs in favor of treating the lifetime registration requirement as non-punitive, and we therefore cannot say it was error for the trial court to deny Seales’ petition to be removed from the sex offender registry. | 5 | 7 |
Jensen v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Appellee's Br. 11-13. [17] Indeed, we are concerned mostly with the lifetime-registration requirement, as it is clear to us that the "lesser new obligations imposed by the [2007 Amendment] are not themselves punishment." Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 396 n. 1 (Sullivan, J., concurring in result). 2011Indeed, we are concerned mostly with the lifetime-registration requirement, as it is clear to us that the "lesser new obligations imposed by the [2007 Amendment] are not themselves punishment.” Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 396 n. 1 (Sullivan, J., concurring in result). | 2 | 5 |
Lemmon v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2013Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 811 . 2012See Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803 (discussing the 2007 amendment to SORA). | 2 | 4 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Ind.Code § 5-2-12-4(1)(C) (Supp.1997). [20] We note that a court may dismiss a petition filed under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(g). [21] Before our decision in Jensen , we wrote that the lifetime-registration requirement has "`penal implications.'" Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1289 n. 3 (quoting Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, abrogated in part by Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). 2011Before our decision in Jensen , we wrote that the lifetime-registration requirement has " 'penal implications.' ” Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1289 n. 3 (quoting Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, abrogated in part by Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). | 1 | 3 |
Kirby v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Whether or not such a belated change is an ex post facto violation, it is not part of a sentence.” Id. at 520-21 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Ind.Code § 5-2-12-4(1)(C) (Supp.1997). [20] We note that a court may dismiss a petition filed under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(g). [21] Before our decision in Jensen , we wrote that the lifetime-registration requirement has "`penal implications.'" Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1289 n. 3 (quoting Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, abrogated in part by Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). 2011Before our decision in Jensen , we wrote that the lifetime-registration requirement has " 'penal implications.' ” Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1289 n. 3 (quoting Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, abrogated in part by Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Compare Green v. State, No. C-090650, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3700 , 2010 WL 3610203 , 2010-Ohio-4371 , ¶¶ 6-10 (per curiam) (holding Bodyke does not apply where there was no prior court order classifying the offender), discretionary appeal granted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1531 , 2011-Ohio-376 , 940 N.E.2d 985 , with Speight v. State, Nos. 96041, 96042, 96043, 96044, 96045, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2467 , 2011 WL 2436606 , 2011-Ohio-2933, ¶¶ 21-22 (disagreeing with Green and applying Bodyke to cases where classification was determined by operation of law). [23] Under Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(j), offende | 1 | 1 |
Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd.green1 sentence2011Compare Green v. State, No. C-090650, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3700 , 2010 WL 3610203 , 2010-Ohio-4371 , ¶¶ 6-10 (per curiam) (holding Bodyke does not apply where there was no prior court order classifying the offender), discretionary appeal granted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1531 , 2011-Ohio-376 , 940 N.E.2d 985 , with Speight v. State, Nos. 96041, 96042, 96043, 96044, 96045, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2467 , 2011 WL 2436606 , 2011-Ohio-2933, ¶¶ 21-22 (disagreeing with Green and applying Bodyke to cases where classification was determined by operation of law). [23] Under Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(j), offende | 1 | 1 |
Speight v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Compare Green v. State, No. C-090650, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3700 , 2010 WL 3610203 , 2010-Ohio-4371 , ¶¶ 6-10 (per curiam) (holding Bodyke does not apply where there was no prior court order classifying the offender), discretionary appeal granted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1531 , 2011-Ohio-376 , 940 N.E.2d 985 , with Speight v. State, Nos. 96041, 96042, 96043, 96044, 96045, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2467 , 2011 WL 2436606 , 2011-Ohio-2933, ¶¶ 21-22 (disagreeing with Green and applying Bodyke to cases where classification was determined by operation of law). [23] Under Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(j), offende | 1 | 1 |
Wallace v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (concluding that statute governing sex offender registration requirements was not impermissible ex post facto law), trans. granted; Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (holding that amendment to Registry statute was not ex post facto law as applied to sex offender), trans. not sought; Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (relying on ex post facto considerations in reversing sexually violent predator determination insofar as it requires defendant to register for life), trans. denied; Jensen v. St | 1 | 1 |
Goldsberry v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); but see Spencer v. O’Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. 9 *410 In keeping with the tenor of the Golds-berry decision, we hold that imposition of a lifetime registration requirement runs afoul of ex post facto considerations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spencer v. O'CONNORgreen1 sentence2007See Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); but see Spencer v. O’Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. 9 *410 In keeping with the tenor of the Golds-berry decision, we hold that imposition of a lifetime registration requirement runs afoul of ex post facto considerations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nichols v. State
green
2 sentences2018The State argued the registration decision, "like decisions on prison placement, is within the discretion of the DOC and courts have no role in such decisions." Id. at 1016-17 . 2015Id. at 1016 . | 2 | 2015–2018 |
State of Indiana v. Terry J. Hough
green
2 sentences2015He argues that Wallace , as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in State v. Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans, de-nied Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied; Burton, supra. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and .that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s, argument suggests: that a conviction date for a crime committed outside Indiana and prior to t 2015He argues that Wallace, as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A04-1506-MI-591 | December 11, 2015 Page 4 of 11 he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in Hough v. State, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Burton, supra. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s ar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thomas H. Andrews v. State of Indiana
green
2 sentences2015He argues that Wallace , as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in State v. Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans, de-nied Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied; Burton, supra. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and .that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s, argument suggests: that a conviction date for a crime committed outside Indiana and prior to t 2015He argues that Wallace, as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A04-1506-MI-591 | December 11, 2015 Page 4 of 11 he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in Hough v. State, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Burton, supra. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s ar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jerome Michael Burton v. State of Indiana
green
2 sentences2015He argues that Wallace , as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in State v. Hough, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans, de-nied Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied; Burton, supra. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and .that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s, argument suggests: that a conviction date for a crime committed outside Indiana and prior to t 2015He argues that Wallace, as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A04-1506-MI-591 | December 11, 2015 Page 4 of 11 he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in Hough v. State, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Burton, supra. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s ar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2011Ind.Code § 5-2-12-4(1)(C) (Supp.1997). [20] We note that a court may dismiss a petition filed under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(g). [21] Before our decision in Jensen , we wrote that the lifetime-registration requirement has "`penal implications.'" Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1289 n. 3 (quoting Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, abrogated in part by Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). 2011Before our decision in Jensen , we wrote that the lifetime-registration requirement has " 'penal implications.' ” Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1289 n. 3 (quoting Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, abrogated in part by Williams v. State, 895 N.E.2d 377, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Douglas v. State
green
1 sentence2008See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (concluding that statute governing sex offender registration requirements was not impermissible ex post facto law), trans. granted; Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (holding that amendment to Registry statute was not ex post facto law as applied to sex offender), trans. not sought; Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (relying on ex post facto considerations in reversing sexually violent predator determination insofar as it requires defendant to register for life), trans. denied; Jensen v. St | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Jensen v. State
green
1 sentence2008See, e.g., Wallace v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (concluding that statute governing sex offender registration requirements was not impermissible ex post facto law), trans. granted; Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (holding that amendment to Registry statute was not ex post facto law as applied to sex offender), trans. not sought; Thompson v. State, 875 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (relying on ex post facto considerations in reversing sexually violent predator determination insofar as it requires defendant to register for life), trans. denied; Jensen v. St | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.