lifetime registration requirement in California

2012In denying plaintiff’s petition for relief from the registration requirement, the trial court agreed that People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ] (Hofsheier) had invalidated the mandatory application of the registration requirement for the violation of section 288a, subdivision (b)(1), but despite uncontradicted evidence that plaintiff is unlikely to reoffend, exercised its discretion to impose a lifetime registration requirement under section 290.006. 3 In the trial court and in his opening brief on appeal, plaintiff’s principal contention was that the

2012In denying plaintiff’s petition for relief from the registration requirement, the trial court agreed that People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ] (Hofsheier) had invalidated the mandatory application of the registration requirement for the violation of section 288a, subdivision (b)(1), but despite uncontradicted evidence that plaintiff is unlikely to reoffend, exercised its discretion to impose a lifetime registration requirement under section 290.006. 3 In the trial court and in his opening brief on appeal, plaintiff’s principal contention was that the

2015(In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1263 .) Proposition 83 added subdivision (b) to section 3003.5, which sets forth restrictions on where certain sex offenders subject to the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 may reside.

2015(In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258, 1263 .) Among other things, Proposition 83 amended section 3003.5, a statute setting forth restrictions on where certain sex offenders subject to the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 may reside.

2014(People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116 .) Even so, the concurring opinion in Tuck observes: “Persons convicted of violating section 288.7 apparently are not excluded from those entitled to seek a certificate of rehabilitation, although persons convicted of violating both section 288.7 and section 269 are excluded. (§ 3000.1, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (a)(2) of section 3000.1 provides that “in the case of any inmate sentenced to a life term under . . . sections 269 and 288.7, [or other enumerated crimes], the period of parole, if parole is granted, shall be the remainder of the

2014(People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116 .) Even so, the concurring opinion in Tuck observes: “Persons convicted of violating section 288.7 apparently are not excluded from those entitled to seek a certificate of rehabilitation, although persons convicted of violating both section 288.7 and section 269 are excluded. (§ 3000.1, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (a)(2) of section 3000.1 provides that “in the case of any inmate sentenced to a life term under . . . sections 269 and 288.7, [or other enumerated crimes], the period of parole, if parole is granted, shall be the remainder of the

2023On appeal, McKenzie raises issues regarding the trial court’s failure to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor. (§ 17, subd. (b); In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 (Williamson).) He also challenges the imposition of sex offender registration, claiming that the lifetime registration requirement violates his constitutional rights to equal protection of the law.

2023On appeal, McKenzie raises issues regarding the trial court’s failure to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor. (§ 17, subd. (b); In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 (Williamson).) He also challenges the imposition of sex offender registration, claiming that the lifetime registration requirement violates his constitutional rights to equal protection of the law.

2013(See Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342 [court accepts People's concession, without deciding the issue, that defendant is not subject to mandatory registration requirement]; In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 911 .) Accordingly, we need not reach the issues of whether the statutory residency restriction applies by operation of law to sex offender registrants who are probationers rather than parolees; whether the residency restriction lasts a lifetime as an adjunct of the lifetime registration requirement; nor whether the statutory residency restriction (outside of the parole cont

2012Tuck quotes People v. Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at page 344 , for the proposition that “there is no constitutional bar to having a judge exercise his or her discretion to determine whether [a defendant] should continue to be subject to registration.” This quote is taken entirely out of context.

2010The majority opinion reaches this conclusion purportedly by examining the "plain language" of section 3003.5(b) under which, it says, "any convicted sex offender already subject to the lifetime registration requirement who is released from custody on parole, whether it be after serving a term in custody for an initial sex offense conviction, a new sex offense conviction, or a new nonsex offense conviction, becomes subject to the new mandatory residency restrictions for the duration of his term." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1272.) Citing People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ,

2010The majority opinion reaches this conclusion purportedly by examining the "plain language" of section 3003.5(b) under which, it says, "any convicted sex offender already subject to the lifetime registration requirement who is released from custody on parole, whether it be after serving a term in custody for an initial sex offense conviction, a new sex offense conviction, or a new nonsex offense conviction, becomes subject to the new mandatory residency restrictions for the duration of his term." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1272.) Citing People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295 ,

2004"Given the `"frightening and high"' danger of long-term recidivism by *387 this class of offenders [citations], the permanent nature of the registration obligation also is designed to serve legitimate regulatory aims." ( Id. at p. 289, 14 Cal. Rptr.3d 811 , 92 P.3d 311 .) Finally, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Reed . ( Id. at p. 292, 191 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 .) Therefore, the appellate division's order must be reversed.

2004"Given the `"frightening and high"' danger of long-term recidivism by *387 this class of offenders [citations], the permanent nature of the registration obligation also is designed to serve legitimate regulatory aims." ( Id. at p. 289, 14 Cal. Rptr.3d 811 , 92 P.3d 311 .) Finally, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Reed . ( Id. at p. 292, 191 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 .) Therefore, the appellate division's order must be reversed.

2025A “trial court’s omission, at the change of plea hearing, of advice regarding [a] defendant’s statutory obligation to register” does “not transform the court’s error into a term of the parties’ plea agreement.” (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 379 .) And because “ ‘[a] plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound’ ” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701 ), we will not modify Victorian’s conviction to a lesser charge under section 1260.

2025Effective January 1, 2021, section 290 1 SARATSO denotes “State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders.” (§ 290.04, subd. (a)(1).) Beginning on January 1, 2007, the SARATSO for adult male registrants has been the Static-99 risk assessment scale. (§ 290.04, subd. (b)(1).) “‘The Static-99R is a revised version of the Static-99 that takes into account the age of a sexual offender based on statistics showing the risk of sexual reoffense decreases as the offender ages.’” (People v. LaBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059 , 1067–1068, fn. 6.) 5 was restructured to provide for three tiers of r

2016(People v. Zeigler, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 667-668.) Appellant’s rape conviction was not just any crime, “but one whose statistically significant odds of recidivism moved the Legislature to impose the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 on the theory that ‘sex offenders pose a “continuing threat to society” [citation] and require constant vigilance.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Blocker, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 445 .) Appellant committed the rape while on parole and, like the prior convictions (all sexual assaults in Virginia), used a ruse to isolate a young woman and used

2016(People v. Zeigler, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 667-668.) Appellant’s rape conviction was not just any crime, “but one whose statistically significant odds of recidivism moved the Legislature to impose the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 on the theory that ‘sex offenders pose a “continuing threat to society” [citation] and require constant vigilance.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Blocker, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 445 .) Appellant committed the rape while on parole and, like the prior convictions (all sexual assaults in Virginia), used a ruse to isolate a young woman and used

2014(See, e.g., McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Although defendant alleges that had he properly been advised, he would not have entered his plea of guilty, there is nothing in the record on appeal to support this contention”]; In re Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353.) Nothing in this record shows that defendant was prejudiced. 13 To the contrary, the registration requirement is automatic, and therefore defendant had no negotiating power with respect to it.

2014Franklin also submitted a number of declarations from 4 advisement of the lifetime nature of the registration requirement suffices to distinguish this case from our opinion in People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 , upon which Franklin relies.

2013(See Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342 [court accepts People's concession, without deciding the issue, that defendant is not subject to mandatory registration requirement]; In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 911 .) Accordingly, we need not reach the issues of whether the statutory residency restriction applies by operation of law to sex offender registrants who are probationers rather than parolees; whether the residency restriction lasts a lifetime as an adjunct of the lifetime registration requirement; nor whether the statutory residency restriction (outside of the parole cont

2013Accordingly, we construe the judgment as not imposing the statutory residency restriction and affirm. 1 Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 . 2 BACKGROUND A. Sex Offender Registration Requirements and Residency Restrictions The Penal Code allows for the imposition of a lifetime registration requirement on sex offenders.

2010(See In re Personal Restraint of Dyer, supra, 189 P.3d 759, 773 ; State v. Wood, supra, 668 S.W.2d 172, 175 .) This was not any crime, but one whose statistically significant odds of recidivism moved the Legislature to impose the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 on the theory that “sex offenders pose a ‘continuing threat to society’ [citation] and require constant vigilance.” (Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 , 936 P.2d 101 ] and decisions cited.) 4 Granting Blocker’s petition would release him from that obligation. (§ 290.007; Barrows v.

2010(See In re Personal Restraint of Dyer, supra, 189 P.3d 759, 773 ; State v. Wood, supra, 668 S.W.2d 172, 175 .) This was not any crime, but one whose statistically significant odds of recidivism moved the Legislature to impose the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 on the theory that “sex offenders pose a ‘continuing threat to society’ [citation] and require constant vigilance.” (Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 , 936 P.2d 101 ] and decisions cited.) 4 Granting Blocker’s petition would release him from that obligation. (§ 290.007; Barrows v.

2010(See In re Personal Restraint of Dyer, supra, 189 P.3d 759, 773 ; State v. Wood, supra, 668 S.W.2d 172, 175 .) This was not any crime, but one whose statistically significant odds of recidivism moved the Legislature to impose the lifetime registration requirement of section 290 on the theory that “sex offenders pose a ‘continuing threat to society’ [citation] and require constant vigilance.” (Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 , 936 P.2d 101 ] and decisions cited.) 4 Granting Blocker’s petition would release him from that obligation. (§ 290.007; Barrows v.